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Taking War Seriously 
A MODEL FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON 
THE USE OF FORCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Craig Martin† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A universal and perpetual peace, it is to be feared, is in the catalogue 
of events, which will never exist but in the imaginations of visionary 
philosophers, or in the breasts of benevolent enthusiasts. It is still 
however true, that war contains so much folly, as well as wickedness, 
that much is to be hoped from the progress of reason; and if any thing 
is be hoped, every thing ought to be tried.1 
War. Few phenomena have caused as much human 
pain, suffering, and death through the ages than the organized 
armed conflict between tribes, realms, peoples, nations, and 
nation-states. And unlike natural disasters, this misery is of 
course attributable entirely to people and the systems we have 
created. We have struggled with the problem of trying to limit 
war from almost as far back as the beginning of recorded 
history. We have come up with theories about the causes of 
war, and we have developed legal systems to both constrain the 
recourse to war (jus ad bellum) and govern the conduct of 
  
 † Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. This 
article is an abridged and revised version of one segment of a dissertation for an S.J.D. 
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to thank the members of my 
committee, Eric Feldman, Bill Burke-White, and Tom Ginsburg for all their invaluable 
assistance and guidance in my work on the dissertation. There are many other people 
who have provided help in various ways at different stages of the development of this 
part of the project, and in particular I would like to thank Anita Allen, Eyal Benvenisti, 
Lois Chiang, Sujit Choudhry, Benson Cowan, Michael Doyle, Diane Desierto, Karen 
Knop, Mattias Kumm, Brian Langille, Gideon Parchomovsky, Deborah Pearlstein, and 
Fernando Téson. I also had the benefit of presenting, and obtaining feedback on, 
various versions of the article, and would like to thank in particular Claire Finkelstein 
for the invitation to present it at the Foundations of International Law Conference at 
the University of Pennsylvania, and the editors of the Brooklyn Law Review for the 
opportunity to present it as part of their author spotlight series. Many thanks also to 
colleagues who provided invaluable feedback at workshops at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School and the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
 1 James Madison, Universal Peace, NAT’L GAZETTE (Phila.), Feb. 2, 1792. 
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hostilities when armed forces clash (jus in bello).2 In the 
twentieth century we developed an international legal 
framework for the central purpose of promoting greater peace 
and security in the world.3 This, combined with the spread of 
constitutional democracy, and the observation that democracies 
virtually never wage war among themselves, has bolstered the 
once unlikely idea that we might achieve a more sustained 
peace in the world.4 Yet, despite these developments the world 
remains wracked by the scourge of war, and liberal 
democracies themselves continue to wage war. And 
notwithstanding the horrors and costs that attend this human 
practice, recourse to war is subject to less legal constraint than 
most other forms of collective activity.  
This study, in the spirit of James Madison’s plea that 
we ought to try everything to reduce the incidence of war, 
advances an argument for how liberal democracies might 
develop more effective legal constraints on the recourse to war. 
More specifically, it develops a constitutional model (the 
“Model”)5 for improved control over the decision to use armed 
force, with the aims of enhancing compliance with the 
international law regime governing the recourse to war, and of 
engaging the core functions of democratic institutions for the 
purposes of making the domestic decision-making process less 
prone to the failures that can lead to irrational or illegitimate 
use of force. It does so based on the well-established 
understanding that the causes of war are to be found not only 
in the structure and operation of the international system, but 
also at the domestic level, in both the structure of states and in 
  
 2 The laws of war are separated into two quite separate regimes. The first, 
jus ad bellum, comprises the laws that govern the resort to war or initiation of the use 
of armed force—when a state can legally go to war. The second, jus in bello (now often 
referred to as the laws of international armed conflict, or international humanitarian 
law), comprises the laws that govern the conduct of armed forces in the course of armed 
conflict—how armed forces may legitimately wage war. These two regimes are distinct, 
such that a state may commence an illegal war but its forces may nonetheless conduct 
themselves legally throughout the war. Conversely, the forces of a state may commence 
fighting for legitimate reasons but engage in acts that are in violation of the jus in 
bello. 
 3 The central purpose of the United Nations system is the maintenance of 
peace and security. U.N. Charter art. 1. For a discussion of the historical development 
of the modern jus ad bellum system, see infra Part III.C. 
 4 An idea developed most famously by Kant in the eighteenth century: 
IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795), reprinted in 
KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 93 (H.S. Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbett trans., 2d ed. 1991). The 
ideas of Kant in Perpetual Peace are discussed infra Parts II.B-C. 
 5 See infra Part V. 
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the systematic failures in the decision-making process of both 
individuals and small-groups. If the causes of war operate at 
both the domestic and the international level, it follows that 
the legal constraints designed to limit the use of force should 
engage those causes at both levels.  
The Model also builds on the insight that until the end of 
the eighteenth century there was a clearer understanding that 
legal limits had to operate at both the international and 
domestic levels; and the observation that in the spread and 
development of constitutional democracy over the last half-
century, there has been a tendency to ignore the need for 
domestic legal constraints on war and overlook the relationship 
between the domestic and the international systems when it 
comes to governing armed conflict. Few democracies have 
constitutional controls over the decision to use force that 
effectively constrain unilateral executive authority, and fewer 
still have any constitutional incorporation of international law 
principles on the use of force. What is more, this failure to 
implement the international law on the use of force within 
domestic legal systems is anomalous, in stark contrast to the 
increasing trend towards domestic implementation of other 
international law regimes, from human rights to international 
trade and intellectual property rights. 
The Model is designed to achieve its objectives through 
the operation of three separate but mutually reinforcing 
elements—three aspects of a constitutional provision. The first 
is a process-based constitutional incorporation of the prevailing 
principles of international law that limit the use of armed force 
(that is, the principles of the jus ad bellum regime). It is 
process-based in the sense that it only requires decision makers 
to sufficiently and demonstrably consider the legality of 
proposed action under the international law principles, in 
contrast to a substantive incorporation model which would 
oblige decision makers to comply with those provisions. This 
aspect of the Model does aim to increase compliance with the 
international law directly, though it will do so in part by also 
engaging domestic causes of war. The second element is a 
provision that requires legislative approval of decisions to use 
armed force rising above a specified de minimis level, thereby 
increasing the separation of powers with respect to the crucial 
decision to engage in armed conflict. This element would bring 
the key functions of representative parliaments to bear on that 
decision-making process, not only engaging the domestic causes 
of war, but reinforcing the traction of the first element in 
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enhancing compliance with international law. The third 
element establishes jurisdiction and standing for a limited 
power of judicial review over the decision-making process, to 
extend the separation of powers to the third branch of 
government, and to help ensure greater adherence to the 
overall process. All three elements of the Model are designed to 
engage, in a mutually reinforcing manner, the causes of war 
that operate at all three levels, within the international system 
and the domestic structures and institutions of states. 
The case for this Model is made by employing a range of 
perspectives on the causes of war from international relations 
theory and political philosophy, a review of the historical 
development of legal constraints on war, international law 
compliance theory, and constitutional law ideas about the 
operation of constitutions, the rule of law, and the role of 
legislatures and the judiciary in democratic states. The article 
thus engages current debates in a range of areas, including 
international law and the use of force, constitutional war 
powers, the effectiveness of constitutions in times of 
emergency, and the role of courts in national security issues. 
The article advances the argument that liberal democracies 
ought to develop constitutional constraints on the decision to 
engage in armed conflict in order to better comply with 
international law, and to improve the level of democratic 
accountability and deliberation in the constitutional process of 
deciding on the use of force. Ultimately, the Model aims to 
extend the reach of the “democratic peace,”6 and reduce the 
incidence of illegitimate armed conflict.7 For while going to war 
is one of the most important decisions a government can make, 
and preventing war is the most central purpose of our 
international law regime, liberal democracies have few 
constitutional controls on the decision to engage in armed 
conflict, and have made almost no use of their domestic legal 
systems to implement and reinforce the international law 
regime. If liberal democracies are to take war seriously, or 
more precisely, if they are to take the constraint of war 
  
 6  The “democratic peace” is the term used to refer to the theory in 
international relations that democracies do not wage war among themselves. See infra 
Parts II.B-C. 
 7  The term “illegitimate” is used here deliberately to capture both (1) uses of 
force in violation of established principles of international law and (2) decisions to use 
force that involve deception of the public or some other characteristic that could be 
construed as running counter to democratic accountability and the fundamental 
features of deliberative democracy. 
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seriously,8 then they must begin to develop the legal systems 
necessary to engage the recognized causes of war, bringing the 
powerful advantages of democratic institutions to bear on the 
issue just as they have done in so many other realms. 
Part II of this article examines the current theories on 
the causes of war. It explains how the causes of war are 
understood to operate at the level of the individual, the 
structure of the state, and the international system, and argues 
that the causes at all three levels thus have to be considered in 
any attempt to reduce the prevalence of war. Part III provides 
a brief review of the modern development of the law and legal 
thinking on controlling the resort to war. This examination 
suggests that historically there was some understanding of the 
need for legal limits to engage the causes of war at all three 
levels, but in the last century we have come to rely almost 
exclusively on the international law system to control the 
recourse to war, and have ignored domestic mechanisms for 
limiting the use of armed force. 
Part IV of the article sets out the theoretical support for 
the development of the Model, explaining how elements of 
different theories of international law compliance, 
constitutional law, and democratic theory ground the argument 
that the proposed elements of the Model would operate to 
better engage the causes of war at all three levels, and thus 
reduce the incidence of illegitimate armed conflict. Finally, 
Part V provides draft language for the three elements of the 
Model, explaining how they would operate in practice, and—
drawing upon the experiences of other nations—why certain 
choices were made in their design.  
It should also be noted at the outset that while the 
analysis in this study draws upon the American experience and 
addresses aspects of the U.S. “war powers” debate, it is not a 
proposal for amendment to the U.S. Constitution. While a 
constitutional amendment might be unrealistic any time soon 
in the U.S., there are several other countries—Japan, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and Spain, to name just a few—in 
which there have been serious steps taken towards altering the 
legal control over the decision to use armed force. Several are 
contemplating either constitutional amendments or new 
legislative regimes, and even the U.S. has had a formal 
  
 8  To borrow a concept from RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
204 (1977); see also infra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing the concept in 
more detail). 
616 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
commission examining ways to resolve some of the war powers 
issues.9 This study seeks to address such developments in 
liberal democracies broadly construed, and to contribute to the 
deliberations wherever there is serious consideration of 
enhancing the domestic legal constraints on the use of armed 
force. 
II. THE CAUSES OF WAR 
In beginning to think about how to improve the legal 
constraints on the resort to war, it is essential to consider the 
causes of international armed conflict.10 The question of what 
causes war is the subject of a massive amount of research and 
debate, stretching back literally thousands of years.11 The focus 
of the various theories on the causes of war range from the 
individual decision makers, through small-group dynamics, the 
structure of the state itself, all the way to the structure and 
operation of the international system of states.12 Thucydides, 
whose analysis of the Peloponnesian War is one of the earliest 
studies of the subject known to us, set the stage with a complex 
explanation for the causes of that war that included the 
individual attributes of decision makers, the nature and 
structure of the leading city-states, and the nature of the 
interstate system itself.13 Kenneth Waltz continues this 
classification by defining the three levels as “Images”: the 
individual or human level (“Image I”), the level of the state 
structure or organization (“Image II”), and the level of the 
international system (“Image III”).14 And despite the differing 
theories, disagreements, and areas of emphasis, there is a 
widely shared acceptance that all three Images play a role in 
explaining the causes of war, albeit to varying degrees 
  
 9  These developments are explored infra Part III.D. 
 10 Ryan Goodman, International Institution and the Mechanisms of War, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 507, 507 (2005) [hereinafter Goodman, International Institution] (review 
essay of John Norton Moore, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace). 
 11 Thucydides, who produced one of the first known analyses of the issue, 
wrote History of the Peloponnesian War in the waning years of the fifth century BCE. 
See M.I. Finley, Introduction to THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 9 
(Rex Warner trans., rev. ed. 1972).  
 12 For a good survey of the entire field, see GREG CASHMAN, WHAT CAUSES 
WAR? AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1993). 
 13 THUCYDIDES, supra note 11; see also MICHAEL DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND 
PEACE 49-53 (1997) (offering an excellent account of Thucydides’ “complex realism,” in 
the context of a comparative analysis of the varying approaches to war). 
 14 KENNETH WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (2001). 
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depending on one’s theoretical perspective.15 While it is not 
necessary for us to examine the various theories in detail, it will 
be helpful to get a flavor for some of the more important ideas as 
they relate to each of the three Images, as I will refer back to 
these ideas to support the argument for the proposed Model. 
A. Image I—The Level of the Individual 
There are a wide variety of theories, and indeed a 
number of different sublevels within the Image I—the 
individual level—perspective on the causes of war. Some of 
these focus on aspects such as human nature itself and the 
inherent aggression of man.16 But the theories that relate to 
both the psychology of decision makers, and a number of 
systemic problems in small-group decision making are of 
greatest significance for the argument being advanced here. 
Beginning with individual psychology, one set of theories focus 
on the personality traits that are common among those who 
tend to reach the highest offices of government as factors that 
contribute to unsound judgments regarding the use of armed 
force. Empirical studies suggest that a number of traits that 
tend to be overrepresented in national leaders—such as 
authoritarian and domineering tendencies, introversion (which 
is perhaps counter-intuitive, but Hitler and Nixon are both 
prime examples of this trait), narcissism, and high-risk 
tolerance—also tend to correlate with much higher levels of 
confrontation and the use of force to resolve conflicts.17 
Psychological theories also focus on problems of 
misperception. There is powerful evidence that people are 
prone to systematic patterns of misperception, and that such 
misperception in government leaders contributes significantly 
to irrational decisions.18 In particular, decision makers 
frequently form strong hypotheses regarding the intentions 
  
 15 See, e.g., id.; DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13. 
 16 CASHMAN, supra note 12, at chs. 2-3; WALTZ, supra note 14, at ch. 2. 
 17 CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 40-42; see also Lloyd Etheredge, Personality 
Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 434 (1978). 
 18 Jervis’s Perception and Misperception in International Politics is the seminal 
and fascinating study of this phenomenon, which focuses on a cognitive theoretical 
explanation of misperception. ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1976). Janis and Mann’s Decision Making provides a different 
approach that focuses on motivational factors in explaining misperception, particularly 
within conflict situations. IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT (1977). For a 
discussion of the differences, see CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 70-73.  
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and capabilities of potential adversaries, and there is a strong 
tendency to then dismiss or discount information that is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis, and to interpret ambiguous 
information in a manner that is consistent with and reinforces 
the hypothesis.19 Such misperception often constitutes a 
significant factor in the path to war.20  
Another set of theories that relate to the Image I causes 
of war focus not on the individual alone, but on how decisions 
are made within groups and organizations. Contrary to the 
expectation that government agencies generally operate in 
accordance with rational choice theory, studies suggest that 
group decision making is often characterized by dynamics that 
can lead to irrational and suboptimal decisions. One such 
characteristic is excessive “incrementalism” and “satisfycing”—
the tendency to make small incremental policy shifts, coupled 
with the sequential analysis of options and adoption of the first 
acceptable alternative, a process captured in the aphorism “the 
good is the enemy of the best.”21 A second theory suggests that 
the dynamic of competing bureaucratic and departmental 
interests—interests which are often inconsistent with the 
larger national interest, but which nonetheless command 
greater loyalty and mobilize greater effort among department 
or division members—subvert the decision-making process.22 
Moreover, each department will itself approach the decision 
making within the constraints of its own perspectives and 
mindsets, standard operating procedures, and capabilities. This 
is the famous “where you stand is where you sit” explanation of 
internal government politics,23 often referred to as the 
  
 19 JERVIS, supra note 18, at chs. 4-5, 7.  
 20 See generally id. ch. 3 (analysis of the effects of misperception in the 
context of spiral theory and deterrence). 
 21 CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 79-81. Herbert Simon earned the Nobel Prize in 
economics for this insight. It should be noted that from some perspectives, 
incrementalism and satisfycing are indeed rational approaches to decision making 
generally, since the cost, time, and effort of exhaustive examination of all options and 
thorough cost-benefit analysis of each would be prohibitive and often counterproductive. 
Id. at 81. But it will also frequently lead to dangerously suboptimal decisions, and, in 
foreign policy, incremental policy shifts tend to feed into the misperception problems of 
one’s counterparts. See JERVIS, supra note 18, at 77-78, 191-92.  
 22 The seminal work on this model is Allison and Zelikow’s Essence of 
Decision. GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE 
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1999). See, in particular, chapter 5. For a short version of 
his original argument, see Graham T. Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, 63 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 689 (1969); see also MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS & FOREIGN POLICY (1974). 
 23 Rufus E. Miles, The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 38 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 399, 399 (1978).  
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“bureaucratic politics model.”24 For example, the senior 
representatives of the U.S. Air Force, with obviously vested 
interests, strongly argued in favor of the continued strategic 
bombing of North Vietnam in 1967, even though the Secretary 
of Defense and others in the Nixon administration had 
determined that it was at best pointless and at worst 
counterproductive.25  
Finally, there is the phenomenon known as 
“groupthink.”26 This theory suggests that some decision-making 
groups—particularly those characterized by a strong leader, 
considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfidence, 
and a shared world view or value system—suffer from a 
deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis 
during the decision-making process.27 Decision-making groups 
that suffer from groupthink are particularly vulnerable to the 
kind of systemic misperception discussed above, but they suffer 
from other weaknesses as well, all stemming from a failure to 
challenge received wisdom, consider alternate perspectives, or 
bring to bear exogenous criteria or modalities in assessing 
policy options.28 
These theories do not, of course, explain all of the 
problems in decision making in all situations. Groupthink and 
the bureaucratic politics model generally do not operate at the 
same time in the same groups. But the studies of each of these 
phenomena suggest that these systemic patterns can be a 
significant factor in the less-than-rational and suboptimal 
decision making about the use of armed force. And these 
theories together show the importance of introducing 
exogenous criteria for assessing the merit of competing policy 
options, and the kinds of checks and balances that might lessen 
the probability that these tendencies could affect the decision 
to go to war. 
  
 24 ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 22. Originally, Allison had formulated two 
separate models, the “organizational behavior model” and the “governmental politics 
model,” but later combined them in the “bureaucratic politics model.” See Graham T. 
Allison & Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications, in THEORY AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Raymond Tanter 
& Richard H. Ullman eds., 1972). 
 25 BARBRA W. TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY: FROM TROY TO VIETNAM 345 
(1984). 
 26 The foundational study on groupthink is Janis’s Groupthink. IRVING L. JANIS, 
GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982). 
 27 Id. 
 28 CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 112-20; JANIS, supra note 26. In particular, see 
id. at ch. 8 for discussion of theoretical implications of groupthink. 
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B. Image II—The Level of the State  
The causes of war also operate at the level of the state 
itself. Again, there is an extensive range of theoretical 
explanations for the causes of war that focus on factors at the 
state level, but those that are central to Image II relate to the 
actual structure or form of the government of the state.29 The 
essential idea is that some forms of government are inherently 
less prone to wage war than others. This idea has been central 
to liberal theories of the state and international relations since 
the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the argument 
that liberal democratic states are less inclined to initiate wars 
than autocratic or other nondemocratic states. These 
arguments were founded upon a number of strands of liberal 
political theory, including the nature of individual rights 
within democracies and the manner in which respect for such 
rights would influence how the state would behave within the 
international society.30 They also drew upon liberal ideas about 
the influence of capitalist economies, arguing that laissez-faire 
capitalist systems would operate to reduce the incentives for 
war in liberal democratic states.31 But perhaps the most 
important argument among these liberal claims, is that the 
very structure of government, both in terms of its leaders being 
representative of and directly accountable to an electorate, and 
the separation of political power between the executive and a 
more broadly representative legislature, would operate to 
reduce the likelihood that such governments would embark on 
military adventures.32 
Rousseau and Madison both wrote about the 
ramifications of the democratic structure of the state on the 
propensity for war.33 But it was Immanuel Kant who developed 
the argument most fully in the eighteenth century with his 
  
 29 See CASHMAN, supra note 12, at ch. 5 for a review of these other theories.  
 30 See generally DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 6. 
 31 These arguments were founded upon the ideas of John Locke, Jeremy 
Bentham, Adam Smith, and, later, Joseph Schumpeter, respectively. See DOYLE, WAYS 
OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at chs. 6-7. 
 32 KANT, supra note 4; Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1. This 
argument is discussed in greater detail infra Parts III-IV. 
 33 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 251-60 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) [hereinafter FEDERALIST NO. 41 (Madison)]; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, STATE OF 
WAR (1756), reprinted in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 162-77 (Victor Gourevitch ed., 1997); Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 
1. For an analysis, see DOYLE, THE WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 4. 
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short work Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.34 Writing 
at a time when there were less than a handful of fledgling 
democratic “republics” in the world,35 Kant argued that a 
perpetual peace would result from the spread of the republican 
form of government among the nations of the world and the 
development of a form of pacific federation among these free 
states.36 His argument thus straddled the second and third 
images, and I will return to discuss his overall theory more 
fully below when we turn to consider Image III. But one of his 
arguments for why republics would be inherently less likely to 
wage war is still very much at the heart of current liberal 
theories relating to Image II. His point was that, in the kind of 
republic he envisioned, the consent of citizens would be 
required for decisions to go to war. Those who would “call[] 
down on themselves all the miseries of war,” not only fighting 
and dying in the conflict but also paying for it and suffering the 
resulting debt, would be much less likely to agree to such an 
adventure than the heads of state in other kinds of political 
systems such as monarchies, who can “decide on war, without 
any significant reason.”37  
As we will see, Kant himself did not argue that the 
development of democratic structures within any given state 
would be sufficient to prevent it from going to war, and his 
theory of perpetual peace also rested on the requirement that 
the republican form of government be also spread throughout 
the international system. Indeed, one of the problems with 
liberal theories that rely upon governmental structure as an 
explanation for the cause of war is that the extensive empirical 
research and analysis on the subject suggest that liberal 
democracies are almost as prone to engaging in war as 
nondemocratic states, at least as against nondemocratic 
countries.38 Some have tried to argue that liberal democracies 
nonetheless do not initiate wars to the same degree, and thus 
  
 34 KANT, supra note 4. 
 35 By “republican” he meant a representative form of government in which 
there is a separation of powers between the executive and the legislature. Depending 
on how precisely one defines “republic,” at the time the U.S. and France were generally 
considered republics, and the Netherlands also fit most definitions. Less clear was 
Poland. See George Athan Billias, American Constitutionalism and Europe, 1776-1848, 
in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD 21-26 (George Athan Billias ed., 1990).  
 36 KANT, supra note 4, at 100-01. 
 37 Id. at 100. 
 38 The most exhaustive empirical study of the incidence of wars is the so-
called Correlates of War Project. See J. DAVID SINGER & MELVIN SMALL, RESORT TO 
ARMS: INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WARS, 1816-1980 (1982). 
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are inherently less aggressive than other forms of government, 
but even that claim is very difficult to sustain from the 
perspective of traditional international law conceptions of 
aggression and self-defense.39  
What has emerged from this line of research, however, is 
the widely accepted proposition that liberal democracies do not 
commence wars against other liberal democracies. The so-called 
“democratic peace” encompasses both this empirical fact and the 
principle said to explain it.40 While there remains some residual 
debate over the validity of the principle,41 persuasive evidence 
suggests that, with the possible exception of two instances of 
armed conflict between what might be considered democratic 
states, there have been no wars between liberal democracies 
during the period between 1816 and 1965.42 The assertion has 
been made, and often cited, that the democratic peace is close to 
being an empirical law in international relations.43 
There is less agreement over the best explanation for 
the democratic peace. There are two main theoretical positions: 
(1) normative and cultural explanations, and (2) institutional 
and structural constraints.44 The normative-cultural 
explanations argue that the shared norms of democracies, and 
particularly the shared adherence to the rule of law and 
commitment to peaceful dispute resolution internally, inform 
and influence the approach of democratic governments to 
  
 39 See, for example, JOHN NORTON MOORE, SOLVING THE WAR PUZZLE: 
BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (2004), and the critique of this argument by Ryan 
Goodman in Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 508; see also 
MELVIN SMALL & J. DAVID SINGER, INTERNATIONAL WAR: AN ANTHOLOGY VI (2d ed. 
1989). For a discussion of this in the context of constitutional control of the decision to 
use force, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANS’L L. 449, 454-60 (1998). 
 40 The literature on the democratic peace is huge. See generally 4 R.J. 
RUMMEL, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR (1979); BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE 
DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993).  
 41 See, for example, DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E. Brown et 
al. eds., 1996), particularly Part II for the essays criticizing the democratic peace theories. 
 42 CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 129 (citing R.J. Rummel, Libertarianism and 
International Violence, 27 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 27, 40-47 (1983); Melvin Small & J. 
David Singer, The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1965, 1 JERUSALEM J. 
INT’L REL. 50, 67 (1976)). 
 43 CASHMAN, supra note 12, at 129 (citing Jack S. Levy, Domestic Politics and 
War, in THE ORIGIN AND PREVENTION OF MAJOR WARS 88 (R. Rothberg & T. Rabb eds., 
1988)); Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 507 (citing Jack S. Levy, 
The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 139, 160 (1998)); 
see also Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, 12 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 205, 213, 224 (1983). 
 44 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 
1979); Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, supra note 39, at 456. 
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resolving disputes that may arise as between democracies. 
Moreover, there is a shared respect for the rights of other 
people who live in a similar system of self-government. These 
shared beliefs, norms and expectations tip the cost-benefit 
analysis toward peaceful resolution of disputes when they arise 
as among democracies.45  
The structural-institutional advocates argue that the 
elements of the liberal democratic legal and political system 
operate to constrain the government from commencing armed 
conflicts. This is entirely in line with the insights of earlier 
writers such as Madison, Kant, and Cobden, regarding the 
lower likelihood of war when representatives of those who will 
pay and die for the war are deciding, since it is more politically 
risky for democratic leaders to gamble the blood and treasure 
of the nation in war unless it is clearly viewed by the public as 
being necessary.46 The arguments are also based in part on the 
broader idea that structural checks and balances typical of 
democratic systems, and the operation of certain other 
institutional features of deliberative democracy, will reduce the 
incidence of war.47 We will return to some of these arguments in 
more detail below. 
The initial insight in this structural argument was 
based in part on the understanding that there would be a 
significant separation of powers on the decision to go to war in 
liberal democracies, which, as will be discussed below, has not 
materialized fully in the practice of most modern democracies. 
Nonetheless, it continues to be argued that the greater 
accountability for decisions and the higher political risk 
domestically of initiating war, makes democratic leaders less 
likely to wage war.48 While these mechanisms do not seem 
  
 45 Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, Normative and Structural Causes of 
Democratic Peace, 1946-1986, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 624, 625 (1993); see also HENKIN, 
HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 44, at 60-68; Damrosch, Use of Force and 
Constitutionalism, supra note 39, at 456; Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign 
Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43, at 230 (explaining how this is an aspect of the second 
definitive article in Kant’s Pacific Union). 
 46 See generally FEDERALIST NO. 41 (Madison), supra note 33; KANT, supra 
note 4; Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1. On Richard Cobden, see generally 2 
RICHARD COBDEN, SPEECHES ON QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (John Bright & J.E. 
Thorold Rogers eds., 1908), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com 
_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=931&Itemid=27. 
 47 Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1; see also infra Parts III-IV. 
 48 See generally, e.g., Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, supra 
note 39, at 456-57; Maoz & Russett, supra note 45; John R. Oneal et al., The Liberal 
Peace: Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict, 1950-85, 33 J. PEACE 
RES. 11 (1996). A recent work suggests that democratic governments will only initiate 
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sufficient to have prevented democracies from initiating wars 
as against nondemocratic states, they are understood to be part 
of the explanation for the democratic peace. One reason for this 
is that these mechanisms tend to effectively signal information 
to the democracy on the other side, preventing the escalation of 
disputes with other democracies, while such signals may be 
misunderstood or missed entirely by nondemocratic states.49  
These structural reasons are of course not mutually 
exclusive of the normative-cultural explanations for the 
democratic peace. Michael Doyle has argued that Kant’s theories 
provide insight into why liberal democracies might be less 
peaceful in their relations with nondemocratic states. Part of 
Kant’s theory relied upon the operation of the law of nations, 
which in his view would facilitate peace because it would require 
a degree of respect for and accommodation of the peoples of other 
republics who are similarly self-governing, enjoy the same rights, 
and thus share a comparable world view.50 Doyle argued that in 
their approach to nondemocratic counterparts, on the other hand, 
the behavior of liberal democracies is characterized by what 
Hume called an “imprudent vehemence.”51 The rights and 
interests of illiberal states and their people are excessively 
discounted, and conflicts tend to take on an ideological flavor that 
can escalate into crusades. In dealing with strong illiberal states, 
this translates into systemic failures to negotiate and missed 
opportunities for accommodation, while with weaker illiberal 
states it can manifest itself in military interventions and 
imperialistic policies.52 These failures flow from an inherent 
mistrust and suspicion of the governments of illiberal states, the 
more limited commercial and cultural intercourse with them, and 
the lack of any sense of shared values at all levels of interaction 
  
wars when there is a substantial probability of winning, or, put another way, the cost-
benefit analysis is weighted heavily in favor of the benefits. DAN REITER & ALLAN C. 
STAM, DEMOCRACIES AT WAR ch. 2 (2002). It is argued that this is the reason that 
democracies tend to “win” most of the wars that they initiate. Id. 
 49 Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, supra note 39, at 456-57. 
For a detailed analysis of the signaling value of democratic institutions, albeit in the 
context of a war-powers argument against legislative involvement in the decision to use 
force, see Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2512 (2006). 
 50 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43, 
at 230. For an explanation of the actual structure of Kant’s theory, and the three 
definitive articles, see infra text accompanying notes 79-83. 
 51 Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2, 12 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 324 (1983) (citing David Hume, Of the Balance of Power, in 
ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 346-47 (Oxford Univ. Press 1963)). 
 52 Id. at 324. 
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between the liberal democracies and the illiberal states. 
Moreover, these tendencies are exacerbated by the vulnerabilities 
of liberal democratic government to pressure from special interest 
groups internally, which can tend to fan the flames of conflict 
when mistrust and suspicion is running high.53 
These explanations are borne out by more recent 
research, grounded in social identity theory in psychology. One 
model, referred to as the “identification model,” validates the 
insight that the propensity of states to initiate armed conflict 
depends to a significant degree on the content of the relations 
between the states, and the extent to which the government 
and people of the initiating state can “identify” with those of 
the counterpart with which a dispute has arisen.54 Moreover, 
there is a tendency to ascribe malicious intent to “outsiders” 
(non-democracies), and conversely to interpret the actions of 
other democracies in a favorable fashion.55  
A second model, referred to here as the “emulation model,” 
suggests that the tendency to go to war is influenced in part by 
the extent to which important states within the international 
system have institutionalized and legitimized the use of force in 
particular circumstances.56 The examples these states provide 
tend to create norms that over time become internalized within 
other states, encouraging more aggressive behavior when similar 
circumstances arise, even to the point of acting in a manner that 
is objectively inconsistent with the functional and strategic 
imperatives of the situation.57 It is analogous to how the 
individual employment of violence to defend “honor” has been 
historically normalized in some macho cultures.58  
These two explanations are complementary, and both 
help explain why democracies are more peaceful in their 
  
 53 Id. at 326. 
 54 Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 510-11 (citing 
Margaret G. Herann & Charles W. Kegley Jr., Rethinking Democracy and International 
Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology, 39 INT’L STUD. Q. 511, 515-17 (1995)). 
 55 Id. at 510. Goodman notes that there is empirical evidence that this 
tendency is common to all states, in that autocracies will “identify” with other 
autocracies, and that conflict among like states is lower generally. Id. at 511. Doyle has 
argued that, while this is true to some extent, the empirical evidence demonstrates 
that the effect is far stronger among democracies. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and 
Foreign Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43, at 222.  
 56 Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 511-12 (citing JOHN 
A. VASQUEZ, THE WAR PUZZLE 161 (1993)). 
 57 Id. at 511; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory 
of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1765-80 (2003).  
 58 Goodman, International Institution, supra note 10, at 511.  
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relations among themselves but not necessarily in their 
relations with illiberal regimes. These explanations dovetail 
with the older cultural-normative arguments, which center on 
the influence of such democratic institutions as the rule of law, 
and on the identification of people in democracies with those in 
other states with similar values and systems. And these new 
explanations help to further reconcile the broader debate over 
the issue of which explanation for the democratic peace—the 
structural-institutional or the normative-cultural—is the most 
accurate; for it is likely that they are both valid to varying 
degrees in any particular circumstance, and that they operate 
together in a mutually-reinforcing manner. And both have 
implications for constitutional models aspiring to develop 
increased institutional constraints on the use of armed force. 
There is something of a dilemma created by this 
difference in the propensity of democracies to wage war, 
depending upon the nature of its counterparty in any given 
circumstance, such that they can be quite aggressive in their 
relations with illiberal states. This is because some of the 
characteristics that tend to make democracies more prone to 
use force in their relations with illiberal states are also the 
very characteristics of liberal democracy that give rise to the 
democratic peace.59 So how does one address the causes of war 
with illiberal states without also undermining factors that 
contribute to the democratic peace? I will refer to this as the 
“Kantian dilemma,” and it will be an important consideration 
in this study of how best to design a constitutional model to 
constrain the use of force. For the dilemma requires the 
development of mechanisms that will operate to address the 
factors that give rise to the “imprudent vehemence” that 
facilitates war with illiberal states, while at the same time 
ensuring that the mechanisms do not undermine or weaken the 
  
 59 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43, 
at 235, in particular identifies this as the key challenge in trying to reduce democratic 
tendencies to wage war. The characteristics that help explain the democratic peace, but 
which may be factors in the tendency to engage in war with illiberal states, include (1) 
the extent to which popular perceptions regarding the political systems and 
fundamental values of potential adversaries influence foreign policy, resulting in 
respect for and identification with the rights of other democratic peoples, but suspicion, 
mistrust, and discounting of the rights of those governed by authoritarian regimes; and 
(2) structurally, the manner in which the formation of foreign policy is vulnerable to 
undue influence by special interests. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign 
Affairs, Part 2, supra note 51, at 324-27. These ideas also tie in nicely with the liberal 
theories of international law compliance, discussed infra Part IV. 
2011] TAKING WAR SERIOUSLY 627 
very features of liberal democracy that operate to produce the 
democratic peace.60 
C. Image III—The Level of the International System 
Turning to the last level, that of the international 
system itself, there is again a wide range of theories about the 
causes of war that focus on the nature and operation of the 
international system.61 Of the relevant theories, the proposition 
that the permissiveness of the international system is a 
primary cause of war is the most significant, and is central to 
our analysis here. It is this explanation that is at the heart of 
Waltz’ Image III causes of war. 
The Image III explanations focus on the anarchical 
structure of the international system of states as the primary 
explanation for armed conflict between states.62 The emphasis 
on the nature of the interstate system goes back as far as 
Thucydides, who argued that one of the central reasons for the 
Peloponnesian War was the dynamics of—and responses to—
shifting power among the city-states.63 In the modern era, 
Thomas Hobbes provided the most influential argument for the 
idea that the anarchy within the interstate system is key to 
understanding the reasons for armed conflict.64 As is well 
known, Hobbes argued that man in the state of nature is in a 
perpetual state of fear and insecurity, not knowing who to trust 
and therefore, quite rationally, trusting no one and treating all 
as potential enemies. The state of nature is thus a state of war 
of all against all. And while man in civil society has been able 
to escape from this state of nature by surrendering some 
sovereignty to a central authority, a Leviathan with a 
  
 60 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2, supra note 51, 
at 344 (“[T]he goal of concerned liberals must be to reduce the harmful impact of the 
dilemmas without undermining the successes.”). 
 61 Some of these theories are not germane to the argument here, for instance, 
focus on long-term economic cycles and other systemic explanations that are not 
susceptible to law and policy prescriptions. See CASHMAN, supra note 12, at ch. 9. 
 62  WALTZ, supra note 14, at ch. 6. 
 63 THUCYDIDES, supra note 11. Michael Doyle described Thucydides as a 
“complex realist” for contemplating causes in all three images. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR 
AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 1. 
 64 See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin 
Classics 1985) (1651).  
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monopoly over the legitimate use of force to impose law and 
order upon society, the same is not true of states.65 
According to the Hobbesian view, states similarly exist in 
a state of nature, but they have not emerged into any form of 
civil society, and there is no Leviathan to impose law and order 
upon the system.66 Thus, the anarchical system of states 
continues to be in a perpetual state of war of all against all—not 
in the sense of a continuous and perpetual armed conflict of 
course, but in the sense of perpetual enmity and tension that can 
at any moment blossom into open hostilities.67 Fear and self-
preservation govern the rational behavior of states, each of 
which confronts a profound security dilemma. In a system 
characterized by anarchy and comprised of fearful states that 
are entirely reliant upon their own use of force for their survival, 
the occurrence of armed conflict is virtually inevitable.68 Given 
these assumptions, a rational approach to international 
relations requires one to focus on the capabilities of states rather 
than professed intentions, and the internal dynamics of states 
are seen as being much less significant than the external 
pressures and security dilemmas created by the international 
system itself. This conceptualization of the international system 
had a profound impact on thinking within political philosophy 
and international relations, and it continues to be one of the 
foundational ideas in modern realist international relations 
theory, a school to which such influential modern scholars and 
practitioners as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry 
Kissinger subscribed.69 
A somewhat more attenuated view of the nature of the 
international system is advanced by what some refer to as the 
“liberal realist” school, or the British school of international 
relations. Hedley Bull, one of the most important advocates for 
this perspective, himself calls it the “Grotian” or 
“internationalist” idea of international relations.70 This 
  
 65 Id. There is a massive literature on Hobbes, but for the analysis of Hobbes 
in the context of the development of legal thinking about war, I have relied upon 
Doyle’s Ways of War and Peace, supra note 13, at ch. 3, and Tuck’s The Rights of War 
and Peace. RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 4 (1999). 
 66 DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at 116-17. 
 67 Id. at 114. 
 68 Id. at 114-17, 128. 
 69 See, e.g., GEORGE F. KENNAN, REALITIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1966); 
HENRY A. KISSINGER, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (expanded ed. 1974); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, 
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973). 
 70 HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 23 (2d ed. 1995).  
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perspective accepts the Hobbesian idea that the international 
system is characterized by a certain degree of anarchy. But 
rather than complete anarchy, in which there is perpetual 
conflict and a total absence of what Hobbes called “sociability,” 
Bull argues that there is a society of states within this 
somewhat anarchical system. This “anarchical society” is 
characterized by a certain degree of order, in which the 
conflicts between states are limited and governed by certain 
rules and institutions.71  
International law is the source of many of these rules 
and is one of the fundamental institutions which functions to 
create order. In contrast to some realists who dismiss entirely 
the effectiveness of international law, or question whether it is 
really law properly so called,72 the liberal-realist perspective 
accepts that international law operates most fundamentally to 
give shape to the system itself. In particular, it does so as the 
source of the concept of the sovereign state, which is the 
primary constitutive principle of world politics. But it also 
provides the corpus of rules of coexistence for those sovereign 
states within the anarchical society, and it helps to mobilize 
compliance with those rules. The problem, according to this 
school of thought, is that while it is generally recognized that 
there is a very substantial degree of conformity with 
international law generally, that compliance is not necessarily 
motivated by respect for the law or because international law 
exercises a powerful force over state action.73 When state 
interest diverges from compliance, particularly on issues 
relating to national security and self-preservation, 
international law is not always by itself capable of restraining 
state action.74 Thus, in this respect, the internationalist school 
shares to some degree the Hobbesian realist view that the 
permissiveness of the international system constitutes one of 
the causes of war.  
  
 71 Id. at 25. 
 72 See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that the behavior of states in international society 
is a function of self-interest, and that international law does not shape such behavior 
as much as it merely reflects and results from coordination and cooperation aspects of 
state interaction); MORGENTHAU, supra note 69, at ch. 18 (arguing that while 
international law exists, and plays a role in international relations, it is largely and 
necessarily decentralized, which makes it ineffective as enforceable law); see also 
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 44, at Introduction, ch. 1 (discussing the 
realist skepticism towards international law). 
 73 BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY, supra note 70, at 135.  
 74 Id. at 137. 
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Moreover, Bull argues that war itself continues to be one 
of the institutions that operates within the international society 
to maintain order. He concedes that this function is much 
attenuated relative to its role up to the end of the nineteenth 
century, largely due to the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
the dynamic of balance of power politics.75 Nonetheless, the 
internationalist perspective emphasizes that war has two 
aspects: first, as a manifestation of disorder and a threat to the 
continued structure of the society, for which reason international 
society seeks to restrain it and keep it within the bounds of 
limiting rules; and second, as a means by which the 
international society sometimes enforces international law.76 
This point will be returned to in both the discussion of the 
history of the laws of war and in the examination of the modern 
system, but it may be noted that collective security operations as 
authorized by the U.N. Security Council constitute the use of 
force for the purposes of imposing peace and security, and 
enforcing international law norms. 
Turning to the liberal view of the causes of war at the 
international level, it was mentioned earlier that Kant’s own 
theory on perpetual peace straddled Image II and Image III, but 
was rooted primarily in the latter.77 The establishment of a 
constitutional republican system at the domestic level was 
necessary, but not sufficient. Kant also accepted the Hobbsesian 
idea of states being in a perpetual state of war, and he thus 
argued that the state of peace must be formally instituted 
through the development of a form of federal system among 
republics.78 This federal system would be founded on a multi-level 
constitutional order, involving three kinds of rights operating on 
both the domestic and the international levels. These three rights 
were given form in three “definitive articles” of the perpetual 
peace, which have been described as “articles in a metaphorical 
‘treaty’” that would be the foundation of the federation.79 
The first article related to the “rights of man,” the 
protection of which required the embrace of the republican 
form of constitutional government at the domestic level, which 
  
 75  Id. at 181-83, 187-88. 
 76 Id. at 181-83. 
 77 DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 8. 
 78 KANT, supra note 4, at 98, 102. In this sense, some have argued that Kant 
was very much in the humanist school. See, e.g., TUCK, supra note 65, at 207-08. 
 79 Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1, supra note 43, at 225. 
For Kant’s articulation of the three definitive articles, see KANT, supra note 4, at 99-108. 
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we discussed above in the Image II analysis. The second 
definitive article related to the “right of nations,” which 
required the creation of a federation of free states in which 
these rights could be adequately secured without recourse to 
war.80 The idea was that while states existing in the state of 
nature would typically seek to enforce their rights by war, this 
could be avoided by binding states in a federation and thereby 
protecting their rights, just as the rights of man were secured 
by entry into the constitutional order of the republican form of 
government.81 Finally, the third definitive article similarly 
related to the international level, but required that a 
“cosmopolitan right” be enforced through the requirement that 
foreigners be accepted without hostility, thereby facilitating 
interstate relations and commercial relationships.82 The 
underlying idea here was that increased interconnection and 
the development of bonds of various kinds between states 
would operate to further constrain the tendency towards 
conflict, an idea that was more systematically developed by the 
liberal economic theorist Adam Smith and his followers.83  
What is striking about Kant’s theory, in the context of 
the argument being advanced here, is that it clearly understood 
the need to implement a system of interlocking constitutional 
orders at both the domestic and the international level, as part 
of a coherent and systematic design to reduce the incidence of 
war. It recognized that any ambition to limit warfare must 
target the state, interstate, and the transnational legal 
structures if it is to maximize its chances of success. 
Kenneth Waltz—the modern realist who developed this 
very three-image framework—also embraced the idea that the 
causes of war must be understood in terms of all three levels 
simultaneously. He concluded his classic study by arguing that 
no single image is ever adequate to explain the prevalence of 
war, or sufficient for the purposes of developing prescriptions to 
reduce the incidence of war.84 To be sure, Waltz—like most 
realists—emphasized the importance of Image III explanations, 
but he also cautioned that overemphasis of any one image will 
  
 80  KANT, supra note 4, at 102-05. 
 81 The other alternative, rather than war or federation, was a form of world 
government or super-state, along the lines suggested by Rousseau, which Kant rejected 
as likely to lead to tyranny. Id. at 102-05. 
 82 Id. at 105-08. 
 83 On the liberal economic theories as they relate to the causes of war, see 
DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at ch. 7. 
 84 WALTZ, supra note 14, at 227. 
632 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
cause a distorted understanding of the problem. All causes, he 
argued, are interrelated in vital ways. In particular, he 
suggested that factors relating to Images I and II, such as 
individual motives and misperceptions, the structures of the 
states involved, and their specific histories, cultures, and 
traditions, will be the immediate or “efficient cause” of any 
given war. But it is the permissive nature of the international 
system itself, together with the security dilemmas that it 
creates, that will allow such wars to occur without restraint. As 
he put it most succinctly: 
That state A wants certain things that it can get only by war does 
not explain war. Such a desire may or may not lead to war. My 
wanting a million dollars does not cause me to rob a bank, but if it 
were easier to rob banks, such desires would lead to much more bank 
robbing. This does not alter the fact that some people will and some 
will not attempt to rob banks no matter what the law enforcement 
situation is. We still have to look to motivation and circumstance in 
order to explain individual acts. Nevertheless one can predict that 
other things being equal, a weakening of law enforcement agencies 
will lead to an increase in crime. From this point of view it is social 
structure—institutionalized restraints and institutionalized methods 
of altering and adjusting interests—that count.85 
The argument being developed in this article thus 
begins with the premise that while international law plays an 
important role in constraining the use of force, it is not 
sufficient. At the same time, while the permissiveness of the 
international legal system is an important cause of war 
generally, the absence of legal constraints and structural 
mechanisms at the domestic level, which could operate to 
restrain the immediate or efficient cause of war in any 
particular instance, is also significant.  
A review of the historical development of the law and 
legal theory on constraining the resort to war suggests that up 
until the nineteenth century there was some understanding of 
this requirement to address the causes of war at all three 
levels. However, despite broad agreement in modern 
international relations theory that factors at all three levels 
are significant causes of war, in the twentieth century we have 
increasingly placed our reliance solely upon the international 
law system to limit armed conflict, and have ignored the 
domestic mechanisms of legal constraint. In the next Part, I 
explore those developments in more detail. 
  
 85 Id. at 231. 
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON WAR 
The history of the laws of war, and of legal thinking 
about war and peace, is obviously very long and quite 
complicated,86 and there is no need to review the entire history 
here. There are several reasons, however, why we need to 
examine some aspects of at least the modern history of these 
developments, including a review of the current state of legal 
constraints on the use of armed force. First, in order to suggest 
that the current systems are inadequate, we need to be sure we 
understand the contours and operation of those systems—
hence the discussion of the current state of both international 
and constitutional law constraints. Second, the examination of 
the developments of the twentieth century and the operation of 
the current systems more specifically illustrate that there is an 
almost exclusive reliance upon international law, and disregard 
for constitutional law and other domestic mechanisms for 
limiting the use of armed force. Third, the review of the earlier 
history, in addition to helping us understand the origins of 
important elements of the current system, suggests that this 
narrow reliance on legal constraints at the international level 
is historically anomalous, which is yet another reason to 
reconsider whether it is optimal to disregard the domestic 
levels of control.  
A. Just War Theory—From Early Origins to the Nineteenth 
Century 
As with so much else, we can trace the seeds of modern 
thinking about constraints on war back to Greek and Roman 
history. While what we would call jus ad bellum was not well 
developed in classical Greece, Thucydides wrote of legal norms 
and peace treaties operating as potential constraints on the 
  
 86 For a recent work that does a magnificent job of providing a detailed 
examination of the history of the legal constraints on war, upon which I have relied 
extensively, see STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 
(2005). Also, for an ambitious and sweeping exploration of the historical relationship 
among strategy, law, and history in the evolution of war and constitutional forms, see 
PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 
(2002); DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER (2002). 
This treatment of the development of the laws on war is focused almost exclusively on 
Western legal systems. As Neff points out, there were important developments in both 
Islamic law and Chinese thinking regarding legal constraints on war, but neither of these 
systems ultimately had much influence on the later development of modern international 
law or on the origins of Western constitutional democracy, which are the two legal 
systems that I am most concerned with here. NEFF, supra, at 39-45. 
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recourse to war,87 and the Romans had a fairly elaborate legal 
code, the jus fetiales, which governed how and on what basis the 
Republic could use force against other peoples.88 Of greatest 
significance for our purposes, however, was the Greek 
philosophers’ development of the idea of “natural law,” the 
concept that there was a set of universal norms that applied to all 
peoples at all times. Originating with Aristotle, the concept was 
more fully elaborated and refined by the Stoics in the third 
century BCE.89 Cicero, in the later period of the Roman republic, 
combined these ideas of natural law with the basic principle 
within the jus fetiale that Rome required some legally sanctioned 
justification to commence armed conflict.90 Cicero elaborated a 
universal principle according to which there were two specific 
natural law justifications for the resort to war: the punishment of 
an enemy for wrongdoing, and repelling an attack. The 
overarching purpose of the universal principle—that the aim of 
war should be to achieve peace—also served as a limitation.91  
Built upon these origins, Christian theologians 
developed the moral and legal framework for thinking about 
war, what would come to be called “just war theory.” It was the 
dominant legal paradigm on recourse to war well into the 
eighteenth century, and vestiges of it inform the current legal 
system.92 St. Augustine (354-430 CE) wove together Stoic ideas 
of natural law, Christian theology on pacifism and nonviolence, 
and Cicero’s arguments regarding war being waged justly for 
the purposes of establishing peace, and developed the principle 
that war could be waged so long as it was: (i) “waged for a ‘just 
cause’”; (ii) “waged [for the] ‘right intention,’ [meaning] to do 
  
 87 See DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 13, at 58-59. Thucydides 
recounts how the Corinthians appealed to the Athenian Assembly just prior to the 
outbreak of the war, attempting to persuade the Athenians not to become involved in 
the likely hostilities between Corinth and Corcyra. The Corinthians explicitly grounded 
their arguments against any Athenian use of force in legal and moral terms. The 
appeal was unsuccessful, Corcyra having successfully played upon Athenian fears and 
insecurities so as to obtain Athenian support, but the account nonetheless suggests the 
existence of widely understood and acknowledged legal and moral norms governing 
recourse to war. THUCYDIDES, supra note 11, at 53-62; see also Adriaan Lanni, The 
Laws of War in Ancient Greece, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 469, 471 (2008). 
 88 G.I.A.D. Draper, Grotius’ Place in the Development of Legal Ideas About War, 
in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 177-79 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 1990) 
[hereinafter Draper, Grotius]; G.I.A.D. Draper, The Origins of the Just War Tradition, 46 
NEW BLACKFRIARS 82, 82-83 (2007); see also NEFF, supra note 86, at 27-29.  
 89 NEFF, supra note 86, at 32-34. 
 90 Draper, Grotius, supra note 88, at 178-79. 
 91 NEFF, supra note 86, at 37-38. 
 92 See generally id.  
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good or to avoid evil”; and (iii) “waged on the authority of a 
[P]rince.”93 Implicit in this, of course, was the notion that only 
one side in a war could legitimately claim to have a just cause.94 
From this foundation, just war theory became increasingly 
elaborate and sophisticated over the next several centuries, 
with St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-74) refining the doctrine and 
greatly increasing its influence.95  
It is important to recall, however, that prior to the 
establishment of the Westphalian system in 1648 there was not 
an international system of sovereign states, and there was no 
separate body of law governing the relations among the 
princely realms that did exist.96 Moreover, “war” was not a legal 
state, but rather was simply a term used to describe organized 
violence, whether it involved conflict between or among clans, 
regions, princely states, nonstate entities such as the papacy, 
bandits, or rebellious peasants.97 The key point is that there 
was only one overarching body of law, derived from natural 
law, which governed all aspects of war on an individual level.98 
The state did not yet have legal identity, and was not the 
subject of the law as we now understand it to be in 
international law.99 The only subject of natural law was the 
individual, and thus the single system of law operated to 
constrain all entities that might be involved in the activity of 
war through the individuals directing it or engaging in the 
conflict. As such, the single system of natural law operated to 
  
 93 Draper, Grotius, supra note 88, at 180. 
 94 NEFF, supra note 86, at 47; Draper, Grotius, supra note 88, at 180; see also 
WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (Michael Byers trans., 
rev. ed. 2000); M.H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 65-66 (1965).  
 95 There were also theoretical schisms in the later medieval period, and the 
differences would continue to echo in thinking about the laws of war into the twentieth 
century, but we need not delve into those differences here. For a detailed analysis of 
the difference between the scholastics and the humanist schools of just war theory, see, 
for example, TUCK, supra note 65.  
 96  NEFF, supra note 86. 
 97 Bobbitt notes that even as late as 1500, there were over 500 princely 
domains, city-states, and disputed regions within Europe. BOBBITT, supra note 86, at 
96. For a fascinating if depressing account of the wars waged by the Papacy during 
part of this period, see TUCHMAN, supra note 25, at ch. 3. 
 98 NEFF, supra note 86, at 54. This is not to suggest that there were no 
distinctions made between legal regimes at all. Thus, for instance, distinct from the 
just war theories, the conduct of war itself was governed in part by jus armorum, which 
was derivative of Roman military law, and these two systems were not merged until 
the sixteenth century. KEEN, supra note 94, at 9-15; NEFF, supra note 86, at 69-70.  
 99 NEFF, supra note 86, at 56. For more discussion of the evolution of the 
state, and the relationship between war, law, and the constitutional structure of the 
state, see BOBBITT, supra note 86, at chs. 7, 19 (describing military/political and legal 
developments of the Westphalian system). 
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address the causes of war at all levels that then existed. And 
there is evidence that actual practice in relation to the waging 
of war was to some degree influenced by this body of law.100 
The emergence of a dual system of law, in which there 
was a truly independent legal system that governed the 
recourse to war at the interstate level, and which formed the 
foundation for modern international law, came with the 
emergence of the sovereign territorial state in the Westphalian 
system and the development of the law of nations in the early 
seventeenth century. The major innovation of Hugo Grotius, 
who is generally credited with the elaboration of the law of 
nations in his On the Law of War and Peace (first published in 
1625, just as the Westphalian system was coming into 
existence), was the concept of a distinct “law of nations”—a 
legal system not entirely divorced from natural law, but in 
which the rights and duties of sovereign states was the primary 
focus.101 Most significantly, states were the subject of this 
system of law. It was positivist in nature and derived in part 
from the actual practice of states, and it was the conduct of and 
relations among states that were governed by the law. As it 
related to the recourse to war, the law of nations governed 
state action, rather than that of individuals as in all earlier 
laws of war.102 There thus developed a dual aspect to the legal 
thinking about war, in which the law of nature continued to 
form the foundation of the framework, but a “voluntary law” 
comprising the law of nations supplemented the natural law 
principles, with ever-increasing importance over time.103  
Even within this dual system, however, both systems of 
law were understood to govern and constrain the resort to war. 
Grotius elaborated the just causes for which a state had a right 
to engage in war, and these just causes were understood to be 
  
 100 NEFF, supra note 86, at 69.  
 101 See TUCK, supra note 65, at 81-83. The Peace of Westphalia actually 
comprised several separate peace treaties entered into over a period of decades, 
culminating in a peace Congress convened in 1644. Negotiations at the Congress 
resulted in peace treaties between Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire, and between 
France and the Empire. In 1648, another such treaty was signed by the Dutch States 
and Spain. BOBBITT, supra note 86, at 501-08. In this sense, the publication of Grotius’s 
most famous and influential book in 1625 pre-dated the final act, but it was written 
during the formative years of the peace process and was already exercising some 
influence by the time of the final peace conference. 
 102 NEFF, supra note 86, at 85; see also TUCK, supra note 65, at ch. 3 
(presenting a rather different analysis of Grotius’s theory); Hedley Bull, The 
Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, in HUGO GROTIUS AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 88. 
 103 NEFF, supra note 86, at 86-87. 
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principles of the law of nations.104 Nonetheless, they were in 
part derived from the law of nature, and grew directly out of 
the earlier just war theory. Indeed, a state’s offenses against 
the laws of nature constituted one of the just causes that 
provided other states with the right to wage war against it in 
order to impose punishment and enforce the law. The broad 
proposition was that violations of the laws of nature by a state 
on the domestic level could provide the justification under the 
law of nations for other states to wage war against the 
offender.105 While this example relates to the justification for 
war rather than its legal constraints, implicit in it is an 
understanding of a close relationship between the domestic 
operation of the law of nature and the legitimacy of war under 
the international law of nations. Indeed, as Neff puts it, the 
two systems formed a kind of partnership, and over time the 
strands of both would be woven together to develop the modern 
system of international law—but in the seventeenth century 
there remained a distinct duality in their approaches to the 
issues of war and peace.106 As such, in terms of the three Images 
on the causes of war, the natural law system continued to 
operate so as to address individual and group dynamics at the 
domestic level, and the new law of nations began to govern the 
conduct of states at the third level, in the emerging system of 
truly sovereign states.  
This Grotian conceptualization of the laws of war, with 
the dual elements of natural law and a law of nations that was 
still very much infused with just war theory, became the 
mainstream perspective in the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
century. It was also becoming more clearly established within 
this perspective that war constituted a legal state that 
triggered the operation of a lex specialis, rather than being a 
simple description of a particular kind of violence, and 
moreover, states alone could legitimately engage in the use of 
armed force under the laws of war.107 But in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, aspects of the mainstream view came 
under pressure from two other schools of thought on the laws of 
  
 104  Id. at 96-102.  
 105 It was also a rather convenient justification for the imperialist conduct of 
European states, particularly the Netherlands, to which Grotius was trying to return 
from exile. See BOBBITT, supra note 86, at 510-12; TUCK, supra note 65, at 102-04. It 
thus appears that the basis for concerns that humanitarian intervention may serve as 
a pretext for self-interested policy has ancient roots.  
 106 NEFF, supra note 86, at 86. 
 107  Id. at 101-02.  
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war. Both of these accepted the dual operation of natural law 
and the law of nations, and that war constituted a legal state, 
but they had very different understandings of how the two 
systems of law operated in times of war and peace. For very 
different reasons, both of these schools adhered to the view 
that can be summed up in the phrase “might makes right.” One 
of the schools was of course associated with Thomas Hobbes, 
and his ideas that war was the normal state of nature for 
states and that the use of armed force was entirely justifiable 
for self-preservation.108  
We need not worry about the details of that intellectual 
conflict here, but the result was that by the end of the 
eighteenth century the conflict had left a somewhat incoherent 
jus ad bellum system with little in common with its just war 
origins, and even less real normative power as a legal 
constraint on the use of armed force. Indeed, international law 
generally, and the law of war in particular, was increasingly 
understood to bear little relationship to any overarching 
natural law system. This humanist and positivist view of the 
law was increasingly utilitarian, technocratic in outlook, and 
rationalist.109 As part of this development, in the nineteenth 
century war was elevated to the status of an “institution” of 
international law.110 In part this was a reflection of the 
development of a robust jus in bello regime; but war was also 
an institution in the sense that it was viewed as being simply 
one among many tools of statecraft. In Clausewitz’ famous 
dictum, war was merely policy pursued by other means.111 It 
was not only justifiable for self-preservation along Hobbesian 
lines, but also had become a permissible means to further the 
vital interests of the state.  
This shift away from the last vestiges of just war 
theory—the notion that war had to be justified in terms of self-
defense, restoring that which was owed, or punishment for 
violations of natural law—and the move to ideas according to 
which armed force could be employed whenever it would 
further the state’s vital interests, essentially emasculated the 
  
 108 See HOBBES, supra note 64, at 223-28; see also NEFF, supra note 86, at 133-
37; TUCK, supra note 65, at 126-39. 
 109 NEFF, supra note 86, at 161-62. 
 110 Id. at 177, 186-89. Here, “institution” means that there was a highly 
developed body of law and rules that would kick into operation to govern the conduct 
and consequences of war once the legal state of war had been triggered. Id. at 177. 
 111 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., 
trans., 1976) (1832). 
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jus ad bellum regime altogether. In legal terms, the use of 
armed force, the commencement of war, did not constitute a 
wrong either to the state that was attacked or to the broader 
community of states.112 Indeed, war became a legitimate means 
of settling disputes, and could give rise to legal rights and 
establishing claims. The question of justification for the resort 
to war was relegated to the domain of morality and ethics, 
while the decision itself was governed only by the utilitarian 
calculus of policy imperatives. As a result, the distinction 
between self-defense and aggression became essentially 
meaningless in terms of international law.113 In this sense, the 
centuries-long conception of legal constraints on the use of 
force, which had at least in theory addressed the causes of war 
at both the domestic and the international levels, receded into 
dormancy in the nineteenth century. 
B. Early Constitutional Constraints 
Even as state practice in Europe increasingly reflected 
the more realist premises of the two dissenting schools, and the 
influence of the mainstream theory on the legal limits on war 
began to fade into irrelevance, there emerged new ideas about 
legal constraints on the use of force within the domestic legal 
systems. These ideas, which held out some promise of 
addressing the causes of war at the domestic level just as the 
combined natural law and law of nations constraints receded, 
developed from new thinking about the internal distribution of 
power and authority, in what would later be called 
constitutional law. The early developments as they related to the 
waging of war can be traced in their modern form to the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England.114 In the Bill of Rights, 
which was the product of the settlement between the English 
Parliament and the King, the monarchy was prohibited from 
raising standing armies in times of peace without parliamentary 
  
 112 NEFF, supra note 86, at 197-99. 
 113 Id.  
 114 The modern idea of constitutionalism itself is said to originate in the 
Glorious Revolution, and in the writing of John Locke from that era. See SCOTT 
GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE 5 & n.3, 15, 322-23 (1999). For further discussion of 
the relationship between the rise of constitutional control over the military and the use 
of force, and international law, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Interface of National 
Constitutional Systems with International Law and Institutions on Military Forces, in 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-60 
(Charlotte Ku & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 2003) [hereinafter Damrosch, Interface]. 
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consent.115 Parliament also gained control over the budget, and 
thus with these two powers gained a degree of control over the 
executive’s ability to take the state to war, though the decision 
itself remained entirely within the Royal Prerogative.116 
These ideas took root in the new constitutional 
experiment that was undertaken in the United States one 
hundred years later. The Articles of Confederation, the first 
constitution of the thirteen colonies, ratified in 1781, placed the 
power to declare war in the central government (being the 
States in Congress), but prohibited the central government 
from engaging in war, granting letters of marque or reprisal in 
time of peace, or entering into any alliances, “unless nine 
States assent to the same.”117 The U.S. Constitution further 
developed these ideas on the constitutional control of the use of 
armed force, ideas that were to a considerable extent grounded 
in concerns over the relationship between domestic 
constitutional structure and international relations.118 The 
Constitution not only included a broad legislative control over 
the raising, maintaining, regulating, and funding of the 
nation’s army and navy, as well as militias,119 but it provided 
that the Congress had the power “[t]o declare war, grant letters 
of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on 
land and water.”120  
This provision is at the heart of the ongoing war powers 
debate, with intense disagreement about the original meaning 
and intent of the language and how it ought to be interpreted 
today. But without getting mired in the details of that debate 
here, this granting of authority to the legislature over the steps 
that were then understood to constitute the initiation of war 
was a legal mechanism designed to constrain the executive’s 
  
 115 See BILL OF RIGHTS [ENG.] Dec. 16, 1689, art. V. Alexander Hamilton 
referred to this prohibition in one of his essays that were to be compiled as the Federalist 
Papers, on the issue of the limited legislative power to raise and maintain a military. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 26, at 165 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 116 See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004). John Locke 
himself wrote about the power of war and peace as being part of the “federative power” 
that was to be held exclusively by the executive. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 382-84 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1670). The Royal 
Prerogative is defined, in the English common law, as the residue of power that is 
reserved to the Crown. There is more detailed discussion of the concept infra Part III.D. 
 117 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 6. 
 118 FEDERALIST NO. 41 (Madison), supra note 33, at 224-35; Madison, 
Universal Peace, supra note 1.  
 119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.  
 120 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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ability to go to war.121 James Madison, in particular, thought 
that wars could only be avoided by developing domestic 
constitutional mechanisms to make it difficult for governments 
to decide to go to war. Foreshadowing Kant, he thought that 
any solution to the scourge of war was to be found first in the 
establishment of republican self-government, since once the 
decision to go to war was subjected to the will of the people, 
wars waged for the benefit of the rulers (which he viewed as 
the most common class of war) would be unlikely.122 In order to 
discourage wars fought on the instigation of society itself 
(which he identified as the second and less common class of 
war), Madison argued that the state required constitutional 
mechanisms to ensure that the costs of the war would be 
internalized and borne by the society, rather than being 
externalized to other peoples and future generations.123  
Similar ideas regarding legislative control over the 
executive decision to wage war can be found in the short-lived 
French revolutionary Constitution of 1791.124 It provided that 
  
 121 I use the word “war” here quite deliberately, as one of the flash-points of 
the current debate is whether the provision constrained the executive power to use 
armed force for measures short of war, or armed conflicts not commenced by formal 
declaration of war. An issue that is often missed in the war powers debate is the 
significance of the power to grant letters of marque and letters of reprisal, with almost 
exclusive focus being on the authority to declare war. Letters of reprisal, in particular, 
related to a concept quite different from the modern notion of reprisals, and letters of 
marque and reprisal constituted methods for broad mobilization of civilian forces for 
employment in an armed conflict. The issuance of such letters was viewed as an act 
attendant to the initiation of war and as an act of war—an understanding that ought to 
influence the modern view of the purpose and original meaning of the war powers 
clause. On reprisals, see NEFF, supra note 86, at 122-26, 225-39. 
 122 James Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1; see also John Tomasi, 
Governance Beyond the Nation State: James Madison on Foreign Policy and “Universal 
Peace,” in JAMES MADISON AND THE FUTURE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT 213, 220-21 
(John Samples ed. 2002). 
 123 Tomasi, supra note 122, at 220-21. On the other hand, Madison was to 
some extent a realist in his views regarding the necessity of maintaining armed forces 
and not excessively fettering the power of the central government to defend the nation. 
In defending the federal power (as opposed to that of the States) to raise and maintain 
armies and to declare war, he wrote that  
[i]f a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the 
exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the 
discretion of its own government and set bounds to the exertion of its own 
safety. . . . The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the 
danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules and by 
no others. 
FEDERALIST NO. 41 (Madison), supra note 33, at 225. 
 124 For discussion on the extent to which the American constitutional 
experience and theories generally influenced the French constitutional developments, 
see Billias, supra note 35, at 19-28.  
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war could only be declared by the legislative body, acting on a 
formal proposal by the monarch.125 In addition, however, it 
included a provision authorizing the executive to act first in the 
case of emergency, but requiring the King to obtain ex post 
approval within a limited time frame, which the legislature 
could withhold and thereby force an end to hostilities. Moreover, 
and even more startling, the Constitution of 1791 provided for 
the legislature to commence criminal prosecution of any 
ministers of the Crown that were determined to have engaged in 
“culpable aggression.”126 The Constitution of 1791 only survived 
for a couple of years, victim to the unfolding dynamics of the 
revolution, yet it reveals the currency of ideas at the time for 
using constitutional mechanisms to constrain the government 
from engaging in armed conflict. As we will see, these ideas have 
not blossomed into more robust domestic systems in the 
constitutional democracies of the twentieth century. 
C. The Twentieth Century Jus ad Bellum Regime127 
In examining the current state of legal constraints, we 
begin with the international law system as it developed in the 
twentieth century. There was a strong revival of the legal 
constraints on the recourse to war beginning at the end of the 
nineteenth century, but only at the level of the international 
system. While the nineteenth century was largely 
characterized by the limited “cabinet wars” in Europe, which 
reflected the Clausewitzian notion of using force for the 
achievement of policy objectives that furthered the interests of 
the state and maintained the balance of power, the American 
Civil War in the second half of the century was a harbinger of 
the modern war—war in which the whole nation, its entire 
economy, and all of its industry and manpower were devoted to 
an endeavor that was itself transformed by the technological 
advances of the late nineteenth century.128 By the end of the 
  
 125 1791 CONST. ch. III, § 1(2) (Fr.). 
 126 Id. 
 127  Portions of this section are drawn from an earlier related work, Craig 
Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the Constitutionalizing of Jus Ad Bellum, 30 
U. PA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 268 (2008) [hereinafter Martin, Binding Dogs of War]. 
 128 The late nineteenth century saw the development of machine guns, steam-
driven naval vessels, rail-transportation of troops, and advances in artillery, all of which 
quite radically altered the conduct of warfare. See RICHARD A. PRESTON & SYDNEY F. WISE, 
MEN IN ARMS: A HISTORY OF WARFARE AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN 
SOCIETY (4th ed. 1979); THEODORE ROPP, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 143-44 (1959). 
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century, there was a growing sense that some limits were 
required. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were the 
first efforts to place legal limits on the use of armed force as a 
legitimate means of dispute resolution.129 But the relevant 
provisions merely bound state parties to pursue negotiation 
with the assistance of the good offices of friendly states prior to 
making “an appeal to arms.”130  
The effort to develop constraints on recourse to war 
picked up steam after the potential horror of the modern total 
war was fully manifested in World War I, referred to in its 
aftermath as the “war to end all wars.” The Covenant of the 
League of Nations, adopted in 1919 as a part of the peace 
process, reestablished the just war theory premise that peace is 
the natural state within the international society,131 and it took 
the first tentative steps towards the establishment of a form of 
collective security system.132 But it only prescribed cooling-off 
periods and arbitration procedures that had to be fulfilled prior 
to commencing war, and did not entirely prohibit recourse to 
war itself, even in the form of aggression.133  
In 1928, however, the Pact of Paris, or the Kellogg-
Briand Agreement as it came to be known, became the first 
multilateral treaty that purported to establish a true 
  
 129 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, 79 (4th ed. 2005); 
see also Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 
32 Stat. 1779 [hereinafter 1899 Convention]; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199 [hereinafter 1907 Convention]; 
Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of 
Contract Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241. 
 130 1899 Convention, supra note 129, Art. 2; 1907 Convention, supra note 129, Art. 2. 
 131 NEFF, supra note 86, at 290. 
 132 League of Nations Covenant arts. 10-17. Article 10 provided, in part, that 
“[t]he Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members 
of the League.” Article 11 provided that “[a]ny war or threat of war, whether 
immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a 
matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may 
be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.” Article 16 stipulated 
that “[s]hould any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants 
under Articles 12, 13, or 15 [which provided for the submission of disputes for 
arbitration, judicial decision, or Council determination] it shall ipso facto be deemed to 
have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League,” which 
automatically triggered broad economic sanctions. What was lacking was any explicit 
provision for the use of force to enforce the collective security system thus envisioned.  
 133 Art. 10 only provided that members “undertake to respect and preserve as 
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence 
of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression . . . the Council shall 
advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” Id. art. 10; see also 
INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 62-63 (2d ed. 2000). 
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prohibition on the aggressive recourse to war.134 The agreement 
itself purported to renounce all recourse to war, and it was 
silent on the scope of the prohibition and the existence of any 
exceptions, but there was an exchange of diplomatic notes 
during the negotiations that articulated a shared 
understanding that the proposed agreement did not extend to 
the exercise of self-defense.135 The agreement also contained an 
implicit collective security component, as the preamble 
provided that any state party that violated the terms of the 
agreement would be denied its benefits. In other words, states 
would not be prohibited by the agreement from using armed 
force against any state that stood in violation of the treaty.136 
Over 40 states were party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact by 1929 
when it came into force, and there are currently 69 parties to 
the treaty.137 While it failed to provide for any enforcement 
mechanism, it was the first modern international law 
prohibition on the aggressive use of force. 
Both the League of Nations system and the Kellogg-
Briand Pact were discredited by their failure to prevent the 
mounting incidences of aggressive war—the Japanese 
occupation of Manchuria and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
being the most serious—which ultimately led to the complete 
breakdown of the system in World War II. One of the 
shortcomings of both the League of Nations Charter and the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, quite apart from the absence of any 
effective enforcement mechanism, was the focus on the concept 
of “war” alone.138 This left a number of well established uses of 
force that fell short of war as it was then understood—
particularly reprisals, interventions, and acts of necessity—
outside of the scope of the prohibition. Nonetheless, the 
prosecutions of the former leaders of Nazi Germany and Japan 
for aggression, or “crimes against peace,” were based on the 
  
 134 Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. I, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 
2343 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]. 
 135 The notes are reproduced at 22 AM. J. INT’L L. SUP. 109 (1928), with replies 
at 23 AM. J. INT’L L. SUP. 1 (1929); see also DENYS P. MYERS, ORIGIN AND CONCLUSION 
OF THE PARIS PACT 34-56 (1929) (providing a history of the negotiations); U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, TREATY FOR THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR (1933) (containing reproductions of all 
the associated documents, including the U.S. note of June 23, 1928).  
 136  Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 134, at Preamble. 
 137 For the current list of parties to the treaty, see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
TREATIES IN FORCE 443-44 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/143863.pdf. 
 138 NEFF, supra note 86, at 280, 296-98. 
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breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, both re-affirming the 
prohibition on aggressive recourse to war and creating personal 
criminal liability for its violation.139  
The final steps towards the development of the modern 
jus ad bellum regime, and the establishment of a more robust 
collective security system, were taken with the creation of the 
United Nations in 1945. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter 
provides that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”140 The only exceptions provided were for the exercise 
of individual and collective self-defense upon the occurrence of 
an armed attack (Article 51), or for collective use of force by 
members as authorized and directed by the Security Council 
upon a determination that there is a threat to or has been a 
breach of the peace and security of the international 
community (Articles 39, 42 and 43).  
It will be noted that the word “war” is absent from the 
prohibition in Article 2(4), and indeed from anywhere else in the 
Charter other than the preamble. Learning from the failures of 
the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the 
prohibition extends to all uses and even threats of the use of 
force. As such, it made irrelevant all the earlier debates over 
how to distinguish between reprisals, interventions, acts of 
necessity, and war, since all use of force was similarly 
prohibited.141 The system also reflects a return to some aspects of 
the Grotian perspectives on just war theory, in that it presumes 
that the normal state of affairs in the international system is 
  
 139 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS (Pub. No. 2613, 
Far Eastern Series No. 12, 1946); Charter of the International Military Tribunal, § 2, art 
6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The debate over the legitimacy of these 
specific prosecutions, in large part, centers on the then-novel, and thus retrospective, 
imposition of personal criminal liability for a state violation of a treaty, but the issue of 
there having been violations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact is not seriously questioned.  
 140 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 141 NEFF, supra note 86, at 318-19; see also DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND 
SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129; CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE (3d ed. 2008). The threshold for the use of force has also been determined by the 
International Court of Justice to be quite low, and significantly lower than the scale 
and intensity of force required to qualify as an “armed attack” that can justify the use 
of force in self-defense. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua 
v. U.S.]; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 42 I.L.M. 1334, 1355 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
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one of peace,142 and the collective security system reflects 
elements of the law enforcement character of just war theory. 
The U.N. collective security system is implemented by 
both the collective self-defense and collective security 
components of the Charter. Collective self-defense, provided for 
in Article 51, permits member states to use force against an 
aggressor state in the event of its armed attack on some other 
member, regardless of whether the attack constitutes any 
immediate threat to the state responding with force to the 
attack on the victim.143 This goes well beyond the notion of self-
defense in its original natural law sense, which was analogous 
to the right of self-defense exercised by an individual, being a 
proportionate use of force immediately necessary to prevent an 
ongoing attack on oneself. It is much more in line with notions 
of using armed force to enforce the law and punish 
transgressions in the Grotian scheme.144 The modern rationale 
is based on the view that any act of aggression constitutes a 
threat to the entire international system, and that, like a 
contagion, unchecked aggression has the tendency to spread, 
creating costs and risks for other states initially unaffected.145 
The second element of the collective security system, as 
provided for in Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, contemplates the 
United Nations itself using armed force, employing the armed 
forces of contributing members, in order to restore or maintain 
peace and security. By virtue of Article 2(6), this means that 
the United Nations may use force against nonmember states, 
and even nonstate entities.146 The operation of Article 42 has 
evolved over time such that member states are typically 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council to use force 
on behalf of the United Nations to restore and maintain peace 
  
 142 U.N. Charter, preamble, art. 1. 
 143  DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 252-
56; GRAY, supra note 141, 167-71.  
 144 The Grotian notion of “defensive war” was much more expansive than the 
natural law right to self-defense. See NEFF, supra note 86, at 127. Interestingly, the 
concept of individual self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is clearly a 
restoration of the very narrow natural law conception, in contrast to the just war 
theory notions of defensive war. NEFF, supra note 86, at 326. 
 145 DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 253-
56; see also GRAY, supra note 141, at 138-41. 
 146 Article 2, paragraph 6 of the U.N. Charter provides, “The Organization 
shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in 
accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.” For discussion of its operation, see DINSTEIN, WAR, 
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 91-92. 
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and security, as coalitions under American leadership have 
most famously done in the Korean War and the Gulf War.147 
The U.N. Charter is not the exclusive source of the 
principles of jus ad bellum. Treaties such as the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea148 repeat the 
principles, and there are a number of treaties, including the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact itself, which predate the U.N. Charter but 
remain in effect.149 More importantly, customary international 
law is a distinct source of the rules of jus ad bellum. As the 
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States 
(Merits) held, there is considerable overlap between the treaty 
regime and the principles of jus ad bellum in customary 
international law (customary international law having evolved 
over the last sixty years from the widespread state practice in 
conformity with the U.N. Charter system), but there are 
important reasons for making the distinction and 
acknowledging the independent existence of the principles in 
customary law.150 The Court noted that there are some 
important differences between the treaty and customary 
principles, particularly in the area of self-defense.151 Moreover, 
customary international law will evolve over time, and so the 
differences between the Charter regime and the customary 
international law principles may well increase as a result, and 
indeed have likely already developed somewhat since the 
Nicaragua decision.152 These differences will be important in 
  
 147 THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST 
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 24-30 (2002) The exact nature and legal authority for 
both these wars remain controversial. Dinstein, for instance, insists that the U.N. 
Security Council resolutions did not authorize the use of force under Article 42 and 
that these were collective self-defense operations under Article 51. DINSTEIN, WAR, 
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 273-77, 292-96; see also GRAY, 
supra note 141, at 258-59 (for a discussion that is much closer to Franck on this issue). 
 148 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 301, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.  
 149 These would include the Pan American Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression 
and Conciliation art. 1, Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat. 3363, 163 L.N.T.S. 393; see also 
DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 97-98. 
 150  Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at 93-97. 
 151 Id. Also, famously, Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion argued that 
Article 51, with its condition precedent of an armed attack, constituted the codification 
of only one of several legitimate grounds for the exercise of self-defense, though this 
remains a minority view. See DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra 
note 129, at 95-96, 183-85 (noting and refuting Judge Schwebel’s interpretation); GRAY, 
supra note 141, at 171-73. 
 152 The response to the attacks by non-state actors on 9/11, in the form of the 
invasion of Afghanistan under the asserted authority of collective self-defense pursuant 
to Article 51, will likely have an impact on customary international law. See DINSTEIN, 
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 207. 
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our consideration of how best to operationalize the 
constitutional incorporation of principles of jus ad bellum. 
The jus ad bellum regime that has emerged since the 
adoption of the U.N. Charter is unquestionably the most robust 
and stringent of any system that has existed in the history of 
legal constraints on recourse to war. And as was noted above, it 
incorporates aspects of the earlier just war theory. But it is an 
entirely positivist conceptualization of the laws of war, and in 
many respects it has a far thinner theoretical and philosophical 
foundation than prior systems of thought on war, and certainly 
as compared to just war theory itself.153 The just war theory, both 
before Grotius and after, was founded squarely in a deep 
understanding of natural law, interwoven with theological and 
ethical theories, while the U.N. Charter is the secular product of 
lawyers and statesmen, operating in the wake of and in response 
to the worst global conflict in our history.154 This is significant in 
the context of international law’s role in mobilizing support for 
and encouraging compliance with its rules. Without a deeper 
philosophical foundation, which might operate to bind all the 
states within the international society with a sense of shared 
values and investment in the system, in the way that natural 
law clearly did in medieval Europe, the U.N. Charter may have 
difficulty in attracting sufficient compliance. 
Certainly the incidence of illegitimate uses of force 
continues apace, often comprising naked acts of aggression in 
violation of Article 2(4) and frequently perpetrated by liberal 
democratic states. Indeed, just ten years after the exhausted 
allied powers ended the worst armed conflict in the history of 
the world and established the United Nations system, two of 
those countries conspired in an act of aggression in the Suez 
crisis of 1956. Notwithstanding internal legal advice that there 
was no legal basis in international law for the use of armed 
force against Egypt after it nationalized the canal zone, the 
government of Prime Minister Anthony Eden in Britain 
conspired with the governments of France and Israel to create 
a fraudulent pretext for intervention, and then invaded Egypt 
according to plan, in violation of international law.155  
  
 153 NEFF, supra note 86, at 317. 
 154 Id. 
 155 BARRY TURNER, SUEZ 1956: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIRST OIL WAR 
(2006). The senior legal advisor to the Foreign Office, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, argued 
that “there was no legal basis for armed intervention of a neutral state to protect 
property or to guarantee freedom of passage through a canal or to prevent further 
violence.” Id. at 204. The conspiracy involved an agreement among the governments of 
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What is more, Eden made the decision without even 
consulting the entire cabinet, far less parliament.156 That there 
were no constitutional or statutory limits on the prime 
minister’s discretion to launch the country into a disastrous 
war is striking. The fact remains that very few constitutional 
democracies have domestic legal regimes that constrain in any 
meaningful way how the executive branch of government 
decides to go to war, an issue we turn to next.  
D. The Current Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force 
During the same period in which the modern jus ad 
bellum regime blossomed, the world also saw the spread of 
democracy and constitutionalism. Seven distinct “waves” of 
democratic constitution-making have been identified, and five 
of these have occurred since the end of World War I, with most 
of them coming after World War II.157 Although not all 
democracies have constitutions, and not all the new 
constitutional democracies would meet many definitions of 
“liberal democracy,” the world has in some real sense seen the 
materialization of Kant’s predicted spread of republicanism. 
Yet, notwithstanding this spread of constitutional democracy, 
there has been little systemic development of constitutional 
constraints on the use of force. 
Constitutional constraints can generally be divided into 
two categories. The first, what we may call the “separation of 
powers” class of constitutional limits, are primarily concerned 
  
the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, for Israel to launch a limited attack against 
Egypt in the Sinai, thereby creating a pretext for a British and French “intervention,” 
involving an invasion of Egyptian territory around the Suez. Id. at 288-301.  
 156 Id. 
 157 Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanism in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 
DUKE L.J. 364, 368-69 (1995). One recent study, which focused on only the 162 
independent states with populations over 500,000, determined that 92 were democracies. 
MONTY G. MARSHALL & BENJAMIN R. COLE, GLOBAL REPORT 2009: CONFLICT, 
GOVERNANCE, AND STATE FRAGILITY (2009), available at http://www.systemicpeace. 
org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf. The most recent Freedom House report states that that 
there were 119 democracies in the world in 2009. Electoral Democracies 2009, FREEDOM 
HOUSE (2009), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=477&year=2009. Most of 
the expansion has come since 1946, at which time there were only twenty democracies 
among the world’s independent states; the most rapid increase has been since the end of 
the Cold War. MARSHALL & COLE, supra, at 11. It is not the case, of course, that all these 
democracies have constitutions or are “constitutional democracies,” but a large 
percentage are. One of the most widely recognized databases and studies for the 
measurement of the degree of democracy among states is the Polity IV Project at the 
University of Maryland. See POLITY IV PROJECT, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/ 
polity4.htm (last updated Sept. 9, 2010). 
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with governing which branch of government has the authority to 
initiate armed conflict or establish states of emergency requiring 
a military response. The separation of powers limits, as we saw 
earlier in the discussion of the English Bill of Rights, the U.S. 
Constitution, and the French Constitution of 1791, were the first 
constitutional provisions relating to the use of force to be 
developed. Such provisions do not, however, bear in any way on 
the legal justifications for engaging in armed conflict. 
In contrast, the constitutional provisions comprising the 
second category, what we may call the “international law” class of 
constraints, are designed to implement or incorporate principles 
of international law relating to the use of force. It was not until 
the early twentieth century, when international law itself began 
to move towards limiting the recourse to war, that the first 
constitution articulated a prohibition on the use of force.158 The 
first such constitution was the Constitution of the Philippines of 
1935, which provided that the Philippines “renounces war as an 
instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted 
principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation.”159 
Its inspiration was the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation 
of war clause, and provisions of the Weimer Constitution and the 
Constitution of Spain for the clause adopting generally accepted 
principles of international law.160 
In this sense, the Philippine Constitution of 1935 
illustrated both the general (provisions that make 
international law as a whole the law of the land) and the 
particular (provisions that purport to implement very specific 
principles of international law) incorporation of international 
law. The general incorporation of international law is much 
  
 158 The short-lived French Constitution of 1791 was ahead of its time, and the 
development of international law, in providing for individual criminal liability for 
complicity in executive decisions leading to acts of aggression. 
 159 CONST. (1935), art. II, sec. 3 (Phil.) (translation from the Chan Robles 
Virtual Law Library of the Laws of the Philippines, available at http://www.chanrobles. 
com/1935constitutionofthephilippines.htm). For a helpful categorization of world 
constitutional provisions relating in some way to the use of force, see Nishi Osamu, Sekai 
no genkōkenpō to heiwashugi jōko [Pacifist Provisions of the World’s Modern 
Constitutions] (Feb. 2006), http://www.komazawa-u.ac.jp/~nishi/Nishi-text/page001.htm 
[hereinafter Nishi, Pacifist Constitutions]. Except in the cases of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
and the Philippines, citations to foreign constitutions in Part III.B reference translations 
from Axel Tschentscher, International Constitutional Law—Countries, INT’L CONST. L., 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/index.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2009). 
 160 DIANE A. DESIERTO, FREEDOM AND CONSTRAINT: UNIVERSALISM IN THE 
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE PARTICULARIST 
POWER (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 130, 134) (on file with author) (citing DIE 
VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 11, 1919, art. 4 (Weimer 
Ger.); CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, Dec. 9, 1931, art 7 (Spain)). 
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more common among modern constitutions. The Constitution of 
the United States, for instance, provides in Article VI that “all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”161 
Similarly, the constitution of Japan, in Article 98(2), provides 
that “[t]he treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of 
nations shall be faithfully observed.”162 But such general 
incorporation of international law, even in monist states, does 
not tend to operate in a manner that effectively constrains 
decision making on the use of armed force.163 The incorporation 
of specific provisions of jus ad bellum, or promulgation of 
constitutional provisions that specifically address the decision 
making on the recourse to war, is far more likely to have a 
substantive influence on the decision to use armed force. This 
proposition is supported by the fact that the few states with 
constitutions that do have specific international law-based 
constraints on the use of force, as in the case of Japan, adopted 
such provisions in addition to general provisions incorporating 
international law into the domestic legal system. In considering 
the constitutional constraints on the use of force, therefore, the 
focus in our analysis here is on the incorporation of specific 
provisions of the jus ad bellum regime. 
Compared to the development and spread of other 
constitutional principles in the last fifty years, particularly 
with respect to the elaboration of individual rights and the 
strengthening of such institutions as judicial review, there has 
been relatively little development with respect to these two 
types of constitutional provisions regarding the use of force 
(that is, the separation of powers type provision, and the 
specific incorporation of international law type provision). This 
is particularly so among the larger states that might be 
thought of as being most representative of the community of 
liberal democracies.164  
  
 161 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 162 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 98, para. 2 (Japan) (official 
translation from the Government Printing Office, available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/ 
constitution/e/etc/c01.html#s2). 
 163 For arguments on why Article VI and other provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution should be understood to require government compliance with 
international law principles on the use of force, see Jules Lobel, International Law 
Constraints, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR 107-20 (Gary 
M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994). 
 164 A complete and systematic study of the constitutions of all the democracies 
listed by either Freedom House or The Center for Systemic Peace Report has not been 
undertaken to ground this proposition. But a number of studies do support the claim. 
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Of the two types of provision, the separation of powers 
with respect to the decision to go to war is more common. Quite 
a number of the states that are most representative of liberal 
democracies have provisions that require legislative approval of 
a declaration of war, along the lines of the U.S. Constitution. 
For instance, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain all 
have provisions that require that the government obtain 
legislative approval prior to a declaration of war.165 The German 
Basic Law does not have any such explicit provision, but the 
Constitutional Court has interpreted the Basic Law as 
requiring the government to obtain legislative approval of any 
deployment of German forces for any “armed operation.”166 A 
number of the constitutions of democracies among the so-called 
nonaligned group of nations, such as Brazil, Mexico, and India, 
similarly have provisions requiring legislative approval for the 
declaration of war or a state of emergency relating to the threat 
of war.167 But even the apparent spread of this form of provision 
is somewhat misleading, for these provisions are typically 
ineffective in constraining unilateral executive decisions to use 
armed force. The operation of the provision in the United 
States itself illustrates the problem. 
The United States Congress has only ever declared war 
five times since the Constitution was ratified.168 Indeed, since 
the end of World War II, the declaration of war has virtually 
disappeared from state practice, which raises questions as to 
the current meaning and effect of constitutional provisions 
  
See WOLFGANG WAGNER, GENEVA CTR. FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED 
FORCES, PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF MILITARY MISSIONS: ACCOUNTING FOR 
PLURALISM (2006), available at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en 
&id=25262&nav1=5; Nishi, Pacifist Constitutions, supra note 159. 
 165 1958 CONST. art. 35 (Fr.); Arts. 78, 87(9) Costituzione (It.); GRONDWET 
VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 17, 1983, art. 96 
(Neth.); CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, art. 63, Oct. 26, 1978 (Spain).  
 166 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [Federal Constitutional Court] July 12, 
1994, 106 I.L.R. 320 (Ger.); see also Georg Nolte, Germany: Ensuring Political 
Legitimacy for the Use of Military Forces by Requiring Constitutional Accountability, in 
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 114, at 231 (providing analysis of the case). 
 167 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [CONSTITUTION] art. 49, para. II (Braz.); 
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, as amended, art. 73, para. 12, 
art. 89, para. 8, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.); INDIA 
CONST. arts. 352, 353. 
 168 They are the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War of 1846, the 
Spanish-American War of 1898, and World Wars I and II. For a complete history of the 
war powers, and the authority under which armed force has been employed by the 
United States throughout history, see FISHER, supra note 116. For a brief overview, see 
JAMES A. BAKER, III & WARREN CHRISTOPHER, MILLER CTR. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, 
NATIONAL WAR POWERS COMMISSION REPORT 11-19 (2009). 
2011] TAKING WAR SERIOUSLY 653 
granting authority to legislators to declare war. There is a 
robust and long-standing debate in the United States over the 
exact meaning of the war powers provisions of the 
Constitution. The better argument would seem to be that the 
clear intention and understanding at the time of drafting and 
ratification was that the executive would have to obtain 
Congressional approval for the initiation of any armed 
conflict.169 But there is a loud lobby in favor of the position that 
the provision is limited quite literally to declarations of war 
and the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal, and since 
the initiation of armed conflict is no longer characterized by 
any of the those acts, the provision has become an 
anachronism.170 More importantly, the practice of the executive 
has been ambiguous at best, with virtually every president 
since Truman arguing that he was not required to obtain 
Congressional approval to use force.171 Many of them have done 
so in any event, but many significant actions have been 
undertaken without Congressional approval, such as the 
Korean war, aspects of the operations against Laos and 
Cambodia during the Vietnam war, the invasions of Grenada 
and Panama, the bombing of Libya in 1986, and the NATO air-
war against the Serbs in the Kosovo war of 1999. The War 
Powers Act of 1973 was enacted (over the veto of President 
Nixon) for the very purpose of trying to reestablish 
Congressional authority over the use of force, but it has been 
utterly ignored by every president since its enactment, to the 
detriment of the rule of law in the United States.172 
Similarly, notwithstanding the requirement under 
Article 35 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic that a 
  
 169 JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF 
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH ch. 1 (1993); FISHER, supra note 116, at ch. 1. 
 170 See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by 
Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 242-52 
(1996). Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have recently made the interesting and 
persuasive argument that declarations of war in the context of the U.S. Constitution 
should be understood to serve a different purpose from congressional approval of the 
use of force, and that the latter is also required regardless of whether there has been a 
declaration of war. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional 
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2057-61 (2005).  
 171 The administration of Jimmy Carter was the only one since World War II 
that did not actually engage in the use of armed force, if one does not count the failed 
mission to rescue the U.S. Embassy personnel being held hostage in Iran as a use of force. 
 172 BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 24-25; ELY, WAR AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 169, at 48-49; see also War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 
93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006)). 
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declaration of war must be authorized by the legislature, the 
executive in France has in practice almost exclusive control 
over the use of force. In particular, the President is both the 
Commander-in-Chief and the member of the executive upon 
whom rests constitutional responsibility for guaranteeing 
“national independence, the integrity of the territory and 
observance of Community agreements, and of treaties.”173 As 
such, he is able to initiate the use of armed force without any 
involvement of the National Assembly.174 This was most 
recently illustrated in the process by which France decided to 
contribute forces to the Gulf War in 1991, and again in its 
involvement in Rwanda in 1994.175 As in the American case, this 
is largely because the clause “declaration of war” in Article 35 
has been interpreted in a very restrictive manner.176 The 
experiences of both Italy and Spain are virtually the same, 
with the constitutional requirement to obtain legislative 
approval for declarations of war having been interpreted to 
mean that no legislative involvement is necessary for military 
actions taken in the absence of a declaration of war.177  
A study by Wolfgang Wagner of the Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (the “Geneva Study”) 
examined the legal systems of the twenty-six states that were 
both members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (and thus economically well 
developed), and were in the highest rank of democracies in the 
POLITY IV database (and thus the most representative of 
liberal democracies).178 Of the twenty-six states, only eight 
ranked as having a high degree of parliamentary control over 
the use of force, of which four were neutral states. These 
include the small handful of macrostate democracies that have 
constitutional provisions that require legislative approval for 
the use of force regardless of a declaration of war. Most 
notably, the constitutions of both Denmark and Sweden include 
  
 173 1958 CONST. arts. 5, 15 (Fr.). 
 174 Yves Boyer et al., France: Security Council Legitimacy and Executive 
Primacy, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 114, at 289-90; see also Eisabeth Zoller, The War Powers in French 
Constitutional Law, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 46 (1996). 
 175 Boyer, supra note 174, at 290-91. 
 176 Zoller, supra note 174, at 49. 
 177 WAGNER, supra note 164, at 45, 52. See Art. 78 Costituzione (It.); 
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, art. 63, para. 3, Oct. 26, 1978 (Spain). But see discussion infra 
note 195 and accompanying text, on new legislative constraints in Spain, which were passed 
in response to the prior government’s policy of support for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
 178 For more on the POLITY IV database see supra note 157. 
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provisions that blend a requirement for legislative approval 
with international law concepts of self-defense from the modern 
jus ad bellum regime. Section 19(2) of the Danish Constitution 
provides that “[e]xcept for the purposes of defence against an 
armed attack upon the Realm or Danish Forces the King shall 
not use military force against any foreign state without the 
consent of the Parliament.”179 The Constitution of Sweden 
provides that the government may only commit the armed 
forces to battle if the parliament has assented, it is permitted 
by law, and there is an obligation to take such action under 
some treaty which as been approved by parliament—but the 
government may unconditionally use the armed forces to repel 
an armed attack on the country.180  
Similarly, the Constitution of Ireland, which like Sweden 
and Denmark maintains a defense policy grounded in the 
concept of neutrality, provides that “[w]ar shall not be declared 
and the State shall not participate in any war save with the 
assent of the House of Representatives,” with the proviso that in 
the event of invasion the government may take necessary steps 
until the House of Representatives can be convened.181 Another 
handful of states have constitutional provisions that require 
some level of “consultation,” but not the prior approval of 
parliament for the deployment of armed forces. These include 
the very recent amendments to the Constitution of the 
Netherlands, which increased the level of legislative 
consultation, and amendments to the Constitution of Hungary 
that actually reduced the level of parliamentary control.182 
In contrast to these examples of varying levels of 
constitutionally-mandated legislative control, there are of 
course many major liberal democracies that do not have any 
constitutional requirement that the legislature be involved in 
the decision to go to war. Leading the list is the United 
Kingdom, which is perhaps ironic given that it is where we saw 
the first developments of mechanisms designed to achieve some 
legislative check on the executive’s ability to use force. The 
  
 179 DANMARKSRIGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] June 5, 1953, sec. 19, para. 2 (Den.). 
 180 REGERINGSFORMEN [CONSTITUTION] 10:9(1) (Swed.). 
 181 IR. CONST., 1937, art. 28, paras. 3.1, 3.2. 
 182 A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁANYA [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 20, 1949, as 
amended, art. 19 (Hung.); GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN 
[CONSTITUTION] Feb. 17, 1983, as amended, art. 100 (Neth.). The amendments to the 
Constitution of Hungary were largely a result of the accommodation seen as necessary 
for participation in NATO operations when it joined NATO in 1999. See WAGNER, 
supra note 164, at 44. 
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decision to use force or go to war falls under the Royal 
Prerogative, which in the common law is defined as the residue 
of discretionary power left in the hands of the Crown, as 
exercised by the cabinet.183 While parliament has been given the 
opportunity to debate the issue of pending armed conflict in 
advance of such recent engagements as the Gulf War and the 
Kosovo operations, the government has never put the decision 
in the hands of parliament in the form of a substantive 
resolution requiring a vote of approval, and in many instances 
the decision has been made without any consultation of 
parliament.184 The same is true of other commonwealth 
countries such as Canada and Australia, which similarly 
operate under the Royal Prerogative.185  
The second form of provision—that is, the kind of 
provision that incorporates international law constraints on the 
use of force—is even less common. There are only a small 
handful of macrostate democracies that have provisions that 
could be classified within this category. For obvious historical 
reasons the three former Axis Powers lead this group. Both 
Italy and Germany have provisions that explicitly prohibit 
engaging in wars of aggression. More precisely, Article 11 of 
the Italian Constitution provides, 
Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom 
of other peoples and as a means for settling international disputes. 
Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the 
limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order 
  
 183 Council of Civil Serv. Unions & Others v. Ministers of Civil Serv., [1985] 
A.C. 374 (H.L.) 398 (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton). 
 184 See CLAIRE TAYLOR, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, ARMED FORCES 
(PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL FOR PARTICIPATION IN ARMED CONFLICT) BILL, 2005-06, 
H.C. Research Paper 05/56 (U.K.); SELECT COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, 
TAMING THE PREROGATIVE: STRENGTHENING MINISTERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY TO 
PARLIAMENT, 2003-04, H.C. 422 (U.K.) [hereinafter TAMING THE PREROGATIVE]; 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN—ANALYSIS OF CONSULTATIONS 
75-89 (2008); PAUL BOWERS, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, PARLIAMENT AND THE USE 
OF FORCE, 2003-04, H.C. Standard Note SN/IA/1218. See generally Nigel White, The 
United Kingdom: Increasing Commitment Requires Greater Parliamentary 
Involvement, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 114. 
 185 See MICHEL ROSSIGNOL, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT OF CANADA, 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: PARLIAMENT, THE NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT, AND THE 
DECISION TO PARTICIPATE (Background Paper BP-303E 1992), available at 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/bp303-e.htm; Deidre McKeown & 
Roy Jordan, Parliamentary Involvement in Declaring War and Deploying Forces Overseas, 
PARLIAMENT AUSTL. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/BN/pol/ 
ParliamentaryInvolvement.htm. For a concise comparative review of the parliamentary 
control of military operations in all OECD countries, see generally WAGNER, supra note 
164. 
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ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and 
encourages international organizations furthering such ends.186 
Article 26(1) of the German Basic Law provides that: “Acts 
tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful 
relations between nations, especially to prepare for war of 
aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a 
punishable offence.”187 
The German Basic Law also includes a provision 
authorizing German participation in international collective 
security organizations.188 Thus, both the German and Italian 
constitutions prohibit uses of force that would constitute acts of 
aggression, but they also provide the authority for the use of 
force pursuant to Security Council authority under Chapter VII 
of the U.N. Charter. Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan on 
the other hand prohibits any use of force beyond that necessary 
for individual self-defense (or even for individual self-defense, 
depending on the interpretation), and the denial of all rights of 
belligerency.189  
In addition to the three former Axis Powers, the 
Constitution of the Philippines of 1935 had a similar 
renunciation of war provision, and that language has been 
retained in the Constitution of 1987.190 There are a small 
  
 186 Art. 11 Costituzione (It.) (translation from Senato della Repubblica, the 
Parliamentary Information, Archives and Publications Office of the Senate Service for 
Official Reports and Communications, available at http://www.senato.it/documenti/ 
repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf). 
 187 GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (BASIC LAW) 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 26, para. 1 (Ger.) [hereinafter GERMAN BASIC LAW] (official 
translation published by the German Budestag, Public Relations Division, available at 
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf). 
 188 Id. art. 24, para. 2. 
 189 Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, in full, provides as follows:  
  Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.  
  In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan). For my analysis of the provision, 
see Martin, Binding the Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 268. 
 190 “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts 
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and 
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with 
all nations.” CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 2 (Phil.) (translation from the Chan Robles 
Virtual Law Library of the Laws of the Philippines, available at http://www.chanrobles. 
com/philsupremelaw1.htm). 
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number of other countries, such as South Korea, Hungary, and 
Azerbaijan, which also have provisions renouncing aggressive 
war or war as a means of settling international disputes.191 The 
constitution of Sweden provides that the government may 
authorize the use of force “in accordance with international law 
and custom to prevent a violation of Swedish soil.”192 And, as 
touched on above, the constitutions of Denmark and Sweden 
require increased parliamentary involvement for decisions 
relating to the use force that do not effectively meet the test for 
self-defense in international law. But taken together this entire 
group of democracies, those that incorporate in some fashion 
the principles of jus ad bellum or otherwise impose conditions 
with respect to the kind of force that can be used or the basis 
for going to war, remains a small minority among all 
macrostate democracies.  
This may not strike some as altogether surprising, until 
it is considered in the context of the broader phenomenon of 
convergence between international and domestic legal systems. 
In the last sixty years there has been an ever-increasing level 
of incorporation or implementation of international law within 
the domestic legal systems of all the countries of the world.193 
The incorporation of international human rights law within the 
constitutions of democracies is only one of the more marked 
aspects of that process, but the rules, principles, standards, 
and norms from most of the major international law regimes, 
from intellectual property and environmental law to 
international investment and finance law regimes, are being 
implemented domestically. As will be discussed below in Part 
IV, such domestic implementation and the increasing 
integration of the domestic and international legal regimes is 
considered essential for the purposes of enhancing compliance 
with the international law regimes in question. And so it is 
indeed anomalous that the principles of the jus ad bellum 
  
 191 CONST. (1999), art. 9, para. II (Azer.); A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG 
ALKOTMÁANYA [CONSTITUTION] Aug. 20, 1949, as amended, art. 6 (Hung.); CONST. 
(1962), 68 (Kuwait); 1948 DAEHAN MINKUK HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 6 (S. Kor.). 
For translations, see Tschentscher, supra note 165. 
 192 REGERINGSFORMEN [CONSTITUTION] 10:9(3) (Swed.). 
 193  See, e.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights 
Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 211 (1998); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of 
Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 
(2000); Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and 
International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707 (2006) [hereinafter Ginsburg, 
Locking in Democracy]; Anne Peters, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets 
Domestic Constitutional Law, 3 VIENNA ONLINE J. INT’L CONST. L. 170, 174 (2009).  
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regime, which form the central purpose of the U.N. system, 
find so little domestic expression. 
Thus far we have been primarily considering the 
absence of constitutional constraints. There remains the 
question of whether liberal democracies may have nonetheless 
developed a range of sophisticated statutory regimes for the 
purpose of controlling the decision making on the use of force. 
The War Powers Act in the United States is, on its face, a 
perfect example, though as already discussed, that legislation 
has been entirely ineffective. A more comprehensive 
comparative analysis would have to be undertaken to answer 
this conclusively, but existing studies suggest that there is 
little effective statutory control in the most representative 
Western liberal democracies over the decision to deploy armed 
forces or engage in armed conflict.194 
Beginning with the separation-of-powers-type controls, 
the Geneva Study of twenty-six liberal democracies found that 
among the handful of states that were characterized by high or 
medium levels of legislative control, there were very few in 
which that control was primarily statutory, or in which 
legislation played a significant role at all.195 At the other end of 
the spectrum, there are many of the most representative liberal 
democracies that have virtually no statutory provisions 
governing legislative involvement on decisions to use armed 
force, or limiting the executive powers in that regard. This 
group includes the United Kingdom and most of its former 
dominions.196 Moreover, with respect to the second form of 
  
 194 See generally DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 114; ROSSIGNOL, supra note 185; McKeown & Jordan, 
supra note 185; sources cited supra note 184. See generally WAGNER, supra note 164. 
 195 In Finland, while the Constitution itself is silent on parliamentary 
involvement in military deployments short of war, a “Peacekeeping Act” passed in 1984 
and revised in 2001 requires the government to obtain approval from the legislature’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee. WAGNER, supra note 164, at 41. Spain, until very recently, 
had almost no legislative involvement in the decision to use force, but passed new laws in 
2005 in response to the prior government’s contribution to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Id. at 52-53. Italy passed a law in 1997 providing that parliament was to approve all 
decisions of the government on defense and security matters involving the deployment of 
armed forces prior to their implementation. This law has been rendered largely 
ineffective by the government practice of employing emergency decrees pursuant to 
Article 77 of the Italian Constitution, and the issue has not yet been resolved by the 
legislature. Id. at 45-46. In Germany, new legislation was recently introduced to 
implement the constitutional requirement for parliamentary control that had been 
mandated by the Constitutional Court in the 1994 judgment on German participation in 
the Bosnia mission. Id. at 42-43; see supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 196 In Canada, the National Defence Act prescribes how and when the 
Canadian Forces can be placed on “active service.” The Act includes requirements for 
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constraint, there are virtually no statutory schemes in the most 
representative democracies that either incorporate 
international law principles or similarly limit the conditions 
under which the government may use force.197 And, as we have 
seen, there are very few countries that have constitutional 
provisions that provide such limits. 
Indeed, the interesting observation that emerges from 
this examination of the large representative democracies is that 
there appears to be a correlation between the existence of 
constitutional provisions governing the decision to use force or 
deploy armed forces, and the establishment of underlying 
legislation implementing or supplementing such principles. 
Where there are no constitutional provisions, there tends to be 
no legislation governing the issue either. Having said all that, 
there have been very recent developments that suggest an 
increasing desire on the part of many legislatures to enhance the 
legal constraints on the use of armed force, particularly in terms 
of increasing parliamentary involvement in the decision to 
deploy forces and engage in armed conflict. In the United States, 
the War Powers Act Commission has revived the debate over the 
effectively defunct War Powers Act, and it has proposed new 
draft legislation.198 In the United Kingdom there were 
parliamentary committee hearings after the invasion of Iraq on 
the issue of reducing the scope of the Royal Prerogative, and in 
particular increasing parliamentary involvement in the decision 
to use armed force, and draft legislation was produced.199 There 
have been similar movements in Australia200 and France,201 and 
some debate on the issue in Canada.202 
A final point to be made about statutory controls is that 
they are far less effective as controls over the decision to use 
  
notice to parliament, but, despite the terminology, this is not determinative of when 
the armed forces can be sent into action. That remains within the exclusive discretion 
of the executive. National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5, para. 31; see ROSSIGNOL, 
supra note 185, at 13-17.  
 197 See generally WAGNER, supra note 164. 
 198 See, e.g., BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 6.  
 199 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 184, at 79; TAYLOR, supra note 184, at 
13. The draft legislation is annexed to TAMING THE PREROGATIVE, supra note 184, at 31. 
 200 McKeown & Jordan, supra note 185, at 1. 
 201 Boyer, supra note 174, at 290-91. 
 202 On the development of a practice of parliamentary debate, see generally 
ROSSIGNOL, supra note 185. On the decisions relating to the contribution of Canadian 
forces and the extension of their deployment in Afghanistan, see JANICE GROSS STEIN 
& EUGENE LANG, THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR ch. 13 (2007) 
(discussing increased pressure for parliamentary debate on the decision to extend the 
mission in 2006). 
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armed force than are constitutional constraints. This is 
illustrated by the sad history of the War Powers Act in the 
United States, and the operation of the recent legislation in 
Italy.203 The War Powers Act has its own particular problems, 
with claims that some of its provisions are unconstitutional, 
and so is perhaps not the best example.204 But as we will see in 
Part IV, there are several arguments that legal constraints on 
the use of force, either statutory or constitutional, would not be 
respected or obeyed in times of crisis. While I will argue below 
that such claims are overstated, it has to be said that they 
would be much stronger when directed at mere statutory 
controls. Legislation is more vulnerable to being ignored or 
subverted in times of crisis, which is one reason that the focus 
of this study has been primarily upon constitutional provisions.  
There are several points that emerge from this 
historical and comparative review that are significant. First, 
there is the insight that up until the nineteenth century the 
legal constraints on the resort to war in Europe were 
understood to operate at both the level of the international 
system governed by the new law of nations, and the domestic 
level that continued to be subject to legal systems founded in 
natural law. But after a hiatus in the nineteenth century there 
emerged in international law a more robust jus ad bellum 
regime in the latter half of the twentieth century, which has 
become the primary legal approach to limiting the use of armed 
force. Notwithstanding early developments in constitutional 
constraints and the remarkable spread of constitutional 
democracy in the last forty years, there is very little domestic 
legal control over the decision to engage in armed conflict. And 
notwithstanding the considerable and ever-increasing 
implementation within domestic legal systems of constitutional 
democracies of the international law relating to virtually all 
major areas of regulation, there is a remarkable absence of 
domestic incorporation or implementation of the principles of 
the jus ad bellum regime, the very core of the modern 
international law system. As such, the domestic causes of war 
are not sufficiently engaged by the national legal systems of 
liberal democratic states.  
  
 203  On the operation of the Italian legislation, see supra note 195. 
 204 BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 23. 
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IV. THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE 
Having looked at the causes of war and the historical 
development of the legal constraints on the use of armed force, 
we now turn to the theoretical arguments that can be 
marshaled in support of the proposed Model. It will be recalled 
that the Model is designed to address the insufficient 
compliance with the international law regime and the 
weakness in domestic-level legal constraints. As will be 
described in detail in Part V, the Model comprises three 
elements, which would: (1) require decision makers to 
adequately consider compliance with international law 
principles from the jus ad bellum regime; (2) require that the 
executive obtain legislative approval of decisions to use armed 
force above a specified threshold level; and (3) provide 
jurisdiction and broad standing for a limited judicial review of 
the decision-making process. This part of the argument will 
explore how the Model is supported by a number of theoretical 
perspectives in both international law and constitutional law. 
Indeed, while the Model may seem somewhat radical or idealist 
at first glance, I will explain how the elements of the Model 
flow logically from a number of these established theories. 
Moreover, it will be argued that the elements of the Model 
would operate to not only fulfill the objectives of each of these 
theories as applied to the specific problem of armed conflict, 
but also that they would do so in a manner that would engage 
the causes of war at each of the three levels, within the 
domestic and the international realms.  
A. International Law and Modern Theories of Compliance 
We begin with theories from international law that 
support the Model. We are primarily concerned with those 
theories from international law that attempt to explain, and 
make normative claims regarding, those features of domestic 
systems that enhance compliance with international law. Part 
of the objective of the Model is, after all, to increase compliance 
with the jus ad bellum regime. It turns out, as we will see, that 
many of those theories focus on, from varying perspectives and 
for differing reasons, the importance of the incorporation of 
international law into domestic law. This of course relates most 
to the element of the Model that calls for incorporation of jus 
ad bellum principles. But we will see that there are some 
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aspects of these theories that also support the separation of 
powers elements of the Model. 
Before launching into an exploration of the theories, 
however, a few words are necessary regarding the assumptions 
of this part of the argument. We start from the proposition that 
while the members of the international society rely almost 
exclusively on the international legal system to limit the use of 
force, the permissiveness of that system is considered to be a 
fundamental cause of war. International law is thus 
insufficiently effective to prevent the incidence of unlawful uses 
of armed force. Many realists in international relations would 
of course argue that this is because international law is not 
really law at all, and that it is virtually irrelevant to the issues 
of war and peace. This view, that international law is neither 
law properly so called, nor any meaningful constraint on state 
conduct in the realm of armed conflict (at least in terms of jus 
ad bellum), coupled with the related normative arguments that 
international law ought not to influence rational decisions 
regarding the use of force in accordance with “reason of state” 
imperatives, is obviously the subject of great debate.205  
The argument I am advancing in support of the proposed 
Model does not rest upon any specific theory of international 
law.206 It does, however, assume that international law 
constitutes a legitimate legal system and that it operates with 
some degree of effectiveness. This does not require the embrace 
of a robust liberal theory of international law. We can take as a 
  
 205 George Kennan was one of the most famous and vociferous critics of 
allowing international law considerations to cloud judgment on foreign policy decision 
making, criticizing such a “legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems” 
and “the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous 
aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system 
of legal rules and restraints.” GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 95 (expanded 
ed. 1984). For more recent questioning of the effectiveness of international law, see 
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 72. For a good review of the history and development 
of aspects of the debate, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?] (review 
essay of ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)), and THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995). For one of the 
seminal works on the effectiveness and legitimacy of international law, see HENKIN, 
HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 44. For a more detailed analysis of the various 
theoretical perspectives on compliance with international law, including an 
examination of the philosophical foundations of each, see MARKUS BURGSTALLER, 
THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
 206 Again, for a good review of the various contending theories of international 
law, see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205. On theories of compliance with 
international law, see BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, which includes a critique of each 
of the current theories of international law compliance, including Koh’s.  
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minimum position the perspective of “liberal-realists” such as 
Hedley Bull, whose perspective we reviewed earlier. Liberal-
realists accept that international law operates sufficiently in 
accordance with Hart’s concept of law, and that international 
law is generally observed to a sufficient degree to justify that it 
be both recognized as law properly so called, and understood to 
be a substantial factor in the operation of the international 
system.207 Bull argues that international law functions to identify 
the very idea of a society of sovereign states as a fundamental 
normative ordering principle, in addition to functioning as the 
source of basic rules of coexistence among those state actors—
primarily rules relating to the constraint of violence, agreements 
among states, and rules on the sovereignty and independence of 
states—and, finally, operating as a mechanism to mobilize 
compliance with those rules.208 
While the liberal-realists accept that international law 
is effective, however, they also argue that there are limitations 
in its efficacy. Thus, while it may be, as Louis Henkin has 
famously observed, that most nations follow international law 
most of the time,209 Bull argues that it is not necessarily the 
case that they do so primarily out of respect for the law. 
International law is a “social reality” to the extent that there is 
a high degree of conformity, but it does not follow that 
international law is therefore a powerful constraint on state 
action.210 Apparent obedience, or conformity with the principles 
  
 207 BULL, supra note 70, at 128-31. While Bull acknowledges that Hart himself 
found that international law lacked several of the essential characteristics of 
“secondary rules,” which are in turn necessary for a true system of law, Bull writes 
that Hart did not thereby conclude that international law was therefore not law. Id. at 
135. Thomas Franck also argued that, notwithstanding Hart’s own conclusions, 
international law did in fact have secondary rules so as to conform to Hart’s conditions 
for a true legal system. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG 
NATIONS 187 (1990). But see Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2616 
(“Until actors within the international system internalize both a rule or recognition 
and secondary rules for orderly change and interpretation, Hart argued, international 
law will consist only of a set of primary rules with which nations will comply out of a 
sense of moral, not legal, obligation.”). While Hart does conclude that the analogy 
between international law and municipal law is apt in terms of function and content, 
but not in relation to form, he does nonetheless appear to accept Bentham’s argument 
that the analogy is essentially close enough to constitute law. H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 231 (1961).  
 208 BULL, supra note 70, at 134-35. 
 209 HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, supra note 44. 
 210 BULL, supra note 70, at 133. For an echo of this argument see GOLDSMITH 
& POSNER, supra note 72, at 7-9 (though they go much further, arguing that not only is 
international law explicable in terms of state interests, but that any state preference to 
comply with international law will be trumped by other interests and preferences to 
the extent they are inconsistent with the international law norms). 
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of international law, may be a consequence of various factors, 
including inertia, a belief that the actions required by the law 
in fact conform to state interests, or that compliance will result 
in the beneficial reciprocal acts by other states, or finally, by 
the coercive power exerted by other states requiring 
compliance. As Bull puts it, “the importance of international 
law does not rest on the willingness of states to abide by its 
principles to the detriment of their interests, but in the fact 
that they so often judge it in their interests to conform to it.”211  
This conception of international law is not being 
advanced here as correct or the one upon which this Model is 
based, but as a moderate realist position it can serve as a 
starting point for our analysis. If one can at least accept that 
minimum position regarding the legitimacy and operation of 
international law, then the premises of this part of the argument 
in support of the Model ought to be accepted as valid: that 
international law is a legitimate legal system that is at least 
somewhat effective; that international law is not, however, 
sufficiently effective, and this is one of the causes of illegitimate 
armed conflict; and that greater compliance with the principles 
of the jus ad bellum regime would therefore help to reduce the 
incidence of such armed conflict. For those more extreme realists 
who dismiss international law as being neither law nor relevant 
to international relations, and who moreover think that the 
internal structures of countries are of little significance in 
explaining the incidence of armed conflicts among states,212 then 
quite obviously the arguments being advanced here will be 
entirely unpersuasive. There is not room here to review that 
entire debate, and there would be little point in doing so. On the 
other hand, the premises are of course consistent with more 
robust liberal theories of international law and international 
relations, but it is not necessary to embrace those theories in 
order to endorse the arguments here. The point is that 
acceptance of the liberal-realist understanding as a minimum 
position is sufficient to ground my argument.  
I now turn to those theories of international law 
compliance that provide descriptive and normative arguments 
regarding how domestic implementation of international law 
principles and rules is crucial to enhancing compliance with the 
international law system. There are a number of strands among 
  
 211 BULL, supra note 70, at 134. 
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the general theory that domestic incorporation is crucial to the 
enhancement of compliance with international law regimes. We 
begin with transnational legal process theory. In considering the 
question of compliance, this theory focuses on the question of how 
obedience with international law is actually mobilized. Obedience 
is understood to mean the internalization of norms such that the 
actor comes to habitually comply with the norm out of some sense 
of obligation and acceptance of its legitimacy.213 The theory 
explains such obedience in part by reference to the complex 
interaction between the international and the domestic systems—
the “transnational legal process”—which operates through 
various mechanisms and institutional points of entry. The process 
is developed through an iterative interaction between actors at 
the domestic and international levels, with an ongoing 
interpretation of the norms according to which such interaction is 
conducted, which over time results in the internalization of those 
norms within the domestic system. Harold Koh actually refers to 
Waltz’ theory of the three Images of the causes of war as an 
analogy for the three levels at which the transnational process 
plays out, and similarly argues that all three levels are important 
to the overall understanding of compliance.214 
Norms can be “internalized” through actual incorporation 
into the legal system, either via legislation or judicial judgment, 
or they can work their way into the political process through 
executive action. The norms then become part of institutional 
standard operating procedures, or policy norms, thereby 
developing to form the fabric of institutional identity, and 
domestic decision makers gradually become “enmeshed” in the 
international norms. Indeed, over time, when fully internalized 
the norm can reconstitute national identity and the perception of 
state interests.215 This internalization of international law norms 
through ongoing domestic application and interpretation is the 
key to compliance, because the norms over time become part of 
the fabric of the domestic legal system, and often develop into 
strong constitutive norms with the power to shape domestic 
policy.216 The incorporation into the Constitution of Japan of the 
international law prohibition on the use of armed force resulted 
  
 213 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2616, 2645-46; see also HART, 
supra note 207, at 51-61 (discussing the complexities of the notions of “obedience” and 
“habit”). 
 214 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2649. 
 215 Id. at 2654-55. 
 216 Id. at 2634, 2655. 
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in the development of powerful constitutive norms, providing an 
excellent illustration of this process.217 
The kind of vertical strategies characteristic of 
transnational legal process theory are most likely to be 
effective in enhancing compliance with regimes in which the 
enforcement mechanisms are weak, but the core customary and 
treaty norms are clearly defined and mandatory218—which, it 
may be argued, exactly describes the jus ad bellum regime. The 
techniques suggested for facilitating the process itself include 
the development of strategies for better internalizing the 
norms that are targeted for support, and, in particular, seeking 
to find ways to effect such internalization at each of the social, 
political, and legal levels of the domestic system. By achieving 
a high level of social internalization, the norm develops such 
public legitimacy that there is widespread pressure for 
obedience to it, while political internalization refers to the 
embrace or acceptance of the norm by the political elites.219 The 
Model’s proposed incorporation of the principles of jus ad 
bellum into the constitutions of liberal democracies would 
constitute legal internalization of the norm, and as reflected in 
the Japanese experience, such constitutional incorporation can 
in turn mobilize powerful social and political internalization.220 
This internalization of the international law norms would 
enhance compliance with the underlying international law rule 
in a manner that arguably engages the Image III causes of war. 
But given how it gets woven into the fabric of national values 
and socio-political norms, such an internalization will also 
operate in a manner that would engage the domestic causes of 
war. This will become more clear when we consider it in 
conjunction with aspects of liberal theories of international law 
compliance, to which we turn next. 
  
 217 The international law norm incorporated in Article 9 of the Constitution of 
Japan (the war-renouncing provision) was “reinterpreted” and embraced by various 
institutions within the domestic legal and political systems, and over time became the 
source of powerful constitutive norms that mobilized powerful support for the 
constitutional provision itself, and consequently the underlying international law 
norm, in a manner that effectively shaped national policy. Martin, Binding Dogs of 
War, supra note 127, at 304, 334-35. 
 218 Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2655 (using the term 
“peremptory” rather than mandatory, but noting nevertheless that he is referring to jus 
cogens). 
 219 Id. at 2656-57. 
 220 PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NORMS & NATIONAL SECURITY 112 
(1996); see also Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 304, 334-35. 
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The second strand we rely on here is liberal theories of 
international law compliance. This approach also focuses on 
the domestic level, both for explanations of why states comply 
with international law and as the subject for normative 
arguments regarding how such compliance can be enhanced. 
Consistent with the liberal theory of the causes of war, liberal 
theories of international law compliance suggest that it is not 
so much the international system that determines state action, 
but rather it is the domestic actors within the state that dictate 
how the state behaves within the international society.221 
Theorists such as Anne-Marie Slaughter emphasize the 
importance of understanding the interaction of the numerous 
actors within the domestic socio-political-legal system that 
combine to shape the configuration of state preferences. Liberal 
theories of international law compliance claim that it is these 
domestic level preferences, which in aggregated form represent 
the individual interests and preferences of the dominant actors 
within the domestic polity at any given moment, that are the 
primary influence on shaping the state’s foreign policy.222  
Because the government of the state represents and is 
responsive to a particular mix of dominant entities and groups 
within the domestic society, the formulation of foreign policy by 
the government will be influenced by the interests and 
preferences of these domestic elements. Indeed, the state’s 
preferences and policies will change as the configuration of these 
domestic entities change and there are shifts in power among 
domestic political arrangements. Moreover, it is not only the 
interaction within the state, but also the interaction between 
internal state actors among different states—especially other 
liberal democratic states—forming multilevel networks that are 
increasingly important in explaining state behavior.223  
From a normative perspective, liberal international 
legal theory proponents argue that in order for international 
law objectives to be met, and to increase compliance with the 
international legal order, mechanisms have to be developed to 
increase the influence of international law on domestic 
  
 221  See generally BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 165-79; Andrew Moravcsik, 
Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 
513 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995). 
 222 BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 165-79; Slaughter, International Law in 
a World of Liberal States, supra note 221, at 508. 
 223 BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 174 (citing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
NEW WORLD ORDER 509 (2004)). 
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institutions. This can be achieved by directly strengthening 
those institutions through some form of incorporation, back-
stopping them through such mechanisms as the principle of 
complementarity in the International Criminal Court treaty 
(which acts as a catalyst to state action by threatening 
international law intervention in the absence of domestic 
action), or by finding the leverage to compel the institutions to 
act in compliance with international law.224 The effectiveness of 
international law in dealing with evolving transnational 
threats to peace and security are identified in liberal theory of 
international law compliance as particularly requiring the 
mobilization of domestic institutions.225  
There are different strands in liberal theory of 
international law compliance regarding how exactly domestic 
actors and institutions operate to determine the manner in 
which states act within the international system.226 Two of them 
in particular are highly relevant to the manner in which the 
Model would operate to increase compliance with the jus ad 
bellum regime. The first, which has been termed the 
“ideational” strand, focuses on the manner in which the 
individual interests and preferences, which form the basis of 
the aggregated state preferences, are generated and shaped, 
particularly by forces of social identity.227 The domestic 
legitimacy of policy, including foreign policy, will be 
fundamentally determined by the operation of a number of 
elements that exercise powerful influences on social identities 
within the state. The characteristics of ideology that help shape 
the commitment of domestic groups and organizations to 
specific institutions are the most important for our purposes. 
Variations and shifts in domestic “perceptions of domestic 
political legitimacy translate into patterns of underlying 
preferences,” which in turn influence the foreign policy that is 
representative of dominant domestic shared preferences and 
interests.228 Thus, for example, the struggle in the United States 
during the last decade over the question of whether torture or 
other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment could 
ever be consistent with American values and the rule of law 
  
 224 Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International 
Law Is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 328 (2006). 
 225 Id. at 343. 
 226 BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 169. 
 227  Id. 
 228 Id. at 170. 
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represented such an ideational conflict that could in turn have 
an effect on foreign policy. The successful incorporation and 
internalization of the international law principles on torture 
would in turn influence the development of ideational norms 
that would in turn shape that policy. 
The republican liberal theory—the second important 
strand or variation of the liberal theory—flows naturally from 
the Kantian roots that have already been reviewed. From this 
perspective the emphasis is not on how the domestic 
preferences are formed, as in the ideational strand, but on the 
manner in which the institutions and political structures 
operate in response to those preferences.229 That is, in how the 
domestic institutions privilege some preferences and discount 
others in a process that results in the development of a policy 
that represents an aggregation of the interests and preferences 
of some particular combination of domestic actors.230 True to 
Kant and Madison, the nature of domestic political 
representation is central to this strand of the theory.  
The form of representation, which of course relates to the 
structure of the state and Image II causes of war, will help 
determine who within the polity is most represented and how 
much political leverage the represented groups have over their 
agents within government. The more “biased” a structure is, in 
terms of it being representative of narrow interests, the more 
vulnerable it is to “capture” by those interests in the formulation 
of foreign policy. Conversely, the more broadly representative 
the decision-making bodies are in the formulation of foreign 
policy, the less vulnerable they are to capture.231 This is of course 
at the core of the structural explanations of the democratic 
peace. The separation of powers in the decision-making process 
on foreign policy is thus not only important for the purposes of 
engaging the domestic causes of war, as will be discussed in the 
next section, but is also significant from the perspective of 
compliance with the international law principles. Indeed, it is a 
feature of the Model that the three elements work together in a 
mutually reinforcing manner, with each element being 
  
 229  Id. at 172. 
 230 Id.  
 231 Id. It should also be noted, however, that it is not broad representation or 
direct representation per se that is at issue, but lack of bias that is key. There are 
circumstances in which broad representation can nonetheless be susceptible to bias 
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explicable for reasons that relate to both international and 
constitutional law objectives. 
There is yet a third broad theory of international law 
compliance, which is Thomas Franck’s theory of “legitimacy.” 
According to this theoretical perspective, international law 
commands obedience and compliance even in the absence of 
powers of coercion, due to the extent to which it is 
characterized by the properties of legitimacy.232 There are a 
number of properties that lend legitimacy to a particular rule 
such that it can exert pressure upon states to comply, but for 
our purposes the most important are “adherence” and 
“symbolic validation.” The former is simply the perception 
among states that there is widespread adherence to the rule or 
principle, and the extent to which there is understood to be a 
relationship between the primary rule of obligation and a 
hierarchy of secondary rules related to the sources, 
interpretation, and application of law, along the lines of Hart’s 
theory of law.233 The latter, the symbolic validation element, is 
the “cultural and anthropological” component of legitimacy, 
which relates to the manner in which rituals and other forms of 
recognition and validation help to bestow legitimacy and 
authenticity upon a particular rule, and operate as a signal 
that there is an expectation of compliance with the rule. The 
formal aspects of the recognition of a newly formed state or 
government would be an example of the ritualized 
acknowledgement of the operation of specific principles of 
international law.234 
The constitutional incorporation of the principles of jus 
ad bellum into the highest law of the land of a number of 
democratic states would serve both to provide such ritualized 
recognition of the validity and legitimacy of those rules, and to 
signal the importance placed on adherence to the rules by the 
incorporating states. The wider the spread of such 
incorporation, the greater the perceived legitimacy of, and the 
expectation of adherence with, the rules of jus ad bellum. 
Indeed, in a detailed study of the Japanese experience, it has 
been explained how this was part of the intuition of those in 
  
 232 See generally THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG 
NATIONS, supra note 207. For an overview of the theory, see BURGSTALLER, supra note 
205, at 113-19; Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 205, at 2641-45 (discussing 
Franck’s theories on both legitimacy and fairness).  
 233 BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 117. 
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the Japanese Diet at the time of ratification of the new 
Constitution, when they embraced the war-renouncing 
provision of the Constitution as a new model and example for 
the world, one which they hoped would lead to emulation and a 
more peaceful international society.235 
A final comment is necessary on the issue of compliance 
with the jus ad bellum regime in particular, which has less to do 
with general theories of international law compliance. This 
relates to changes that can be anticipated in the jus ad bellum 
regime in the coming decades and the demands that are going to 
be placed on institutions for ex ante analysis of compliance 
issues. In the last decade there has been considerable concern 
over the continued viability of the current jus ad bellum regime, 
and how it ought to be adjusted in order to accommodate and 
address some of the new realities in the twenty-first century. 
The questions raised have focused on a number of specific issues, 
or more particularly, on uses of force that are increasingly 
thought necessary or legitimate, but which under current 
principles are considered illegal. These would include 
humanitarian intervention,236 the use of force for “preventive self-
defense” (the so-called “Bush Doctrine”),237 and the use of force 
directly against nonstate entities.238 There is increasing pressure 
  
 235 Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 289-305; see also RAY A. 
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for some form of change to the international legal regime to 
relax the prohibition on the use of force or otherwise develop 
broader exceptions and conditions for the legitimate use of force 
in these particular circumstances.  
These are only three of the most pressing issues, but the 
point to be made is that there is increasing pressure to adjust 
the jus ad bellum regime to address these and related issues, 
and the regime is likely to evolve over the coming decade in 
response to these developments. Given the complexity of the 
issues that require these adjustments, it can be anticipated 
that the regime will evolve in ways that demand increasingly 
complicated and sophisticated standards and conditions 
precedent for the legitimate use of armed force. That in turn 
requires thinking about how and where such tests will be 
applied, and particularly what mechanisms may be developed 
to ensure that such tests are employed prior to any final 
decision to engage in armed conflict.239 There are insufficient 
institutional mechanisms within the international law system 
to operationalize such tests and provide the fora for that kind 
of ex ante analysis. This is one more reason in support of 
harnessing the domestic legal and political systems—with the 
established fora and institutions that can provide the space for 
the debate, analysis, and determination of precisely these kinds 
of issues—to assist in the implementation and application of 
the evolving principles of jus ad bellum. 
B. Constitutional Theory—Precommitment, Rule of Law, 
and the Role of the Legislature 
A number of theories in constitutional law also provide 
support for the Model, and help explain how the elements of 
the Model would better engage the causes of war at each level 
of the three Images. This is of course most obvious in relation 
to the second and third element of the Model, the two 
separation of powers provisions. But constitutional theory also 
provides support for the constitutional incorporation of 
principles of jus ad bellum. Indeed, constitutional theory not 
only provides further support for the argument that such 
  
Targeted Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston); 
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incorporation would enhance the state’s compliance with the 
international law norms, but it also suggests that this element 
of the Model would help to achieve domestic constitutional 
objectives as well. In this section I will thus begin with 
discussion of constitutional theory relating to the first element 
of the Model, and then turn to the constitutional law theories 
that support the second element, the requirement for 
legislative approval of decisions to use armed force. 
Constitutional incorporation of international law 
principles is not itself novel. Indeed, empirical analysis 
suggests an increasing “convergence” of international and 
constitutional law, resulting in part from the domestic 
implementation of international law norms, as discussed 
earlier.240 Many of the constitutions promulgated or 
significantly amended in the post-Cold War years have, for 
instance, incorporated the language and principles of 
international human rights regimes.241 In exploring why this 
might be, why states would voluntarily incorporate 
international law norms that would constrain government 
conduct, it has been argued that modern constitutions, 
particularly those adopted in new transitional democracies, 
have employed international law to lock in specific democratic 
principles and norms.242 One of the methods by which 
constitutions have locked in international law commitments is 
by directly incorporating the norms of either customary 
international law or treaty law into the text of the 
constitution.243 It has been argued that these developments 
reflect examples of constitutional design being used to employ 
international law as a means of strengthening the 
precommitment mechanisms of the constitution.244  
The theory that constitutions operate as 
precommitment devices provides support for the Model. 
According to the theory, drafters create constitutional 
provisions that will bind the government’s behavior in the 
future, motivated by expectations that there may be 
  
 240 Peters, supra note 193, at 174.  
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circumstances that, in the absence of such constraints, could 
cause the government of the day to act irrationally, in a 
manner contrary to the state’s fundamental values and 
interests.245 It is the same idea as when a person gives his car 
keys to a friend before entering a bar, thereby making 
arrangements while he is still sober to prevent himself from 
driving later when he is drunk. It is captured in the metaphor 
of Ulysses from Greek mythology, who, to protect himself from 
later jumping to his death while in thrall to the Sirens’ song, 
ordered his men to bind him to the mast, stop up their ears 
with beeswax, and refuse any subsequent order to release him 
until they had passed the danger.246 
Treaties may similarly operate as precommitment 
devices. To the extent that the motive in entering into a treaty 
is to create constraints on the state’s own future conduct, out of 
concern that it may otherwise behave in a manner that is 
contrary to its welfare (as opposed to being a strategy to 
constrain or otherwise influence the behavior of other states), 
the entry into a treaty constitutes a genuine form of 
precommitment.247 Indeed the use of international law as a 
precommitment device enjoys the advantage of not being 
susceptible to change by local actors, so that abrogation or 
violation are the only options available to avoid the 
precommitment mechanisms. To the extent that the costs of 
doing so may be perceived by local actors as being high, it may 
successfully operate as intended to constrain policy.  
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The use of constitutions to implement the principles of 
treaties already entered into, however, serves to internalize the 
precommitment and subject the commitment to domestic 
enforcement mechanisms, thereby increasing the costs and 
difficulty of violating the bonds.248 While Tom Ginsburg, in his 
study on how constitutions have been used to lock in 
democratic norms, focused on this device of incorporating 
international law principles as a means of strengthening the 
constitutional precommitment to democratic norms, it can be 
extended more generally, and employed in a normative 
argument in line with liberal theories of international law. 
That is, the constitutional incorporation of international law 
norms can be used for the purpose of strengthening the bind of 
the international precommitments, and thereby enhancing 
compliance with international law. To put it another way, 
while Ginsburg and others argue that international law is often 
used to strengthen the already existing precommitment 
mechanisms of the constitution, the corollary that I am 
advancing here is that the precommitment devices of the 
constitution can be used to enhance compliance with 
preexisting commitments in international law. 
The constitutionalizing of international law principles 
increases the likelihood of compliance because it raises the 
difficulty and costs of noncompliance. The costs of 
noncompliance with the norm will not only be incurred in the 
international arena by reason of the violation of the 
international obligation already entered into, but also 
domestically as a result of the concurrent violation of the 
constitutional provision that incorporated the international law 
norm. The costs of constitutional violation, or the difficulty of 
avoiding compliance, can be that much higher, or at least more 
immediate and certainly quite different in nature, than those 
associated with the corresponding violation of international 
law, particularly when the issue is subject to judicial review 
and other such constitutional enforcement mechanisms. The 
constitutionalizing of a prior international law obligation 
creates a double bind. 
Aside from judicial review and other explicit 
enforcement mechanisms, it will be apparent that the 
incorporated norms will also operate on other levels, in a 
manner that may be more effective than their operation as 
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purely legal rules enforced by the courts. This ties into the 
earlier discussion of transnational legal process theory and the 
ideational strand of liberal theories of international law, which 
emphasize the process of interpretation and internalization of 
the international legal norms, such that the norms begin to 
operate not only as legal rules but also as political and social 
norms within the domestic system.249 Constitutions can, more 
than any other laws, generate and shape the contours of the 
norms that operate on the social and political level, and indeed 
shape culture and the collective identity of nation states.250  
The foregoing discussion involves the use of the 
constitution for the purposes of enhancing compliance with 
international law and employing constitutional theories in 
support of the efficacy of doing so. This may seem somewhat 
anomalous. Constitutions are fundamentally inward looking, 
not internationally oriented, and the operation of the 
international legal system is not typically a constitutional 
concern. But the incorporation of the principles of jus ad 
bellum is also, quite fundamentally, for the benefit of the 
nation itself, and constitutional theory provides support for the 
Model in terms of achieving purely constitutional objectives. 
As discussed earlier, Madison and Kant thought war to 
be often ruinous for the state; an unnecessary squandering of 
the nation’s blood and treasure. And while they both argued 
that democracies would be less likely to wage war precisely 
because the citizens of the state would be less inclined to 
embrace the hardships of war, they also understood that other 
structural checks would nonetheless have to be created. 
Madison argued that constitutional impediments were required 
to prevent that class of war that originated with the will of the 
people, against which the mechanism of the separation of 
powers alone would not be sufficient.251 The constitutional 
incorporation of the principles of jus ad bellum, as 
contemplated by the Model, would by itself serve to create an 
additional check on the government and the people’s ability to 
engage in rash military adventures. In addition to the reasons 
provided above in the discussion of international law 
compliance theory and precommitment theory, we will below 
  
 249 BURGSTALLER, supra note 205, at 170; Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra 
note 205, at 2654-55. 
 250 Günter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology—
Toward a Layered Narrative, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 439, 450 (2006). 
 251 Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1. 
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examine how the Model further operates in conjunction with 
the core functions of the legislature to influence public debate 
and the decision-making process within the legislature in a 
manner likely to reduce irrational or unsound judgments on 
the use of force. In creating such a check, this element of the 
Model would help to protect the people from the loss of blood 
and treasure caused by the illegitimate use of armed force, 
which would serve the constitutional objectives that Madison 
had in mind.252 It would constitute a constitutional check that 
would help resolve the Kantian dilemma, reducing the 
tendency of democracies to illegitimately use force against 
illiberal states, without undermining the factors that give rise 
to the democratic peace. 
There is also a relationship between constitutional 
theory as it relates to the domestic objectives of constitutional 
law and the conduct of the state in the international society. 
For a foundational element in the constitutional theory of 
liberal democracy is the commitment to the rule of law.253 As an 
extension of that value system, the liberal democracies of the 
world have committed to an international legal system that is 
similarly founded upon notions of the rule of law. But that 
system itself lacks many of the institutional forms and features 
that are characteristic of a thick rule of law system, and some 
would argue that even the features of clarity and certainty that 
define a thin understanding of the rule of law are rather weak 
in international law.254 This element of the international law 
system is thus fundamentally dependent upon the commitment 
of the participating states—and particularly the liberal 
democratic states—to over time provide substance and form to 
its rule of law features.  
  
 252 Consider how much better off the state would have been if there had been 
such a constitutional check in place to help prevent the British disaster in the Suez 
crisis, or the American misadventure in Vietnam, or indeed the more recent invasion 
and occupation of Iraq. All three armed conflicts constituted the use of force by liberal 
democratic states in ways that arguably violated the principles of jus ad bellum. Two of 
them were commenced with formal legislative approval (though both with some 
measure of executive branch deception). A constitutional requirement to consider the 
international legality of the proposed action in the decision-making process, in a 
manner that could be subsequently explained and defended, could have made a 
difference in the decision-making process and possibly led to a different outcome. See 
infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 253 On the rule of law generally, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF 
LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004). 
 254 Id. chs. 7, 8 (discussing the differences between thick and thin conceptions 
of the rule of law); id. ch. 10 (discussing the rule of law at the international level).  
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I have not, however, reverted here to a discussion of 
how the Model achieves international law objectives. What is 
being suggested is that the incorporation of international law 
can further the fundamental rule of law project within the 
domestic legal system, and that there are domestic rule of law 
imperatives that require compliance with international law. 
This is not new or novel. Such arguments have been made in 
different forms in the context of both human rights and 
administrative law.255 And John Rawls has argued that the 
constitutions of liberal states oblige compliance with a range of 
international law norms for related reasons.256 The claim that I 
am making here is that these arguments should be extended 
more explicitly to the use of force regime—that the failure of 
liberal democratic states to comply with the most fundamental 
principles of the international legal system undermines that 
entire project and erodes the already thin framework of the 
rule of law at the international level. And that, in turn, has an 
impact on the integrity of the much thicker rule of law regime 
in the liberal democratic state that has so violated the 
international law norm. The constitutional incorporation of the 
international law principles of jus ad bellum, serving as a 
check on uses of force in violation of international law 
commitments, can be understood as a mechanism for further 
protecting and enforcing the rule of law features of the 
domestic legal system. 
Turning to the second element of the Model—the 
provision that would require legislative approval of decisions to 
use force—there is of course considerable theoretical support 
for such a constitutional structure. As we have already 
discussed, the concept dates back at least to the development of 
the American Articles of Confederation, and the war powers 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution continues to be a model of 
the principle. It is also one of the central issues in the war 
powers debate that has been raging in the United States for 
over a hundred years. But much of the modern debate in the 
United States is over the precise meaning and exact scope of 
the war powers provisions of the U.S. Constitution, and the 
particulars of many of those arguments need not concern us 
  
 255 See, e.g., David Dyzenhaus et al., The Principle of Legality in 
Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation, 1 OXFORD U. 
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 5 (2001). 
 256 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES ch. 13 (1999). This point is emphasized 
by Patrick Gudridge in his book review, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 714, 716-17 (2001).  
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here.257 As we have already reviewed, however, the primary 
motive of many of the drafters of the U.S. Constitution, as 
expressed most clearly by Madison, was to reduce the 
likelihood of war.258 And the theoretical arguments of Madison, 
Kant, and others in support of such a separation of powers 
related to both the domestic objectives of the state: putting an 
important check on the state’s rush to war and increasing the 
democratic accountability of the process of deciding on war; and 
the broader goals of reducing the incidence of war generally in 
the international system. In this sense, the arguments in 
support of this element of the Model again relate to the causes 
of war at both the domestic level and the international level. 
The starting point is the insight that requiring 
legislative approval of executive decision making on the use of 
force will likely reduce the risk of rash decisions to go to war 
for the wrong reasons. This argument was initially advanced 
by Madison and Kant, among others, and indeed can be traced 
all the way back to Thucydides.259 Madison and John Jay both 
argued that the executive is more likely to be motivated by 
parochial self-interest and narrow perspectives, and thus more 
likely to enter into armed conflict than the legislature.260 
Madison further argued that there ought to be a separation 
between those who are charged with the conduct of war, as the 
President is as the Commander in Chief, and those who have 
the authority to decide on the commencement of war.261 But the 
argument becomes more compelling when unpacked and 
explained in a little more detail, with the support of more 
modern theory. We need to explore the question of how exactly 
the legislative involvement improves decision making or 
  
 257 As a starting point for some of the sources on the war powers debate 
generally, see the authorities cited supra notes 168-72. 
 258 THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); Madison, Universal Peace, supra note 1; see also ELY, supra note 169, at 4; FISHER, 
supra note 116, at 5-9; Lobel, supra note 163, at 108. Indeed, notwithstanding the 
vociferous debate on the war powers, it has been argued that John Yoo stands virtually 
alone in suggesting that this was not the primary motive of the framers. FISHER, supra 
note 116, at 15 (citing YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, supra note 170). 
 259 Thucydides recounts Pericles stating, in respect of the Athenian form of 
democracy, “[I]nstead of looking on discussion as a stumbling block in the way of 
action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.” 
THUCYDIDES, supra note 11, at 147 [bk. II, l. 40]. 
 260 FISHER, supra note 116, at 9. 
 261 Michael J. Glennon, The United States: Democracy, Hegemony, and 
Accountability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 114, at 324 (citing 6 JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)).  
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engages the causes of war in a manner that would reduce the 
incidence of war. 
It is helpful to begin by recalling the functions of 
legislatures.262 In addition to passing legislation, the legislature 
in virtually all liberal democracies, whether parliamentary or 
presidential in structure, performs the core functions of 
representation, oversight, and control over government 
expenditure.263 Representation and oversight in particular are 
important to the argued benefit of legislative involvement in the 
decision to use force. Both functions are tied to the core notions 
of democratic accountability and to deliberative democracy, 
which overlap in important ways. Democratic accountability is 
understood to include the idea that the people who are likely to 
be impacted by decisions ought to be able to participate in the 
decision making. Participation in this sense means not only 
having some expectation that the collective will of constituents 
will be taken into consideration in the decision-making process, 
but that the public debate and deliberation that is part of the 
parliamentary process of decision making will also serve the 
vital function of informing constituents and affording them some 
sense of access to the decision-making process.264  
Obviously, this process of debate and information 
exchange is also at the heart of ideas of deliberative democracy. 
The perspective here, though, is not so much on the importance 
of making the process accountable to and representative of the 
people, but on the extent to which the very process of 
deliberation among the representatives of disparate stake-
holders and interests will result in the generation of sounder 
judgments. The argument is that the process results in better 
decisions due to the attenuation of extreme positions, the 
canvassing of a wider range of perspectives and sources of 
information, and the vigorous public interrogation of reasons 
  
 262 Heiner Hänggi argues that the term “parliament” is a better general term 
than “legislature,” in order to capture the diverse functions of this branch of 
government, since “legislating” is only one of its core functions. Heiner Hänggi, The Use 
of Force Under International Auspices: Parliamentary Accountability and ‘Democratic 
Deficits,’ in THE ‘DOUBLE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT’ 3, 11 (Hans Born & Heiner Hänggi 
eds., 2004). Here, I use the terms interchangeably, unless otherwise noted. 
 263 Id. (discussing these functions in the context of the democratic deficit 
relation to the use of force); Owen Greene, Democratic Governance and the 
Internationalisation of Security Policy: The Relevance of Parliaments, in THE ‘DOUBLE 
DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT,’ supra note 262, at 19. 
 264 Greene, supra note 263, at 28-30; Hänggi, supra note 262, at 13-15. 
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and motives underlying proposals.265 More specifically, theories 
of deliberative democracy hold that the deliberative process, of 
which the parliamentary debate and decision-making process is 
a key feature, actually involves the transformation of 
preferences through the consideration of the justifications 
offered by various perspectives, rather than merely serving as 
a means by which society can aggregate preferences.266  
The oversight function of legislatures also feeds into 
both these aspects of democracy, in that the employment of 
specialized committees to engage in public inquiries into policy 
choices or proposed courses of action, provides a deeper level of 
deliberation that ensures a more thorough interrogation of 
policy justifications and the underlying information upon which 
policy proposals are based. Senate committee hearings during 
the Vietnam War illustrate how such oversight can reveal 
important information underlying policy debates, which in turn 
can influence public opinion and better inform the policy 
preferences of the representatives of the people. In 1967, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on the 
escalation of the strategic bombing of North Vietnam. After the 
representatives of the Joint Chiefs, and in particular the Chief 
of the Air Force, had testified before the committee on the 
necessity of the continued strategic bombing, Secretary of 
Defense Robert S. McNamara stunned the committee, the 
government, and the public by testifying that the bombing was 
entirely ineffective.267  
The performance of these functions of the legislature, to 
the extent that they are permitted or required to operate in the 
decision-making process on the use of force, engage the 
domestic causes of war in important ways. The fuller 
realization of the representative and oversight functions—
serving as they do to both incorporate the will of the broader 
population and to arguably contribute to the arrival at sounder 
judgments through the deliberative process—would result in 
those structural aspects of democratic states that comprise the 
Image II factors most related to the causes of the “democratic 
  
 265 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY? 1-20 (2004). See generally DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998).  
 266 Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 266, at 1, 
1; GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 265, at 13. Professors Diehl and Ginsburg make 
this point in the specific context of war powers and the legislative role in decisions to go 
war. Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to 
Professors Nzilebe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1249-50 (2006). 
 267 TUCHMAN, supra note 25, at 345. 
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peace,” being brought to bear more directly on the decision-
making process. In other words, the structure would thus more 
perfectly reflect the theoretical ideal that is part of the 
structural explanations of the democratic peace.268  
The institutional structure of the decision-making 
process created by the Model’s separation of powers element 
would also affect the political costs of going to war in a manner 
that would further engage the Image II causes of war. Absent 
an overwhelming or obvious threat, the procedural 
requirements to obtain the support of the majority of the 
legislature would impose significant political costs upon the 
executive.269 The structure would effectively create a sliding 
scale, in the sense that the greater the threat or the more 
obvious the case for war—such as the use of force in self-
defense against an ongoing armed attack—the lower the costs 
would be in obtaining legislative approval. Conversely, the 
more tenuous the case for engaging in armed conflict, the more 
  
 268 The modern history of the process by which democratic countries have 
decided to engage in armed conflict reveals a significant degree of executive branch 
deception, of both the public and the legislature, as to the facts and reasons justifying 
the decision. A constitutional requirement that the legislature approve the use of force 
would not necessarily provide a guarantee against the executive misleading the nation 
down the path to war, but the mechanism would help to ensure that probing questions 
are asked, that facts and motives are subjected to some rigorous review, and, most 
importantly, that the issues involved are argued and examined from a range of 
different perspectives. As an example of such deception, the White House obtained 
Congressional approval to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam after the second 
“attack” in the Gulf of Tonkin, when it was already known within the executive that 
the attack had likely never occurred and that Congress was operating on the basis of a 
false account of the incident. See DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM 
AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS ch. 1 (2002); ELY, supra note 169, at 19. Another is the 
decision by the British Cabinet to intervene in Egypt in 1956 when many members of 
the Cabinet, and none of the remainder of the members of Parliament, were aware that 
the government had entered into a conspiracy with the governments of France and 
Israel pursuant to which Israel would create the pretext for intervention. TURNER, 
supra note 155, at 296-315. The final determination of the extent to which the Bush and 
Blaire Administrations were duplicitous in their characterization of the reasons for the 
invasion of Iraq will have to await later historical work, but it is already clear that there 
was some deliberate deception of the public and the legislature in both the U.S. and U.K. 
See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004); Elizabeth Manningham-Buller, Dir. 
Gen. of Sec. Serv., Testimony Before the U.K. Iraq Inquiry (July 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/100720.aspx; Clare Short, 
Int’l Dev. Sec’y, Testimony Before the U.K. Iraq Inquiry (Feb. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Short 
Testimony], available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/ 
100202.aspx. 
 269 Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49, at 
2530-32 (examining how the political costs of the process of obtaining Congressional 
approval can serve to send signals to potential adversaries in this context); see also 
Damrosch, Interface, supra note 114, at 58-60 (making the point that the increased 
political costs of obtaining parliamentary approval can help to generate public support 
and signal the depth of commitment to potential adversaries).  
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politically costly it would be to win over the majority of the 
legislature for support. This is precisely the kind of structural 
characteristic that reduces the Image II causes of war. 
The second element of the Model would also engage the 
Image I causes of war, which include particular psychological 
traits that are common in many executive officers, systemic 
problems of misperception among decision makers, and the 
irrational behavior of small-group decision making reflected in 
“groupthink” and the “bureaucratic politics model” of decision 
making.270 The risks that such tendencies could lead to 
irrational or suboptimal decisions to use armed force would be 
reduced, in the case of each of these particular phenomenon, by 
spreading the decision-making process more widely through 
the inclusion of the legislative body. The requirement to obtain 
legislative approval, bringing to bear the core functions of 
deliberative democracy on the decision-making process, such 
that a wider set of perspectives and criteria are brought to the 
process, as well as a more public interrogation of reasons and 
rationales, would significantly reduce the potential for these 
potential features of government decision making to manifest 
themselves in the form of unsound or dangerous decisions 
regarding the use of force.271  
The requirement to consider the legality of the proposed 
action under international law, as mandated by the first 
element of the Model, would of course inject precisely the kind 
of exogenous criteria and divergent perspectives that could 
operate to reduce the effects of the domestic causes of war. And 
conversely, the requirement for legislative approval, bringing 
to bear the foregoing parliamentary functions on the 
considerations of legality, would vastly increase the traction of 
that aspect of the process. Evidence has recently emerged, for 
instance, on the extent to which disputes within the British 
cabinet over the legality of the contemplated invasion of Iraq 
  
 270 See supra Part II.A. 
 271  The spreading of decision making across different institutions would by 
definition reduce the possibility of groupthink, which afflicts decision making within 
smaller groups characterized by high levels of cohesion and group loyalty, shared 
values, and the dominance of a strong leader. The broadening of perspectives, public 
debate, introduction of exogenous criteria, and deeper interrogation of rationales would 
all help to reduce the problems of misperception caused in part by the assimilation of 
ambiguous information to pre-existing assumptions and hypotheses. Similarly, the 
cross-institutional decision making attended by public debate and inquiry into 
rationales would likely reduce the more obvious problems of the bureaucratic politics 
model of decision making, since the self-interested departmental interests will tend to 
be laid bare in such debate. 
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severely complicated the prime minister’s decision making, 
even in the absence of any constitutional or statutory to 
consider such issues. Had there been such a legal obligation, 
and in addition a requirement to take the debate of that issue 
to parliament, it is quite conceivable that the decision would 
have gone the other way.272 
Finally, the requirement to obtain legislative approval 
will also serve to enhance international law objectives and 
engage the Image III causes of war. Thus far in our discussion 
of this element of the Model we have been looking primarily at 
the domestic perspective—the extent to which legislative 
involvement assists the state in avoiding the ruinous costs of 
military misadventure. But Kant in particular contemplated 
the benefits that such a government structure would provide to 
the international system as a whole.273 The spread of a 
constitutional system that included representative government 
and a separation of powers between the executive and the 
legislature would lead to an ever-widening circle of peace 
among these like-minded states. It is ironic that he has been 
proved prescient, with the actual spread of constitutional 
democracy and the realization of the democratic peace, while at 
the same time the feature of his model involving the separation 
of powers with respect to the decision to go war has been very 
imperfectly realized among the world’s community of liberal 
democracies.274 It has been argued that this is changing, and 
indeed as already discussed, there is some significant evidence 
that a trend is developing, with legislatures in many liberal 
democracies around the world increasingly addressing the 
  
 272  Prime Minister Tony Blair reacted very negatively to a one-page 
memorandum from Attorney General Lord Goldsmith on the likely illegality of any 
invasion of Iraq, and to similar advice from legal counsel in the Foreign Office. Blair 
ultimately brought considerable pressure to bear on Goldsmith to prepare a more 
positive opinion. Moreover, the head of the British Army indicated reluctance to 
participate in the invasion without a legal opinion as to the legality of the operation. 
See Peter Goldsmith, Attorney Gen., Testimony Before the U.K. Iraq Inquiry (Jan. 27, 
2010), available at http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/ 
100127.aspx; Short Testimony, supra note 268; see also Rosa Prince, Government Knew 
‘No Leg to Stand On’ Legally to Go to War in Iraq, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Jan. 26, 2010 
10:00 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/7079895/Government-
knew-no-leg-to-stand-on-legally-to-go-to-war-in-Iraq.html; John F. Burns, Blair Called 
a Liar in Iraq Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A6. 
 273 See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.  
 274 This fact, of course, feeds into the debate in the democratic peace literature 
over whether structural-institutional or normative-cultural explanations best account 
for the phenomenon. 
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issue and mobilizing for change.275 The proposed Model merely 
builds on the theory and seeks to encourage this actual trend. 
Many arguments, already well developed as part of 
ongoing debates such as constitutional war powers and the 
operation of the constitution in times of emergency, will be 
raised in objection to much of the foregoing discussion on 
constitutional support for the Model. I will address a few of the 
more likely critiques in order to round out the analysis.  
The most fundamental objection, grounded in the 
theories of Carl Schmitt, is that it is simply not possible to 
develop effective constitutional constraints on the use of armed 
force, for in moments of crisis such constitutional provisions 
will be simply ignored.276 This form of argument comes in a 
number of variations. It is reflected in the U.S. war powers 
debate, in which it is frequently argued that requiring 
Congressional approval of the use of armed force would not 
really provide for a sober second look, and thereby reduce the 
incidence of imprudent wars, because Congress would either be 
just as prone as the executive to patriotic fervor or other 
inflamed emotions in the midst of a severe crisis.277 An 
analogous form of argument, much more explicitly grounded in 
or responsive to the theories of Schmitt, is to be found in much 
of the post 9/11 theoretical literature regarding the impact of 
national security imperatives on the normative power of 
constitutional protections, and the role of the judiciary in times 
of national crisis or emergency—what Schmitt called the 
moment of “exception.”278  
  
 275 Lori Fisler Damrosch, Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A Common 
Core of Accountability in Democratic Societies?, 50 MIAMI L. REV. 181, 182-83 (1995); 
Damrosch, Interface, supra note 114, at 58-60. See supra notes 173-202 and 
accompanying text regarding trends in Germany, Spain, Italy, the U.K., Australia, 
France, and Canada.  
 276 Schmitt’s theory is, of course, much deeper than this proposition, attacking 
the entire foundation of liberal legal theory with the argument that law and the 
constitution cannot function during moments of exception, and that liberal legal theory 
is incapable of explaining or accommodating this reality. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY, FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 
2005). For a critical analysis of Schmitt’s theory, see, for example, David Dyzenhaus, 
Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2005 (2006); Oren Gross, The Normless and the Exceptionless 
Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the ‘Norm-Exception’ 
Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825 (2000). 
 277 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 169, at 8-9 (considering the argument before 
criticizing it). 
 278 Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and 
the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004). For a discussion of such 
arguments, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); 
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David Dyzenhaus and others have marshaled several 
persuasive arguments to refute the Schmittian attack on the 
idea, central to liberal legal theory, that the law, and more 
importantly the rule of law, can operate effectively in periods of 
emergency.279 Dyzenhaus draws upon the theories of Dicey to 
argue that the continued operation of a thick substantive 
notion of the rule of law during the period of emergency is not 
only possible, but that cooperation among the executive, 
legislature, and judiciary to ensure that legal responses to the 
emergency comply with the rule of law is crucial to the liberal 
democratic idea of the state being constituted by law.280 Under 
this theory of the liberal democratic constitution and a thick 
conception of the rule of law, the exception does not provide the 
justification for the creation of legal black holes or the 
suspension of constitutional constraints at all, and neither does 
it operate so as to necessarily create such lawlessness. On the 
contrary, it is feasible to develop constitutional provisions that 
can survive the exception and operate to govern the response to 
national security emergencies.281 
It is not necessary, however, to refute Schmittian 
theoretical arguments to defend the Model. This is because the 
Model is designed primarily to constrain conduct in the 
moment of true exception. The rationales advanced to justify 
the use of armed force cover a broad spectrum, from protecting 
national interests as ephemeral as national prestige and 
credibility, to the desperate need to repulse a massive invasion 
of the homeland. It may be true that when a state is suddenly 
confronted with an immediate existential threat, one that truly 
threatens the “life of the nation,” it might be less likely that a 
constitutional provision prohibiting any use of armed force will 
effectively govern state behavior.282 Thus, while the war-
  
Stanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. 
REV. 699 (2006); Kim Scheppele, We Are All Post-9/11 Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 607 
(2006); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095 
(2009). 
 279 Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 276, at 2035, 2037-38; see also 
Gross, supra note 276, at 1851-53 (providing an analysis of the structural flaws in 
Schmitt’s theoretical attack on liberal constitutionalism).  
 280 Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 276, at 2008, 2030-33, 2037. 
 281 Both Dyzenhaus and Gross do acknowledge, however, that as a descriptive 
matter the response to the threat of terrorism after 9/11, particularly in the United 
States, has not been encouraging, with significant erosion of the rule of law and 
weakening of fundamental constitutional protections. Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, 
supra note 276, at 2015-16; Gross, supra note 276, at 1853-63. 
 282 For a useful discussion of what constitutes a threat to the “life of the 
nation,” see the House of Lords decision A(FC) and Others (FC) v. Secretary of State for 
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renouncing provision of the Constitution of Japan operated 
effectively to constrain Japanese policy on the use of armed 
force even in moments of perceived crisis, the provision “would 
not likely have exercised much influence over national policy in 
the event of a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido.”283 But the Model 
being developed here is not intended to prevent or even hinder 
the use of force in such dire circumstances. 
First, the constitutional incorporation of principles of jus 
ad bellum being proposed here would not actually operate to 
prohibit an appropriate response to such existential crises. The 
jus ad bellum regime itself provides for the exercise of the right 
to self-defense, and since most true existential threats would 
more than satisfy the conditions for the exercise of self-defense 
in international law, the requirement to consider compliance 
with international law would not create any constraint on 
government action. Similarly, requiring legislative approval 
would not operate as any constraint in such circumstances. So 
quite aside from the argument that the constitutional provisions 
will not operate in moments of existential crisis, this Model is 
neither intended to be, nor would it actually operate as, a 
constraint in such circumstances. 
The Model is intended, rather, to operate as a constraint 
with respect to the use of force when the life of the nation is not 
at stake, but where “vital interests” and other such imperatives 
provoke calls for action. For the fact remains that few armed 
conflicts that have involved Western constitutional democracies 
in the last 60 years have been responsive to existential threats. 
Rather, they range from such low-level operations as the U.S. 
invasions of Grenada and Panama at one end of the spectrum, 
which were defended as being for the purpose of protecting 
nationals overseas,284 to such larger conflicts as the Korean 
conflict, the Vietnam war, the first Gulf war, the Kosovo war, 
the Falklands war, or the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 
since 2001, all of which were justified as being exercises of 
collective or individual self-defense. None of these, however, 
were in response to existential threats to the Western 
  
the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.), particularly id. 
para. 88 (Lord Hoffman). 
 283 See Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 288. 
 284 The protection of nationals overseas is not a generally accepted 
justification for the use of force under international law, and the facts necessary to 
establish such a claim in these two instances are very much in dispute. See DINSTEIN, 
WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 232; GRAY, supra note 141, 
at 57-58, 91, 157-58, 390-91. 
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democracies central to the conflicts. Some were consistent with 
international law, some were not, but with the possible 
exception of the invasion of Afghanistan in response to 9/11, 
none was a reaction to a national security crisis of such a scale 
that constitutional provisions would likely be ignored in liberal 
democracies engaged in the conflicts.285  
Another set of anticipated objections will be that the 
executive branch needs to be left free from the encumbrances of 
domestic legal constraints on its ability to make the appropriate 
decisions in the realm of national security. These arguments, 
quite contrary to Schmittian theory, assume that constitutional 
constraints may indeed hinder the effective response of the 
executive in times of crisis, and that, normatively, such 
constraints should be eliminated. According to this view, the 
government may enter into an international convention that 
commits the state to observe certain obligations, but that still 
leaves the government free to breach those obligations in some 
future circumstance in which it decides that the benefits to be 
derived from breach are greater than the costs of doing so. To 
import the obligation into the constitution, however, would be to 
vastly complicate that option, increasing the costs of breach, and 
reducing the discretion of the government—which of course, 
according to the argument I am advancing, is the very point of 
doing so. But for some, such binding of the hands of the 
executive in advance, and possibly invoking the involvement of 
the judiciary by embedding the international law principles into 
the constitution, would be to interfere unwisely with the scope of 
executive powers, and at some gut level, with the sovereignty of 
the nation.286 
  
 285 This is not to say that 9/11 constituted a true existential threat to the U.S., 
for it clearly did not, but it was certainly perceived as a national crisis, and the 
national response was one that reflected a readiness on the part of the executive to 
disregard certain constitutional provisions and international law commitments in the 
name of national security. While Kuwait is not typically grouped among liberal 
democracies, it is true that the Gulf War was a response to an existential threat to that 
state, and to a naked act of aggression on the part of Iraq. 
 286 The term “gut level” is used here, since the state has already voluntarily 
entered into the relevant treaty regimes. Thus, domestic implementation to enhance 
compliance with those regimes cannot be any real additional sacrifice of sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, there are many who feel that any such limitation on the freedom of the 
nation to act in the future constitutes an infringement of sovereignty. See Robert J. 
Delahunty & John Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 73 (2006), for an example of an argument that the President is not, and ought not 
to be, constrained by international law as a constitutional matter in the U.S.; see also 
Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49. For a very good 
analysis and critique of the range of instrumentalist arguments more generally, see 
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There are a range of arguments in this category, and in 
the United States many of them are intertwined with the 
constitutional war powers debates. One line of arguments 
makes the claim that the executive is the best positioned and 
most competent branch to make the determinations of what is 
in the national interest when it comes to war, and that 
involvement of other branches would interfere with and 
degrade the effectiveness and soundness of the decision-making 
process. We see here a sharp disagreement over the definition 
and meaning of “sound decisions.” For I have made the 
argument above that legislative involvement, and the addition 
of exogenous criteria such as compliance with international 
law, will lead to decisions that are “better” or “sounder” than 
unilateral decisions made by the executive. Much of the 
disagreement can be traced to the criteria that are used in 
determining the wisdom or soundness of judgment. 
John Yoo and Jide Nzelibe, for instance, in their 
functional analysis of the war powers issue, apply a very 
narrow cost-benefit analysis that employs the criteria of 
winning wars as the primary basis for assessing which branch 
will make the “better” decisions.287 They quite explicitly argue 
that Congressional involvement is likely to increase errors of 
omission in which the state will miss opportunities to engage in 
“good” wars.288 As Tom Ginsburg has pointed out, implicit in 
their analysis is the argument that under the current 
arrangement there are too few wars, or at least there is the 
potential for failure to capitalize on the possible gains through 
war.289 This relies in part on an excessively narrow and 
simplistic understanding of the costs and benefits of armed 
conflict.290 As the term “Pyrrhic victory” reminds us, many wars 
that may have been “won” in purely military terms, were not 
necessarily worth the cost to the nation in terms of human life, 
resources, damage to the domestic political system and the 
  
Deborah Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2009). 
 287 Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49, at 2525. 
 288  Id. at 2517-19, 2522-26. 
 289 Diehl & Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 
266, at 1240. 
 290 See, for example, Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 
supra note 49, at 2525, which labels past wars “won,” “lost,” or a “draw” as a basis for 
assessing the relative merits of congressional approval of presidential decisions to use 
force. This suggests an exceedingly simplistic and narrow understanding of the true 
strategic, political, economic, social, and human costs and benefits of going to war. 
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cultural fabric of the society, and the state’s standing in 
international society.291  
Aside from pure competency arguments, another claim 
of the executive power proponents such as John Yoo is that the 
executive ought to be free from any domestic legal obligation to 
adhere to international law commitments when it is in the 
“national interest” to violate those commitments.292 This claim 
is often made quite explicitly, but it is also implicit in the 
arguments that the executive should have exclusive power to 
initiate war, on the grounds that it has the advantages of rapid 
decision-making capabilities and superior-but-secret 
information, all of which is crucial (so the argument goes) to 
the use of force in circumstances requiring speed and surprise. 
The problem with this, however, is that the circumstances in 
which the use of force could be initiated with such speed and 
strategic surprise, and be nonetheless consistent with the 
principles of jus ad bellum, would be rare indeed.293  
  
 291 These functionalist arguments have been dismissed in more detail 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Diehl & Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional Design, 
supra note 266; Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350 
(2006); Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 1230 (2007); Pearlstein, supra note 286. Also, it should be noted that not all 
functionalist arguments approach the issue with the same assumptions, or employ the 
same narrow criteria. The arguments referred to above can be classified as those of the 
“effectiveness functionalists,” who in this context focus primarily on which institution 
would be most effective at achieving the narrowly defined objectives of winning wars. A 
second category, what has been termed the “purposive functionalists,” more 
appropriately bring a functional analysis to bear on the question of which institution 
would be best suited to realize the original or intended purpose of the constitutional 
provisions in question. This latter group, guided as they are by the primary function of 
constitutional and institutional structures, are less inclined to get caught up in 
excessively narrow considerations of which branch is best able to win wars. See 
Pearlstein, supra note 286, at 1556-57. 
 292 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 170; Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational 
War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (arguing for greater 
deference with respect to executive decisions related to foreign relations law, even 
decisions in violation of international law). 
 293 This is to be distinguished, of course, from the need for speed, secrecy, and 
the element of surprise once the state is engaged in armed conflict, as opposed to in the 
course of deciding whether to initiate the use of armed force. For those who argue that 
the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 constituted a legitimate exercise of anticipatory self-
defense, with Israel launching a surprise attack to pre-empt a potential first strike by 
the deployed Egyptian and Jordanian forces, this would constitute one of those very 
rare circumstances. Most international law scholars, however, do not view the ‘67 War 
as having been a legitimate act of self-defense. Even former Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin publicly stated in 1982 that Israel had other options when deciding whether to 
launch its attack, undermining any argument that the action met the necessity 
element of the test for self-defense. See RICHARD N. HAASS, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF 
CHOICE 9-10 (2009). 
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At a much more fundamental level, however, the 
overarching argument that the state ought to be left free to 
violate international law whenever it is in the national interest 
to do so, without qualification, suggests an underlying refusal 
to take seriously international law and the obligation to limit 
the use of armed force. It reflects the “realist” view that states 
only comply with international law when it is convenient or 
beneficial to do so, which is obviously a view that is at odds 
with the assumptions of this entire project.294 But if one does 
accept the legitimacy of the collective security system and the 
jus ad bellum regime, and one takes seriously the 
commitments that states have made to that regime in 
becoming party to the U.N. Charter and other treaties that 
underlie the regime, then it is difficult to see how one can 
argue in a principled fashion that governments should avoid 
any domestic implementation of the commitment to the regime 
in order to leave room for its violation at the international 
level. It is like arguing that one should join Alcoholics 
Anonymous, but ought not to tell anyone at home for fear that 
they might lock up the liquor cabinet. And when one considers 
the litany of armed conflicts engaged in by liberal democracies 
since the establishment of the U.N. system, many in apparent 
violation of that regime,295 some form of effective domestic 
mechanism to enhance compliance with the regime would seem 
desirable.296 Moreover, as discussed earlier, developing a 
national policy predicated upon the “efficient breach” of the 
  
 294 Moreover, this is not a view that is universally embraced by realists and 
has to be seen as a more extreme view even among them. See, e.g., BULL, supra note 70. 
 295 Examples include the Suez crisis of 1956; the 1967 Israeli-Arab war, 
though many argue that this was a valid exercise of the right to self-defense; the 
Vietnam war, including the U.S. bombings of Cambodia and operations in Laos; the 
U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989; the U.S. intervention in 
Nicaragua in the early 1980s; the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986; the NATO bombing in 
the Kosovo war in 1999; the second invasion of Iraq in 2003; not to mention smaller 
scale attacks by the U.S., such as the recent operations against purported terrorists in 
Somalia in 2007.  
 296 There has been recent work suggesting that the international law of armed 
conflict already informs the proper interpretation of congressional approval under the 
U.S. Constitution for executive use of armed force. In this very limited manner, the 
current domestic mechanism could be said to provide such compliance, though scholars 
differ on the extent to which the international laws of war (primarily jus in bello) can 
thereby exercise a real constraint on executive power. See generally Bradley & 
Goldsmith, supra note 170; Delahunty & Yoo, Executive Power v. International Law, 
supra note 286; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: 
International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2653 (2005). 
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most fundamental international law obligations is corrosive of 
the domestic commitments to the rule of law. 
Ronald Dworkin has made the now famous argument 
that to take rights seriously is to enforce them even though 
doing so will impose real costs on the society as a whole.297 It is 
grounded in a recognition that we are prepared, as a liberal 
democratic society founded on certain values and beliefs, to 
incur such costs in order to structure our society according to 
those values, as expressed in the respect for and enforcement of 
individual rights.298 The analogy can be made to the costs 
associated with avoiding war and structuring our society—both 
the individual societies of liberal democracies, and the broader 
international society within which democracies now form the 
majority—in such a way that better constrains our ability and 
propensity to make war. There may indeed be times when 
those constraints will exact very real and even painful costs, 
but if we are to take war seriously, or to be more precise, if we 
are to take the reduction of war seriously, we should be 
prepared to incur such costs. Aharon Barak, the former 
President of the Supreme Court of Israel, has in the context of 
judicial decisions relating to constitutional constraints on the 
conduct of armed conflict, noted that the laws may seem to 
require democracies to fight with one arm tied behind their 
back, but that in fact democracies must indeed remain true to 
these laws, even if it handicaps them in war, in order to remain 
true to the values that make them democracies in the first 
place.299 This can be extended to the realm of jus ad bellum. If 
we are to remain true to the international rule of law, we ought 
to accept the costs of domestic constraints that merely bind us 
closer to the commitments we have already made to the most 
fundamental principles in international law. 
C. Constitutional Theory—The Role of Judicial Review 
The second branch of the separation of powers elements 
of the Model is the provision of some limited measure of judicial 
review of the decision-making process. Including the third 
branch assists in providing a further check on the “second class” 
  
 297  DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 204. 
 298 Id. 
 299 CA 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of 
Israel 53(4), 37 HCJ [1999] (Isr.); see also AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 
ch. 16 (2006). 
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of war that worried Madison, those driven by the passions of the 
people, and it provides further assistance in addressing the 
Kantian dilemma. For the problem identified in this context is 
the proclivity of the people, and their representatives in the 
legislature, to be just as inflamed and bent on action as the 
executive in certain circumstances, particularly when dealing 
with illiberal states.300 By providing for yet another check, in the 
form of potential judicial review of the decision-making process 
to ensure that the proper procedure was followed, and that the 
required factors and criteria were sufficiently considered, the 
Model can further ameliorate this weakness in the democratic 
process of going to war. 
To better appreciate the manner in which judicial 
review would operate as an effective check on improper 
decision making of both the executive and the legislature, it is 
useful to place the discussion in the context of the broader 
theoretical justifications for judicial review as a fundamental 
component of constitutional democracy. One of the central 
justifications for judicial review flows from the idea that 
constitutions comprise the formal terms of a social contract. 
The people surrender power and authority to governmental 
institutions in return for a commitment that such authority 
and power will be exercised in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.301 Even for those who view this as being more of a 
useful fiction rather than any empirical explanation of the 
formation of constitutions, it reflects the principle of popular 
sovereignty that is fundamental to constitutional democracy, 
and captures the principal-agent problems that characterize 
democratic governance. To the extent that the government 
constitutes the agent for the voting population as principal, the 
relationship is likely to suffer from agency problems, with the 
interests of the agent diverging from those of the principal in 
various circumstances.302 
The courts play an important role in reducing these 
agency problems. Informational agency problems are 
particularly significant in the people-government 
relationship.303 It is extremely difficult for the population to 
obtain information regarding government malfeasance or even 
  
 300 See supra Part IV.B. 
 301 For a good review of this theoretical explanation of judicial review, see David 
S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723 (2009). 
 302 Id. at 723. 
 303  Id. at 745. 
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misjudgment. We have already discussed this in the context of 
the role of legislative oversight of the executive in deliberative 
democracy, but the judicial review of government conduct also 
serves a vital monitoring function that helps to attenuate this 
problem. The courts provide information to the population 
regarding the extent to which either branch is engaging in 
activity that is outside of its constitutional authority, or in 
conduct that violates specific limits or constraints on how it is 
to exercise power.304 Indeed, the judgments of courts provide 
particularly accessible and legitimate opinions regarding 
government action, which tend to be given wide publication by 
the media. These not only provide information in the form of 
both findings of fact and judgments relating to the conduct of 
the other branches of government, but they serve an important 
coordination function as well. Judicial decisions help to shape 
public beliefs, both in terms of the factual circumstances 
alleged to constitute a violation of the constitutional terms, and 
the normative views as to what ought to constitute legitimate 
exercises of authority under the constitutional arrangement.305  
These two functions of the courts in the exercise of 
judicial review—the monitoring and informational role, and the 
coordinating and opinion-shaping role—dovetail in very 
obvious ways with the theoretical analysis that has been 
developed thus far in support of the Model. To the extent that 
the courts are forced to actually engage in judicial review of 
government decisions on the use of force, the monitoring and 
informational role amplifies and reinforces the elements of 
deliberative democracy. Moreover, over time the process of 
judicial review, in considering and interpreting the manner in 
which the international law principles were applied in 
governmental decision making, will internalize those norms in 
precisely the manner contemplated by transnational legal 
process theory. And of course, the mere potential for such 
judicial review, because of the well-understood capability of the 
courts to judge the legitimacy of government decisions and 
their power to shape public perceptions, can operate to 
influence the behavior of both the executive and the legislature. 
While theoretically and ideologically appealing, the 
social-contract theory may not fully explain why political 
entities engaged in the development of a new constitution, or 
  
 304 Id. at 745-55. 
 305 Id. at 756-57. 
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for that matter contemplating the amendment of an existing 
one, entities which themselves expect to exercise political 
power within the new polity, would confer such power upon the 
third branch of government. An alternative explanation is that 
they do so as a form of insurance, to entrench the political and 
legal arrangement about which there is now consensus against 
the possible interference by subsequent regimes. Judicial 
review thus serves as a hedge against the loss of power in the 
near to medium term, and insurance against successors acting 
in ways inimical to the currently agreed-upon structure.306 This 
may be a better explanation for why new democracies entrench 
the power of judicial review within constitutions as a factual 
matter, but it does not deny the agency problems inherent in 
democratic governance, nor does it negate this understanding 
of the role courts and judicial review play in providing 
information and shaping public opinions.  
The judicial review of the decision-making process 
provided for in the Model would bring to bear these monitoring 
and coordinating functions of the judiciary on the crucial process 
of deciding on the use of armed force, and in so doing it would 
engage the Image I and Image II causes of war in a manner very 
similar to that of the deliberative functions of the legislature 
already discussed. Yet because it is limited to a review of 
whether the decision has been made with adequate 
consideration of specified principles, and that the decision was 
made with the requisite authority and approvals, the provision 
for judicial review is not nearly as radical a move as it might 
seem at first glance. Rather, it is entirely within the scope of 
what courts are already understood to have full authority to do 
in most constitutional democracies. What is novel about the 
Model is the substance of those criteria or factors to be 
considered by government in its decision making—that it 
mandates the consideration of the principles of jus ad bellum as 
part of the decision-making process. But it does not require the 
court to apply those principles substantively, and the court need 
not agree with the decision makers’ judgment that the proposed 
policy complied with the international law principles—so long as 
the court is satisfied that the principles were sufficiently and in 
good faith considered in the process, then the court will have no 
grounds to interfere with the decision. 
  
 306 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 22-33 (2003). 
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Including judicial review also addresses a structural 
weakness in the decision-making process on the use of armed 
force. The argument above was that the legislature’s 
involvement can bring to bear the core parliamentary functions 
on the decision-making process. As discussed, that separation 
of powers on the decision to use force is underdeveloped in most 
democracies. This is in large measure due to the executive 
branch jealously guarding what is seen as its prerogative in the 
absence of clear constitutional requirements to involve the 
legislature.307 But another aspect of the problem is the natural 
proclivity of legislatures to abdicate any responsibility for such 
decision making. Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo make the 
argument, grounded in agency theory, that legislatures will 
always have incentives in hard cases to sit on the fence, and so 
will avoid committing to any position in up-or-down votes, 
thereby permitting the executive to go it alone and take the 
blame if things go poorly.308 John Ely, arguing from the other 
end of the spectrum in the executive powers debate, similarly 
excoriated Congress for its failure to exercise its constitutional 
function effectively or responsibly during the early years of 
escalation in Vietnam.309 This was reflected in the passage of a 
notoriously ambiguous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, only to have 
senior Congressmen later argue that they never intended to 
authorize various aspects of the war as it began to unfold 
badly.310 Thus, the clear requirement for legislative approval 
would not only force the executive’s hand, but it would help 
prevent the legislature from shirking its duty. It is the 
provision of jurisdiction and broad standing for judicial review, 
  
 307  This is reflected in the U.S. in the stance of every President since Truman 
on the war powers provision of the Constitution. 
 308 Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra note 49, at 
2524-25. Ironically, Nzelibe and Yoo make this argument as part of a broader argument in 
favor of clear executive control over the power to engage in armed conflict. See id. at 2516. 
 309 ELY, supra note 169, at chs. 2-3. 
 310 Id. at 16-17. The “intentions” of a deliberative body like Congress can be 
somewhat misleading, and its voting behavior can seem bizarre if viewed from the 
perspective of any unitary intent. This is exquisitely reflected by the voting on the U.S. 
participation in NATO air strikes in the Kosovo war of 1999. On April 28, Congress voted 
on four related resolutions. First, it overwhelmingly rejected a declaration of war, by a 
vote of 427 to 2. It also rejected, by a tie vote, a resolution authorizing the President to 
conduct air operations and missile strikes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But it 
then went on to reject a resolution requiring the President to terminate U.S. participation 
in the NATO operations immediately. Finally, it voted to provide all necessary funds for 
that operation. In terms of “intention,” one could say that Congress did not want to 
authorize the war, did not want to stop it, and was happy to pay for it. For the voting 
record, see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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however, that gives this aspect of the Model real bite, since the 
potential for judicial review would likely reduce legislative 
resistance to fulfilling its responsibilities. 
There is, of course, a final institutional weakness, which 
is the reluctance of the judiciary itself to be drawn into cases 
involving high-stakes national security issues. And this lies at 
the heart of what are likely to be significant objections to this 
aspect of the Model. General arguments are often raised against 
judicial review of government conduct that does not implicate 
individual rights.311 But there have also been many arguments 
made in the context of the American war powers debate to 
suggest that the courts are reluctant to, and that normatively 
they ought not to, play any role in decisions on the use of force.312 
And indeed, there are numerous appellate court cases in the 
U.S. in which judges have made precisely such claims, typically 
on the basis that such issues are not justiciable due to the 
operation of the “political question doctrine.”313 
Beginning with the descriptive claims, the argument is 
that courts will employ such devices as the “political question” 
doctrine, excessively narrow standing rules, or the employment 
of standards of review that are relaxed or “dialed down” so far as 
to reduce the judicial review to a mere façade when dealing with 
national security issues.314 Recent empirical research, however, 
including analysis of the decisions of the U.S. federal courts in 
national security related cases in the post-9/11 context, suggests 
that these descriptive claims are not accurate—that the courts 
are no more reluctant to exercise judicial review of such issues 
than they are in any other public law cases.315 
I would argue that when courts have appeared 
reluctant, it has most frequently been when there was 
  
 311 E.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1497-1505 (2005). 
 312 E.g., id.; Nzelibe & Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, supra 
note 49, at 2536-38; Vermeule, supra note 278, at 1098, 1106-25. 
 313 See, e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24-25 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 314 See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs 
Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87 (2009), for a good review of these arguments. The 
reference to “dialing down” the level of review comes from Vermeule, supra note 278, 
which relates more specifically to judicial review in administrative law and the 
creation of “gray holes” and “black holes” in the legal order—but the same arguments 
apply to judicial review in the constitutional context. 
 315 Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism (Univ. of Chicago, 
Public Law Working Paper No. 299); Kent Roach, Judicial Review of the State’s Anti-
Terrorism Activities: The Post 9/11 Experience and Justification for Judicial Review, 3 
INDIAN J. CONST. L. 138 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-
9/11: An Empirical Investigation, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269. 
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ambiguity as to either what the precise issue was, or where the 
lines of authority lay with respect to the exercise of power that 
was in question. Where there is a lack of sufficient clarity, it 
permits an unfortunate mischaracterization of the question 
that is properly before the court, appearing in the arguments 
advanced before the courts, the reasoning in the resulting 
judgments, and in subsequent scholarly analysis. The issue is 
all too frequently articulated as being a substantive inquiry 
into what is, in the particular circumstances, the optimal 
strategic or tactical policy to achieve national security 
objectives. The objection is then made that the courts do not 
have sufficient competence to assess such questions, and that it 
is not in any event within their proper jurisdiction to be 
second-guessing the political branches of government on 
decisions relating to the deployment of forces in the national 
security of the nation.316 But this is usually a 
mischaracterization of the issue, and it is typically not the kind 
of question that is actually before the court. The issue before 
the court in these cases is more often whether a decision that 
has been made or action taken in respect of the deployment of 
armed forces has been made with the requisite authority, or 
whether it has violated some constitutional provision.  
Those are questions that are entirely within the proper 
purview and competency of the judiciary.317 Many common law 
courts have indeed noted the distinction between the non-
justiciability of questions relating to the substance of the 
government’s defense policy on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, questions as to whether a branch of government had the 
requisite authority to make the decision in question, and 
whether there is evidence that the decision was made on the 
basis of the specific considerations required by the authority 
  
 316 See, e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d at 27-28 (Silberman, J., concurring); 
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973). To be fair, there are times 
when the courts mischaracterize the question even when there does not appear to be 
any real ambiguity, as reflected in the famous Sunakawa case in the Japanese 
Supreme Court: Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, 1959(A) No. 710, 13 KEISHŪ 
3225, sec. 2, para. 4 (Japan), available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/ 
text/1959.12.16-1959-A-No.710.html [hereinafter the Sunakawa case]. In the context of 
the war powers cases in the United States the issue is complicated further by questions 
of whether the terms “war” and the scope of the phrase “declare war” are sufficiently 
clear standards upon which the court may make judgment. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 24-
26 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 317 ELY, supra note 169, at 56; Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” 
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 606 (1976) [hereinafter Henkin, Political Question]. 
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under which the decision was said to be made.318 The point was 
made by Judge Tatel, concurring in Campbell v. Clinton: 
Resolving the issues in this case would require us to decide not 
whether the air campaign was wise . . . but whether the President 
possessed legal authority to conduct military operations. Did the 
President exceed his constitutional authority as commander in chief? 
Did he intrude on Congress’s power to declare war? Did he violate 
the War Powers Resolution? Presenting purely legal issues, these 
questions call on us to perform one of the most important functions 
of Article III courts: determining the proper allocation of power 
among constitutional branches of government.319 
The House of Lords in the United Kingdom and the Supreme 
Court of Canada have similarly held that while courts may not 
second-guess the substance of national security decisions in the 
government’s exercise of the Royal Prerogative, they may still 
review the decision for the purpose of determining whether the 
government had the requisite authority to take the action in 
question and whether the action was in violation of any 
limitation on that authority or other constitutional provision.320  
In short, while a more exhaustive analysis of case law is 
not possible here, an examination of these cases from different 
jurisdictions provides some basis for two important and related 
arguments. First, they suggest that courts are not reluctant to 
exercise their powers of judicial review where the question 
  
 318 E.g., Council of Civil Serv. Unions & Others v. Ministers of Civil Serv., 
[1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.); Chandler v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 763 (H.L.); 
Aleksic v. Canada, [2002] 215 D.L.R.4th 720 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Operation 
Dismantle, Inc. v. R, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.). 
 319 Campbell, 203 F.3d at 40-41 (Tatel, J., concurring); see also Mitchell v. Laird, 
488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the courts do not lack the ability or the 
authority to determine whether the actions of the executive constitute war-making for the 
purposes of the war-powers provision of the Constitution); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 
1141, 1145 (D.D.C. 1990) (“If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any 
particular offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute war-
making but only an offensive military attack, the congressional power to declare war will 
be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the executive. Such an ‘interpretation’ would 
evade the plain language of the Constitution, and it cannot stand.”).  
 320 Council of Civil Serv. Unions, [1985] A.C. (H.L.), at 401-02 (Lord Fraser of 
Tullybelton) (holding that the courts will only defer to the government’s opinion as to 
the necessity of the policy for national security purposes, in so far as it is not patently 
unreasonable); id. at 405-06 (Lord Scarman); Operation Dismantle, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 
(S.C.C. Can.), at para. 65 (Wilson, J.). The Operation Dismantle case involved U.S. 
cruise missile testing in Canada, and the claim was dismissed on the grounds that the 
risk to the life and security of the person that the policy was alleged to have raised, by 
reason of making missile strikes against Canada more likely in the event of war with 
the Warsaw Pact, was too speculative. The majority implicitly accepted that the issue 
was justiciable, but Justice Wilson explicitly dealt with the issue in her concurring 
opinion, which has been relied upon in subsequent cases, including Aleksic, [2002] 215 
D.L.R.4th 720 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
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before them is whether the impugned government action was 
exercised with the requisite authority. Or, to put it another 
way, where the question is whether the political branch in 
question has the constitutional authority to do what it proposes 
to do. Second, the courts are less reluctant to exercise judicial 
review where the constitutional provisions (or even statutory 
provisions for that matter) that form the basis of the claim 
being advanced are clear and unambiguous—whether they 
delineate the authority at issue, or establish specific limitation 
on the exercise of government power. It is partly with this 
insight in mind that the provisions in the Model would make 
quite explicit the limited scope of the question that the court 
can address, and the broad standing for advancing the claim. 
The “political question” doctrine would not frustrate the 
operation of the provision. In the constitutional jurisprudence 
of the United States, the “political question” doctrine suggests 
that certain categories of issue will be nonjusticiable. The most 
important and widely accepted categories of constitutional 
issues that fall within the scope of the “political question” 
doctrine include: those over which other branches of 
government have been given specific authority to decide by the 
constitution; those for which there are no judicially manageable 
standards available to resolve the question; and those which 
are impossible to decide without first making an initial policy 
determination that is clearly outside of the court’s 
jurisdiction.321 There continues to be considerable controversy 
regarding the actual scope, continued viability, and legitimacy 
of the “political question” doctrine in the United States.322 We 
need not delve into that debate here, but because the Model 
  
 321 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962). The remaining “categories” 
according to the court, were: questions the resolution of which was impossible without 
expressing lack of respect for another branch of government; questions that involved 
circumstances in which there was an unusual requirement for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; and questions which raised the 
possibility of embarrassment caused by the different positions taken by coordinate 
branches of government. Id. at 211-17. There is, however, much less agreement on 
these criteria, and, indeed, some scholars do not even accept the criteria I have set out 
as most widely accepted. See authorities cited infra note 322. In my view, there is no 
principled basis for foreclosing judicial review of any decision simply because it might 
cause embarrassment or reflect a lack of respect for another branch of government, 
where the decision potentially constitutes an unconstitutional act. 
 322 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 169, at 55-56; THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL 
QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS (1992); Choper, supra note 311; Henkin, Political 
Question, supra note 317; Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justicibility: 
The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 1203 (2002). 
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would provide clear issues for the courts to determine, for the 
reasons explained above it would not, run afoul of the most 
widely accepted criteria of the “political question” doctrine. 
Turning to the normative arguments against judicial 
review of national security issues, many of these are similar to 
the functionalist claims for executive power in the war powers 
debate. These claims are a subset of undertheorized and often 
internally inconsistent “special deference” doctrines, according to 
which the courts ought to defer entirely on foreign affairs 
issues.323 The reasons given include the need for secrecy in 
decision making; the courts’ lack of access to crucial information 
to resolve complex issues relating to national security; the 
courts’ lack of professional competency to decide such issues; and 
from the political question doctrine itself, the need to avoid 
“embarrassment” flowing from conflicting decisions from 
different branches of government in foreign affairs, and the lack 
of manageable standards for the judiciary to apply in resolving 
disputes, particularly given the allegedly political and dynamic 
nature of international norms (in contrast to the stable and legal 
norms in the domestic system).324 
All of these claims have been dismissed at some length 
elsewhere,325 and many of the more general counterarguments 
to broader functionalist claims have already been addressed in 
the previous section on the legislative role. To address briefly a 
few of the criticisms specific to the judicial role, the arguments 
advanced on the lack of judicial competency do not bear 
scrutiny when placed in the context of the demands made of 
courts for the resolution of incredibly complex, large scale, and 
hugely significant domestic issues. The problems relating to 
judicial access to information, specialized knowledge and 
competency, and the development of sufficiently manageable 
standards are no less problematic in various kinds of 
environmental, securities, insolvency, and similarly technical 
issues arising in a regulatory context, some of which may 
include constitutional aspects and even impact the state’s 
foreign affairs.326 Yet the advocates of special deference on 
national security issues do not object to judicial review of these 
  
 323 Knowles, supra note 314, at 89, 130-38. 
 324 Id. at 130-38. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and 
Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 659-63 (2000); Jinks & Katyal, supra note 291; 
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 292. 
 325 See, e.g., Knowles, supra note 314, at 130-38. 
 326 Id. at 290. 
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sorts of complex domestic cases. Moreover, those who suggest 
that there is some fundamental difference between these kinds 
of cases and those relating to national security issues again 
mischaracterize the question at issue in national security 
cases. As already discussed, the courts are not seeking to 
second-guess the policy determination as to what is in the 
national interest on the basis of highly classified information—
they are simply assessing whether such decisions were made 
with the requisite authority, based on a sufficient consideration 
of the required criteria, and not otherwise in violation of 
constitutional rights or limitations. 
The notion of “special deference” is inconsistent with a thick 
conception of the rule of law, as David Dyzenhaus has argued, and 
even champions of “special deference” such as like Adrian 
Vermeule have conceded.327 The idea rests in part on the theories of 
Carl Schmitt regarding the ineffectiveness of constitutional law 
constraints in moments of crisis—arguments that were ultimately 
intended to prove the invalidity of liberal democratic theory, as we 
have already examined. And it will of course be clear by now that 
this entire project is premised upon the legitimacy and validity of 
liberal democratic theory and the importance of a thick or 
substantive conception of the rule of law.328 
Claims for deference to the executive in foreign affairs 
are also grounded in an anachronistic adherence to the most 
conservative versions of realism in international relations. 
They flow from the belief in a Hobbesian world characterized 
by an anarchical international system in perpetual conflict, in 
which unitary sovereign states are the sole actors and self-
preservation is the prime directive.329 That worldview does not 
comport with the reality of an increasingly interconnected and 
globalized international society, with growing networks of 
transnational relations at various levels and involving nonstate 
actors, governed by an increasingly integrated web of 
international and domestic legal systems. Descriptively, the 
international society does not reflect the Hobbesian conception 
of the world, and normatively, this project is predicated upon 
  
 327 DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN TIME OF 
EMERGENCY (2006); Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey, supra note 276, at 231, 235, 237-38; 
Vermeule, supra note 278, at 1132-33.  
 328 For the discussion of Schmitt’s theories and the arguments refuting them, 
see supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.  
 329 Knowles, supra note 314, at 25-39; see supra Part II.C (discussing the 
Hobbesian perspective). 
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the need to move us further away from the vestigial remnants 
of that pre-twentieth century understanding of the world. 
In short, as an empirical matter, the evidence casts doubt 
on the extent to which courts are reluctant to engage national 
security issues. The normative arguments for such deference are 
neither persuasive nor grounded in theories of international 
relations and constitutional law that are consistent with a 
liberal understanding of international law and explanations for 
the democratic peace, or indeed deliberative democracy and the 
place of the rule of law in liberal democracy. There is evidence to 
suggest that courts will quite willingly engage in judicial review 
where there are clear constitutional provisions regarding the 
distribution of authority and the establishment of limits on the 
exercise of such authority in national security matters. And the 
kinds of questions that are presented to courts in such situations 
do not attract many of the objections, such as technical 
competence and the nature of standards to be applied, that are 
often raised by opponents of judicial review in the realm of 
national security. 
In closing, it should be emphasized how the three 
distinct elements of the Model would operate together in a 
mutually reinforcing fashion, and indeed the extent to which 
the theoretical rationales for them are complimentary and 
interlocking. Taken as a whole the Model has a certain Gestalt 
character, with the combined effect of these mutually 
reinforcing elements being greater than the sum of the 
individual benefits that each could provide alone. This becomes 
clearer with a consideration of the actual design of the Model, 
to which we turn next, and at the end of that discussion I will 
revisit the importance of the combined operation of the 
elements of the Model.  
V. DESIGN OF THE MODEL 
The last question to consider is exactly how the Model 
would be structured in practical terms, and to explain briefly 
why certain choices were made in developing the suggested 
design. Moreover, in this discussion of the specific provisions 
comprising the Model, I shall explore further how the elements 
would operate to effectively achieve the theoretical objectives 
previously outlined. To facilitate this discussion, I have 
developed draft language for a constitutional provision. The 
entire Model would be comprised of one article, divided into 
three sections or clauses, with each section constituting one of 
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the elements of the Model. This is a generic proposal to serve 
as a vehicle for illustrating the conceptual design of the Model. 
It is not aimed at any specific constitution. 
A. A Process-Based Constitutional Incorporation of Jus ad 
Bellum 
The article begins with the incorporation of the 
principles of jus ad bellum. The first section provides: 
(1) Any decision to use armed force, or to deploy armed forces in 
circumstances likely to lead to the use of armed force, of a level in 
scale, duration, and intensity equal to that constituting an armed 
attack in international law, shall be made only after sufficient and 
demonstrable consideration of whether the proposed action is 
consistent with the applicable principles of international law 
relating to the use of armed force, as found in the United Nations 
Charter, other relevant treaties to which the State is a party, and 
the related principles of customary international law. 
The key elements of this section, which require some 
further discussion and explanation, are that: (i) it incorporates 
both conventional international law (that is, treaty law) and 
customary international law; (ii) it specifies the regime of law 
from which the principles are drawn, with reference by name to 
the most important governing convention (the U.N. Charter); 
(iii) it incorporates the relevant principles of international law 
by reference only, rather than explicitly stipulating the 
substance of those principles; (iv) it is process based rather than 
substantive, in the sense that it does not purport to incorporate 
and impose the actual prohibitions from international law, but 
rather it only creates an obligation for decision makers to 
sufficiently consider compliance with those prohibitions (and the 
exceptions thereto); and finally, (v) it provides a threshold level 
of force that would trigger the operation of the provision, with 
some criteria for defining that trigger. 
Beginning with the first element, there are a number of 
reasons underlying the decision to incorporate both treaty and 
customary international law. There is a wide range of 
approaches among constitutional democracies regarding the 
manner in which international law is treated within their 
domestic legal systems, and great variation in the extent to 
which there is already some constitutional provision for such 
treatment. This not only relates to the classic theoretical 
division between monist and dualist perspectives, but also 
relates, in practical terms, to the significant differences among 
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states regarding how the different forms of international law 
are received and the status each is afforded within the 
domestic legal system.330 The mechanisms and processes by 
which states incorporate (or transform, as the case may be) 
customary international law are typically different than those 
used for the incorporation of conventional international law, 
and many states also afford one a higher status within the 
domestic legal system than the other. Moreover, these 
differences themselves vary considerably across states, even 
among liberal democracies, with some such as the Netherlands 
placing a primacy on treaty law,331 while others such as 
Germany, Austria, and Italy giving customary international 
law higher status.332 States vary as well on how each of these is 
to be received by the domestic legal systems.333 
All of this suggests a couple of inferences. First, there 
are clear examples of constitutional democracies incorporating 
within their constitutions both conventional international law 
and customary international law, and indeed examples of each 
being afforded a higher status than domestic statutes and even 
a national constitution. Second, given the very uneven 
treatment among democracies for the purposes of developing a 
universal model of incorporation, and given that there are 
principles from both a treaty and custom that are thought to be 
  
 330 For a more extensive review of the various permutations of how monism 
and dualism are reflected in the legal systems of a number of constitutional 
democracies, and the varying ways in which treaty and custom are ranked in different 
systems, see Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy, supra note 193, at 713-19. 
 331 GRONDWET VOOR HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 
17, 1983, arts. 91, 93, 94 (Neth.); see also Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy, supra note 
193, at 713. The French Constitution of 1958 ranks ratified treaties above statute, 
subject only to a condition of reciprocity. 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.). The Constitution of 
Costa Rica of 1968 has a similar provision. CONST. Nov. 8, 1949, art. 7 (Costa Rica). See 
generally Buergenthal, supra note 193, at 215-20.  
 332 Buergenthal, supra note 193, at 215-20. See GERMAN BASIC LAW, supra note 
187, art. 25 (“The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal 
law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the 
inhabitants of the federal territory.”) The Constitution of Austria includes only the first 
clause of Article 25 of the German Basic Law. BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (Austria). The Constitution of Hungary similarly provides that “the 
legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognized principles of 
international law, and shall harmonize the country’s domestic law with the obligations 
assumed under international law.” A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁANYA 
[CONSTITUTION] Aug. 20, 1949, as amended, art. 7, para. 1 (Hung.). 
 333 The principle in the United Kingdom was articulated most famously by 
Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, [1997] Q.B. 529, 
553-57; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; GIBRAN VAN ERT, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
CANADIAN COURTS 142-50 (2002). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist 
Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999); 
Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy, supra note 193, at 109. 
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important, the incorporation mechanism should explicitly 
incorporate the principles of both systems as part of the Model. 
That way, regardless of the more general approach within the 
particular constitutional system, the provision would make 
quite clear that the principles of both systems are being 
incorporated directly into the constitution for the purposes of 
this constraint on the use of armed force.  
This of course raises the question of whether there are 
significant differences between the principles of jus ad bellum 
to be found in conventional international law and custom. 
There is in fact very little difference, as the International Court 
of Justice went to some pains to establish in Nicaragua v. 
United States (Merits).334 And the most fundamental principles 
of the jus ad bellum regime, the incorporation of which is 
central to the Model, are essentially found in Article 2(4) and 
Chapter VII (which includes Article 51) of the U.N. Charter. 
Nonetheless, it will be recalled that one of the theoretical 
arguments in support of adopting the Model to begin with is 
that the jus ad bellum regime is coming under pressure to 
change, leading to the possible development of new principles 
and new legal tests to determine their application. The extent 
to which there is indeed some change to the jus ad bellum 
regime in the near to mid-term, it is unlikely to come in the 
form of amendments to the U.N. Charter or the adoption of any 
new treaty. It is much more likely to come in the form of 
changes to customary international law. In such circumstances, 
it will be important that the Model will have been structured so 
as to incorporate the relevant principles of customary 
international law, and to require that the decision making on 
the use of armed force be informed by the most current 
developments in the law. 
The second element of this subsection of the provision is 
the manner in which it refers specifically to the principles of 
the jus ad bellum regime, and refers even more explicitly to a 
particular treaty regime, namely the U.N. Charter. This is in 
contrast to the option of a much broader incorporation of 
international law as a whole, as many national constitutions 
already have. Some of the reasons for a more narrow and 
specific incorporation will be obvious and were discussed 
earlier.335 In addition, given fairly widespread concerns about 
  
 334 Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at 14. 
 335  See supra text accompanying notes 161-63. 
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the legitimacy in permitting international law to trump 
domestic law—concerns grounded in arguments about the 
democratic deficiency of the international law-making process, 
the erosion of national sovereignty, and the negating of the 
democratic will of the state’s citizenry—it may be considerably 
easier in practical terms to mobilize support for a carefully 
tailored provision than a blanket incorporation of international 
law along the lines of the Netherlands.  
In addition to this, however, the incorporation of specific 
principles or regimes of international law provides a much 
more fertile basis for the internal interpretation and 
internalization of the associated norms, which as was discussed 
earlier is an important aspect of the process of enhancing 
compliance with international law according to transnational 
legal process theory. Moreover, by identifying particular 
regimes and specifying the precise treaty from which principles 
are drawn, examples from a number of countries suggest that 
the constitutional provision will thereby create the legitimate 
basis for courts and other domestic institutions to consider how 
those principles have been interpreted by international 
tribunals and organizations. This can be an important factor in 
insuring that the principles that are incorporated remain 
organically connected to the international law sources from 
which they were drawn. 
One of the best examples of this approach is the 
constitutional incorporation of human rights principles by a 
number of countries over the last few decades. For instance, 
Article 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 provides that 
“the norms relative to basic human rights and liberties which 
are recognized by the constitution, shall be interpreted in 
conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the international treaties and agreements on those 
matters ratified by Spain.”336 This has been interpreted to mean 
that such human rights conventions as the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights337 have constitutional 
status within the Spanish legal system; or, to put it another 
way, the relevant provisions of those conventions have 
effectively been incorporated by reference into the 
  
 336 CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, art. 10, para. 2, Oct. 26, 1978 (Spain). 
 337 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976). 
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Constitution.338 What is more, this incorporation by explicit 
reference to the conventions themselves has provided a basis 
for the Spanish courts to not only interpret the constitutional 
provisions in light of the principles in the conventions, but also 
to draw upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions of 
the conventions by international courts and other 
interpretative bodies.339  
The third element of this subsection of the Model relates 
to the manner in which the provision incorporates the principles 
of jus ad bellum by reference only, rather than specifying the 
content of those principles as part of the constitutional text. In 
other words, the provision requires decision makers to consider 
the applicable principles relating to the use of force, as found in 
the U.N. Charter and other sources, but it does not provide an 
explicit list of what those principles are. An alternative approach 
would have been to provide a set of subsections detailing the 
content of each principle and rule taken from international law 
that decision makers had to consider before taking action. Aside 
from the sheer awkwardness of trying to stipulate all the 
relevant rules and principles, the reasons for employing the “by 
reference” mechanism are similar to those discussed above in 
relation to the importance of including general references to 
customary international law and treaty sources. That is, 
incorporation by reference preserves the flexibility of the Model, 
such that the provision can essentially evolve as the underlying 
international law principles change over time, and it retains the 
organic link to those principles for purposes of interpretation. As 
already discussed, that has its own inherent risks, but given the 
likelihood that the jus ad bellum regime will develop over the 
next few decades, coupled with the difficulty associated with any 
constitutional amendment, building in that kind of flexibility is 
important. 
An example of this approach, albeit in a regular statute 
rather than a constitutional context, can be found in the Alien 
Tort Statute in the United States, the key clause of which states 
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
  
 338 Buergenthal, supra note 193, at 217. 
 339 Id. A number of Latin American countries have followed a similar path. 
See, e.g., Art. 75, para. 22, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL (Arg.). For a discussion of similar 
developments among the new democracies of Eastern Europe, see Eric Stein, 
International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization of Central-Eastern 
European Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 427 (1994). 
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the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”340 This does 
not incorporate international law norms per se, but as the 
Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the statute 
confers subject matter jurisdiction and creates a cause of action 
for the violation of the “laws of nations,” which is a reference to 
customary international law.341  
Two advantages of the incorporation by reference are 
well illustrated by this example. The first is the flexibility of the 
legislative provision, as its content can essentially evolve over 
time without requiring any change to statutory language. Thus, 
in Sosa it was recognized that the content of the “narrow set of 
violations of the law of nations” today is certainly not the same 
as the narrow set of violations that were contemplated back in 
1789 when the statute was enacted. Rather, the range of what 
types of violations within the law of nations was defined, but the 
content of those violations was not specified, and is left to be 
ascertained according to the current principles of customary 
international law.342 Second, but very much related, is the 
advantage of maintaining an organic connection to the 
international law principles, which thus continue to be the living 
source of the rules. The employment of the term “in violation of 
the laws of nations” constituted an intermediary within the 
statute, or a trigger, for the application of the primary norms 
that are promulgated in detail somewhere else—in this instance 
in the sources of the laws of nations. In the sense of Hart’s 
primary and secondary rules, therefore, the reference in the 
statute is merely a secondary norm, and leaves the primary 
norm as the source of the content.343 
  
 340 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (enacted as part of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789). 
 341 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 342  Id. at 720, 724, 732. 
 343 Patrick Gudridge explains how the Retaliation Act of March 1813 
employed this device to incorporate the laws of war. The Act conferred authority upon 
the President to retaliate against any “violations of the laws and usages of war, among 
civilized nations.” Law of March 3, 1813, ch. LXI, 2 Stat. 829-30 (1813). Gudridge 
makes the argument that use of legislation as an intermediary was a common device at 
the time, and it essentially rendered available to the President an entire body of law, 
the international laws of war; and as a secondary norm, did not attempt to specify the 
content of the primary norms it thus incorporated. Patrick O. Gudridge, Ely, Black, 
Grotius & Vattel, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 81, 85-86 (1995); see also Bernard H. Oxman, 
The Relevance of the International Order to the Internal Allocation of Powers to Use 
Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 133-34 (1995) (arguing that the changes to the 
international law regime on the use of force should inform our understanding of the 
relationship between the constitutional war powers provisions and international law). 
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As explained earlier, this retention of an organic 
connection with the underlying international law principles also 
ensures that there will be full access to the associated 
interpretations and understanding of those principles, including 
the decisions of international tribunals and organizations, as 
they have developed over time. This relationship tends to be lost 
when the contemporary understanding of customary 
international law rules is taken or the language of a rule is lifted 
from some treaty and then dropped into the text of a constitution 
(often in some slightly revised form). Moreover, the juxtaposition 
of the revised language with other provisions, severed as it is 
from its conceptual source, can lead to significant unintended 
consequences.344 
The fourth element of the subsection is that it is 
process-based rather than substantive in nature. In other 
words, the provision does not incorporate the prohibitions (and 
corresponding exceptions) of the jus ad bellum regime as 
substantive clauses in the Constitution. Rather, it merely 
requires that the decision makers contemplating the use of 
force sufficiently and demonstrably consider whether the 
proposed action is consistent with the international law 
principles that have been incorporated.  
There are several reasons for choosing to develop the 
mechanism in this fashion, but they largely relate to the 
practical issues of implementation. It can be anticipated that 
there would be significant political objection in many 
jurisdictions to any contemplated adoption of this Model. The 
foundation of many of these objections, principled and 
otherwise, would be a resistance to the idea of incorporating 
international law principles to bind the hands of government 
on issues of national security—issues relating to self-
preservation and defending “vital interests.” As has already 
been suggested above, the arguments behind many of these 
objections are misplaced. But the fact remains that if the Model 
proposed the incorporation of the principles as binding 
constitutional prohibitions, which would also entail conferring 
upon the judiciary the power to decide whether a proposed use 
of force did or did not comply with the exceptions to the 
prohibition as a matter of both constitutional and international 
  
 344 Both these problems are reflected in the history of the drafting and 
operation of the war renouncing provision of the Japanese Constitution, one clause of 
which was developed using adapted language from principles of jus ad bellum. See 
Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 289-327. 
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law, then the volume of these objections would likely be 
overwhelming. Such implementation of binding prohibitions 
may be possible and desirable in the future, but for now a 
process-based model may serve as an initial and more viable 
step along the road to that objective. And for the reasons 
already discussed in the previous Part, a process-based 
provision will still have a significant effect. 
The final element in the subsection is the initial gate-
keeping mechanism, which limits the application of the 
provision to only those decisions regarding the use of armed 
force that could constitute an “armed attack,” as that term is 
understood in international law. This is to ensure that there is 
a de minimis level below which the government would not be 
bound by the provision. Moreover, as will be discussed in the 
next section, the same trigger would apply to the other 
elements of the Model, thus ensuring that the various elements 
of the Model operate in harmony, and the domestic elements 
are triggered by criteria that are consistent with valid concepts 
in international law.  
The parameters of this threshold test are not novel. As 
explained briefly in the discussion of the modern system of jus 
ad bellum, the occurrence of an armed attack is a condition 
precedent to the exercise of the right of self-defense (or, for the 
exercise of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense, that an 
armed attack is imminent, in the sense that it is irrevocably in 
motion).345 Similarly, the current understanding in 
international law is that the use of force against a state must 
reach a certain level—or be of “sufficient gravity,” to use the 
language of the U.N. Resolution on the Definition of 
Aggression—before it can be considered an act of aggression.346 
The International Court of Justice has adopted this language 
in holding that the use of armed force must rise to a certain 
level before it constitutes an “armed attack” justifying the 
exercise of the right of self-defense, and it is clearly well above 
the mere use of force that would violate the prohibition in 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.347 Where that line is actually 
drawn, or what criteria are to be used to determine exactly 
where to draw the line, has not yet been clearly established in 
international law, but the principle itself has been. It is no 
  
 345 DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 187. 
 346 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29(1) RGA 142, 143 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 347 Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at 110; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 42 
I.L.M. 1334, 1355 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
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more uncertain or incapable of determination than any number 
of other constitutional principles. Dinstein suggests that an 
armed attack requires that the use of force must be of a 
magnitude that is likely to “produce serious consequences, 
epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties, or 
considerable destruction of property.”348  
The trigger mechanisms in current constitutions, in 
legislation such as the War Powers Act, and proposed 
legislation such as that in the War Powers Commission Report, 
are not any clearer, and what is more, they often employ terms 
that are not related to known and valid concepts in 
international law. We have already seen that the constitutions 
of many countries, including that of the United States, require 
legislative approval of any “declaration of war.” While 
declarations of war continue to be theoretically part of the 
international law on the use of force, they are no longer 
reflected in state practice, and are certainly no longer 
considered necessary to trigger the operation of the laws of war 
or bring into existence the legal state of war.349 To the extent 
the term is interpreted to mean anything other than a formal 
declaration that triggers a technical state of war, it becomes 
highly ambiguous, as the war powers debate in the United 
States illustrates. 
The War Powers Act lowered the threshold significantly, 
using as the trigger “any case in which United States Armed 
Forces are introduced: . . . into hostilities or into situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated 
by the circumstances.”350 There is no definition of “hostilities,” 
and so there is no indication of what scale, intensity, or 
duration of armed conflict that would be required to constitute 
“hostilities” for the purpose of the provision. It could arguably 
encompass peace-keeping operations, or the lowest-level border 
skirmishes, yet could potentially be interpreted to exclude such 
uses of force as cruise missile strikes on foreign targets.  
The proposed legislation of the War Powers Commission 
Report, in contrast, tries to raise the threshold by requiring a 
“significant armed conflict” as a condition precedent, which is 
defined as being “any combat operation by U.S. armed forces 
  
 348 DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 193. 
 349  Id. at 30-34; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 15 (2004). 
 350 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006)). 
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lasting more than a week or expected by the president to last 
more than a week.” It explicitly excludes a number of activities, 
such as “limited acts of reprisal against terrorists or states that 
sponsor terrorism,” “covert operations,” and “missions to protect 
or rescue American citizens or military or diplomatic personnel 
abroad.”351 Again, “combat operation” remains undefined, creating 
uncertainty as to what precisely is contemplated. More 
significantly, not only does this formulation similarly employ 
concepts for the trigger that do not equate with the principles of 
jus ad bellum, but the provision also explicitly endorses unilateral 
executive action for purposes that could very well violate the 
prohibition on the use of force in international law. Reprisals, as 
the term is understood in international law, are illegal.352 Covert 
ops and missions to protect nationals abroad would easily 
encompass the support provided to the Contras in Nicaragua, and 
the invasions of Grenada and Panama, all actions that are widely 
seen as having been unlawful.353 Moreover, aside from the explicit 
exceptions, the threshold would not be crossed by such uses of 
force as extensive missile or air strikes, including strikes with 
nuclear weapons, so long as they would not be expected to lead to 
“combat” lasting more than one week. There is little apparent 
relationship between the requirements of international law and 
that which the War Powers Commission Report considered 
important enough to require Congressional involvement. 
The trigger that is contemplated in the Model, while it 
admittedly contains some uncertainty as to its precise scope, is 
a concept understood in international law. By employing it in 
the Model, we ensure that the same criterion is used for both 
requiring consideration of international legality and for 
obligating the government to obtain legislative approval, and 
that the criterion itself is comprised of concepts taken from 
international law. It is the kind of principle that courts are in 
any event well accustomed to working with, and it is necessary 
to have some threshold to ensure that the government is able 
to act more freely in circumstances that would not implicate 
the jus ad bellum regime in international law. It is only the use 
  
 351 BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 45 (proposed War Powers 
Consultation Act of 2009 § 3(A)-(B)). 
 352 GRAY, supra note 141, at 150-51. Professor Dinstein makes some allowance 
for “defensive reprisals,” as being actions short of war taken in self-defense that would 
otherwise meet all the conditions for legitimate self-defense. DINSTEIN, WAR, 
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, supra note 129, at 221-22.  
 353 Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at paras. 75-126, 227-28; GRAY, supra 
note 141, at 57 (Panama), 157-58, 390-91 (Grenada). 
2011] TAKING WAR SERIOUSLY 715 
of force constituting an armed attack, whether legally justified 
or not, which is likely to escalate into an armed conflict. Armed 
attack, therefore, is arguably the appropriate level of force to 
trigger the requirement to involve the other branches of 
government and focus consideration on the questions of 
whether that use of force will comply with international law.354 
A final word should be said about whether the trigger 
makes any distinction between the use of force for individual 
self-defense and that used for other purposes, be it collective 
self-defense or collective security operations. Constitutional 
controls of some countries do make such a distinction, as 
discussed in Part III. The Constitution of Denmark, for 
instance, provides that “[e]xcept for purposes of defence against 
an armed attack upon the Realm or Danish forces the King 
shall not use military force against any foreign state without 
the consent of the Parliament.”355 This clearly limits the 
exception to the exercise of individual self-defense. 
The trigger as it is employed in both this element of the 
Model and in the separation of powers element to be discussed 
next, makes no such distinction. In this element, the whole 
point is to force the decision makers to consider whether the 
proposed action complies with the principles of jus ad bellum—
that is, to determine whether it falls within the scope of either 
self-defense, individual or collective, or collective security 
operations authorized by the U.N. Security Council (to state 
the current exceptions on the prohibition on the use of force). It 
would simply beg the question to suggest that they could avoid 
such a requirement in the event that the contemplated use of 
force was to be an exercise of self-defense. Whether it is legally 
a case justifying self-defense is the very thing to be determined 
by considering compliance with international law principles. 
In the context of the next element of the Model, the 
requirement to obtain approval of the legislature, the trigger 
would serve the same function. Permitting the government to 
avoid obtaining legislative approval in the event the force is to 
be used for self-defense would simply create further incentives 
  
 354 The jurisprudence of the ICJ has made clear that there is a gap between 
the minimum use of force that would violate the prohibition on the use of force in 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and the scale, intensity, and effect that is required of 
any specific use of force in order for it to rise to the level of constituting an “armed 
attack” for the purposes of triggering the right to use force in self-defense under Article 
51. See Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 141, at paras. 191, 210-11, 230-32; Oil Platforms 
(Iran v. U.S.), 42 I.L.M. 1334, paras. 51, 64 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
 355 DANMARKSRIGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] June 5, 1953, sec. 19, para. 2 (Den.). 
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for the government to manipulate the record to provide support 
for a claim that the action is in fact an exercise of self-defense. 
It would thereby defeat the very objective of having such 
assertions subjected to inquiry and debate in the legislature. If 
the case is obvious and pressing, the analysis will be easy and 
the approval from the legislature quickly forthcoming; if it is 
not easy, than there is all the more reason for having the 
legislature involved in the deliberations, with all the 
advantages that such deliberation brings to the exercise. In the 
event of an invasion or the like, there is an emergency 
exception, as will be discussed in the next section. 
B. Separation of Powers: Legislative Approval and Judicial 
Review 
The second element of the Model would require 
legislative approval of any decision to use force, while the third 
element would explicitly confer jurisdiction and establish 
standing for judicial review of the decision-making process. 
Together they form the “separation of powers” component of 
the Model, and as such they will be considered together here. 
The two provisions would read as follows, allowing, of course, 
for the necessary changes to conform to the circumstances of 
each jurisdiction: 
2. (i) Any decision to use armed force, or to deploy armed forces in 
circumstances likely to lead to the use of armed force, of a level in 
scale, duration, and intensity equal to that constituting an armed 
attack in international law, shall be approved by both houses of the 
legislature by a simple majority of votes cast. 
(ii) In the event of an armed attack against the territory or armed 
forces of the state, or other such national security emergency 
requiring the urgent use of armed force, making prior approval from 
the legislature impractical, the government may use armed force 
without prior approval, but shall immediately provide notice of such 
determination to the legislature, and it shall obtain approval from 
each house of the legislature in accordance with the terms of 
subsection (i) above within 14 days of providing such notice, failing 
which the executive shall cease any such use of armed force. 
(iii) The approval of any use of force by the legislature in accordance 
with subsections (i) and (ii) above shall also constitute a decision to 
use force, subject to the requirements of Section 1 above. 
3. (i) Any person may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to 
obtain a declaration, injunctive relief, or damages, or any other 
remedy that the Court may consider just and appropriate in the 
circumstances, for any violation of this Article. 
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(ii) Any person who has made application under subsection 3(i) 
above shall have standing so long as the issue raised is a serious 
issue to be tried, the person has a genuine interest in the issue, even 
if only as a representative of the general public, and there would be 
no other reasonable or effective means for the issue to be brought 
before the Court. 
Again, a number of the elements of these two sections require 
further explanation, namely, (i) the terms of the requirement for 
legislative approval of the use of armed force; (ii) the trigger for 
the provision, being the same de minimis level that was 
provided for in the first section of the Model; (iii) the emergency 
exception and ex post approval requirement; (iv) the fact that 
the approval of the legislature is a “decision to use force,” thus 
triggering the application of the requirements of Section 1 of the 
same Article; (v) the provision of specific jurisdiction for judicial 
review, and the remedies provided for; and (vi) the creation of 
broad standing for applications for judicial review.  
The first element, legislative approval for the use of 
armed force, is obviously an explicit move away from a 
“declaration of war,” and it does not even require that the 
approval be in the form of a law. But it does require “approval,” 
expressed through a formal vote. This is in contrast to the 
“consultation” that is contemplated by the draft legislation 
proposed in the War Powers Commission Report.356 As 
discussed earlier, legislatures may have natural tendencies to 
avoid making difficult decisions in these kinds of situations, 
but that is precisely why the Model should require the 
executive to work to obtain the legislature’s approval. At the 
same time, while in some jurisdictions such approval requires 
supermajorities of some form, a simple majority of votes cast 
should be sufficient for the purposes of a general model, albeit 
in both houses if the system consists of a bicameral 
  
 356 Under that proposed scheme, there is no affirmative requirement for the 
executive to do anything more than consult, and there is no requirement that Congress 
actually vote on the issue. Rather, Congress must on its own initiative vote in 
disapproval of any proposed or undertaken action by the President if it does not agree 
with the policy on which it is being “consulted.” This reverses the onus contemplated by 
Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution and significantly reduces the probability 
that Congress would act as any check on the executive. While the Commission states 
that it was making an effort to remain entirely agnostic on the long-standing 
constitutional debate, its recommended legislation by default reverses the onus in a 
manner that entirely undercuts the “congressional power” argument. This effectively 
endorses the “executive power” side of the debate. BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 
168, at 43-48. On the problems of mobilizing support of Congress, see the voting of 
Congress on the Kosovo war, supra note 310 and accompanying text.  
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legislature.357 The requirement to obtain a majority vote in each 
house should be sufficient to engage the deliberative and 
representational features of the parliamentary process in a 
manner that will have an impact on the operation of the 
domestic causes of war. 
The second element is the employment of the same 
trigger or threshold level of force as was used in the first section 
of the Article. The reasons for employing this particular concept 
as the threshold has already been discussed at some length in 
the explanation of Section 1 so will not be repeated here. It is 
perhaps helpful to emphasize yet again, however, how important 
it is to use a concept that has real meaning in international law 
for the purposes of triggering the involvement of the legislature 
in the decision to use armed force.358 Even if a provision 
providing for the separation of powers with respect to the use of 
force does not have as one of its objectives an increased 
compliance with international law, the principles of jus ad 
bellum would naturally serve as a good proxy for the kinds of 
armed force that are likely to both escalate conflict and attract 
international censure. The trigger employed in this Model is 
taken directly from international law, based on precisely the 
kind of action that is most likely to lead to wider armed conflict, 
which are exactly the types of action that should be subject to 
legislative deliberation and oversight. Moreover, it still provides 
the executive with significant scope for limited use of force that 
falls below that threshold. 
The third element is the emergency carve out. As 
mentioned earlier, this too is not a novel concept, and various 
forms of such an emergency exception with ex post approval 
requirements can be found in a number of constitutions, 
though more frequently with respect to the power to declare 
emergencies and thus trigger emergency powers domestically. 
An early example of such a mechanism can be seen in the 
  
 357 E.g., CONST. (1935), art. VI, sec. 23, para. 1 (Phil.) (requiring a two-thirds 
majority in each house to approve a declaration of war). Article 115a of the German 
Basic Law requires a two-thirds majority of votes, and votes cast by at least a majority 
of the Bundestag, to determine that the territory of Germany is under attack or 
immediately threatened with such an attack, and to thereby declare a state of defense. 
GERMAN BASIC LAW, supra note 187, art. 115a. 
 358 It is striking that the draft legislation proposed in the War Commissions 
Report not only uses a concept that has little meaning in international law, but also 
explicitly excludes several uses of force that could, in many foreseeable circumstances, 
constitute violations of the principles of the jus ad bellum regime. See BAKER & 
CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 43-48. 
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Constitution of France of 1791.359 A variation on this form of 
emergency carve-out is also the cause of much of the 
controversy regarding the structure and operation of the U.S. 
War Powers Act of 1973. Upon closer inspection, however, the 
War Powers Act provisions in question are not so much an 
emergency carve out as the grant of a carte blanche for up to 
ninety days, followed by an effective legislative veto of further 
action if Congress does not move to approve the operation.360 
That is very different from what is contemplated by the Model. 
Many of the criticisms of the War Powers Act may be 
quite valid, but they ought not to be extended to constitutional 
provisions that require the executive to obtain legislative 
approval, and which include an automatic termination 
mechanism in the event that approval is not obtained within a 
specified period following an emergency use of force. Precisely 
because the provision is constitutional rather than statutory, the 
legislature would be less able to shirk its obligations to take up 
the issue when approval is sought by the executive. And 
requiring the executive to overcome the difficulty of mobilizing 
support within the legislature is a key element of the Model. 
That it is difficult and costly is not a basis for criticism, but one 
of the virtues of the structure. If the executive cannot galvanize 
the legislature to approve the use of force by a simple majority, 
particularly where the use of force has already been undertaken 
in what are alleged to be urgent circumstances, then that by 
itself ought to raise significant questions about both the 
necessity and legitimacy of the use of force in question. 
The fourth element of this subsection of the article 
specifies that any approval to use force enacted by the 
legislature constitutes a “decision to use force” as contemplated 
by the provisions of section 1 of the article, thus being subject 
to the requirements of that section. This means that the 
legislature too, in deliberating on the question of whether or 
not to approve the use of force, must sufficiently and 
demonstrably consider whether the use of force in question is 
in compliance with the relevant prevailing principles of 
international law. This is key to the combined operation of the 
distinct elements of the Model, as it is the mechanism through 
which the Model effectively causes the deliberative functions of 
  
 359 1791 CONST., ch. III, sec. 2 (Fr.).  
 360 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543(a)(1), 1544(a)-(b) (2006). For criticism of the operation of 
these provisions, see BAKER & CHRISTOPHER, supra note 168, at 21-25; ELY, supra note 
169, at 115-31.  
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the legislature to engage the issues of international law 
compliance, and which causes the criteria of legitimacy under 
international law to be integrated into the deliberative process 
of the legislature. It is only by requiring both branches of 
government to grapple with the question of compliance with 
international law that the Model can ensure that this 
perspective will be brought to bear in a meaningful and serious 
fashion in the decision-making process, and that over time the 
international law norms will be internalized and subsequently 
exercise influence, in the manner contemplated by 
transnational process theory and the ideational strand of the 
liberal theories of international law compliance.  
The next element is the first subsection of the judicial 
review provision of the Model. It establishes specific jurisdiction 
for judicial review of the decision-making process. This aspect of 
the separation of powers component of the Model is likely to be 
the most controversial. As already discussed, there are many 
who argue that the courts should have little involvement in 
matters of national security policy generally, and particularly 
with respect to broader strategic questions relating to the use of 
force. We have already reviewed at some length the theoretical 
justification for it,361 so here the discussion will be focused on the 
specifics of the structure of the provision.  
First, we must address why a specific section on judicial 
review would be required at all, once the substantive aspects of 
the Model are adopted into any given constitution. For it might 
be supposed that once made part of the constitution, these 
provisions would be enforceable through judicial review in the 
normal course. The reason is quite simply to make it more 
difficult for the courts to evade their responsibility by avoiding 
the issue. The courts in some jurisdictions have shown 
themselves to be reluctant to engage in review of issues 
relating to national security policy, in some cases employing 
perceived ambiguity as to jurisdiction as the grounds for 
denying claims.362 This reluctance might be unfounded, and I 
have argued above that such judicial reluctance is neither as 
great as some would suggest, nor as likely when the lines of 
authority and the precise constitutional limits in issue are 
clear.363 But there have been examples of courts avoiding their 
  
 361 See supra Part IV.C. 
 362  See, e.g., the Sunakawa case, supra note 316; Campbell v. Clinton, 203 
F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 363 See supra Part IV. 
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responsibility, and indeed the more extreme versions of the 
political question doctrine constitute an attempt to deny the 
jurisdiction of courts on most issues having any bearing on 
foreign relations.364 The creation of specific jurisdiction, like the 
creation of clear provisions, will help ensure that courts do not 
abdicate their authority or avoid their responsibility to provide 
oversight of the decision-making process.  
The second aspect of the first subsection of the judicial 
review provision relates to the kinds of remedies that ought to 
be available. The provision is broad in this sense, and many 
will no doubt take particular issue with the idea of courts being 
given the authority to grant injunctions in respect of decisions 
to use force. The idea that a court could enjoin the executive 
from deploying military force, when the executive has made a 
determination that the use of force is necessary for national 
security reasons, smacks of the judiciary being given the 
authority to second-guess the government on the soundness of 
its judgments relating to national defense. But that is simply 
not the case under the provision being proposed here. As 
discussed above, the issues before the court would be whether 
the executive obtained legislative approval as required, and 
whether the decision makers in both branches sufficiently and 
demonstrably considered the principles of international law. It 
is well established that courts have jurisdiction to consider 
whether a branch of the government has exceeded its 
constitutional powers, and to issue injunctions to prevent the 
execution of a policy that the government has no constitutional 
authority to undertake.365  
While the availability of the injunctive remedy is 
important, the reality is that courts may be very reluctant to issue 
an injunction for the obvious reason that in circumstances in 
which the stakes were that high (and depending on the 
institutional power of the courts in whichever country we might 
be talking about), there could be a real fear that the injunction 
might be ignored, with a resulting constitutional crisis or at least 
a serious weakening of the judiciary.366 Thus the subsection also 
  
 364  See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962); Choper, supra note 
311, at 1497-99; Henkin, Political Question, supra note 317, at 610-12 (critiquing such 
interpretations). 
 365 Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990) (claim ultimately 
failing for reasons of ripeness). 
 366 As discussed in Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 341, this 
is one of the arguments made to explain the posture of the Supreme Court of Japan in 
Article 9 litigation. 
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provides for declaratory relief and other remedies that the court 
might find more appropriate in the circumstances. And it should 
not be thought that these lesser remedies are insignificant.  
Declarations can have a considerable impact in national 
security cases. For instance, the Nagoya High Court in Japan 
handed down a judgment in 2008 on the constitutionality of 
Japan’s deployment of air forces to support coalition forces in 
Iraq.367 While the court dismissed the application for an injunction 
on standing grounds, it nonetheless opined that the deployment of 
troops to Iraq was a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution, the 
provision that provides for the prohibition on the use of force. 
That judgment, which was not even a formal declaration, but 
merely an opinion incidental to the dismissal of the claim, 
nonetheless had a significant impact in Japan, and arguably 
played a role in the formulation of national policy in the 
immediate aftermath.368 And of course, this is entirely consistent 
with the theoretical explanation of judicial review outlined above 
in Part IV. That is, the issuing of declarations such as this are 
examples of the courts functioning to monitor government 
conduct and provide information to the population on the 
legitimacy and propriety of the government’s exercise of power, 
potentially shaping public opinion on the issues in the process. 
The second subsection of the judicial review element of 
the Model is the explicit provision of broad standing to 
commence an application. The reasons for this are likely rather 
obvious. From the United States to Japan, courts have used 
standing as a mechanism to avoid being dragged into the 
minefield of adjudicating controversial public policy issues. And 
even when lower courts have not been reluctant to engage the 
issues, they have nonetheless been bound by narrow standing 
rules established by higher courts. The Japanese courts, for 
instance, have developed a doctrine on standing that has 
  
 367  Kōtō Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Apr. 17, 2008, Heisei 19 (Ne) no. 58, 
http://www.haheisashidome.jp/hanketsu_kouso (Japan) (unpublished decision). 
 368 Id. The remaining Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Iraq were withdrawn 
by the government ahead of schedule. ASDF’s Iraq Mission to End by December, JAPAN 
TIMES (July 30, 2008), http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20080730a2.html; Japan’s 
Iraq Aid Mission Officially Ends, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 16, 2009), http://search. 
japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20090216a2.html; see also Martin, Binding Dogs of War, 
supra note 127, at 352-54; Kobayashi Takeshi, Jieitai iraku hakken—iken Nagoya 
kōsai hanketsu no igi [Unconstitutionality of the Iraq Deployment: The Significance of 
the Nagoya High Court Judgment], 80 HŌJI JIHŌ 8, 1 (July 2008). Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of Canada recently issued a declaration on the government’s complicity 
in the violation of the human rights of a Canadian detainee being held in Guantanamo 
Bay, which created considerable pressure on the government to act. See Canada (Prime 
Minister) v. Khadr, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
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rendered the war-renouncing provision of the Constitution 
effectively unenforceable, as virtually no one outside of the 
military could ever demonstrate the narrow and direct legal 
interest in the issues sufficient to ground a claim.369 Similarly, 
the courts of the United States have dismissed many of the war 
powers lawsuits on the basis of standing, the conditions for 
which have been construed very narrowly by the courts.370  
Without getting into the intricacies of standing doctrine 
in any one country, one of the key problems common to many 
jurisdictions is that standing for constitutional litigation often 
requires some direct legal interest in the issues, flowing from 
some personal harm, such as would arise from being the direct 
victim of a violation by the state of a constitutionally protected 
right. Because a use of force provision such as that 
contemplated here does not create any individual rights, these 
requirements will typically render the provision unenforceable 
by the courts. The government decision will be insulated from 
judicial review, which seriously undermines the normative 
effectiveness of the provision. 
By way of contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
formulated a test for determining when courts may grant 
standing in constitutional cases in which there is a broader 
public interest that will be advanced by the claim, but the 
claimant lacks a direct and substantive legal interest in the 
issue, or has not suffered an exceptional prejudice. According to 
the test, the courts will grant standing so long as the applicant 
can demonstrate that (i) the issue is a serious one; (ii) the 
applicant has a genuine interest in the issue; and (iii) there is 
no other reasonable and effective manner for the issue to come 
before the court.371 The term “genuine interest” here is defined 
broadly, not requiring a direct legal interest, but rather 
including an interest that may be shared by the public at large. 
The genuine interest in cases likely to be advanced 
under the proposed Model would be similarly shared by the 
public at large, in that the policy being undertaken would not 
only be allegedly in violation of the constitution, but would 
indeed embroil the country in armed conflict—something in 
  
 369 See Martin, Binding Dogs of War, supra note 127, at 338-39. 
 370 E.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), though courts have 
also held that members of Congress have standing to commence an application. E.g., 
Dellums, 752 F. Supp. 1141. 
 371 Thorson v. Attorney Gen., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 (Can.); Nova Scotia Bd. of 
Censors v. McNeil, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 (Can.); see also PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF CANADA 776-80 (5th ed. 2007). 
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which the entire nation surely has an interest. It is the third 
element of this Canadian test, therefore, that is the key, for it 
permits the court to grant standing even when the genuine 
interest is no more specific than a shared public interest in the 
enforcement of a fundamental constitutional provision—the 
consideration that there is likely no one else who would have a 
more narrow and direct legal interest in the issues who could 
commence the claim.372 It will often be the case that only 
members of the armed forces would have the kind of direct 
legal interest that would meet many typical standing 
requirements, and it is unreasonable to look to members of the 
armed forces to bring constitutional claims against their 
commander in chief.  
In closing the discussion on this aspect of standing, it 
should be noted that this broadening of standing is entirely 
consistent with the theoretical justification for judicial review 
outlined above in Part IV. If we agree that the courts serve an 
important function in monitoring government conduct and 
providing information to the public on the legitimacy of the 
government’s exercise of power, we should want a broad 
standing doctrine. The fact that there is no one person who has 
a narrow legal interest in the issue is irrelevant to the role of 
the judiciary as a check on the improper or excessive exercise of 
power by one of the political branches. 
Finally, I have described the judicial review here as 
being “limited.” It might be thought, given the breadth of both 
the remedies available and the basis for standing, that this 
provision for judicial review is anything but limited. But it is in 
fact limited by the nature of the rest of the Model. All that the 
courts are being given jurisdiction to review here is whether 
the legislature has approved the use of force as required by the 
provision, and whether the decision makers in both the 
legislature and the executive have sufficiently and 
demonstrably considered whether the contemplated action is 
consistent with the prevailing principles of international law. It 
  
 372 As Chief Justice Laskin wrote for the majority in one of the cases 
establishing this test,  
The substantive issue raised by the plaintiff’s action is a justiciable one; and, 
prima facie, it would be strange and, indeed, alarming, if there was no way in 
which a question of alleged excess of legislative power, a matter traditionally 
within the scope of the judicial process, could be made the subject of 
adjudication. 
Thorson, [1975] 1 S.C.R. at 145. 
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does not require, nor does it provide jurisdiction for, the courts 
to engage in any inquiry into whether the decision arrived at is 
actually consistent with international law, or whether it is a 
sound judgment, or whether it is in the national interest. It is 
simply a question of whether the mandated process was 
followed such that the authorized branches of government 
made and approved the decision, and that it was made on the 
proper basis. It is in this respect that the judicial review is 
limited, and indeed is limited to the types of questions that are 
entirely within the competence and constitutional authority of 
courts to decide. 
The objection may be made that it is a small step for 
courts to take, in their examination of whether the decision 
makers have sufficiently considered the principles of 
international law, to engage in impermissible substantive 
review of the decision itself. In other words, a court could find 
that the substance of the government’s decision was so patently 
inconsistent with the principles of international law that no 
reasonable person could conclude that the government had 
sufficiently considered those principles in reaching its decision. 
Thus under the cover of process, the courts will be engaging in 
substantive review. And it is conceded that such a “patently 
unreasonable” test could indeed evolve. At least one of the Law 
Lords in the House of Lords has suggested that such a test 
could apply in cases involving the exercise of the Royal 
Prerogative in respect of national security issues.373  
On the one hand, this would still give the government a 
very large margin of appreciation, and it could be argued that 
it would be a positive development to have a judicial check on 
decisions that are so blatantly in violation of principles of 
international law that it could not satisfy such a test. But it is 
in any event unlikely. The better argument is that under the 
language of the provision it would be open for the government, 
in circumstances where it was clearly acting in a manner 
inconsistent with the principles of jus ad bellum, to argue that 
it had indeed sufficiently considered the principles, but that in 
the circumstances, and all other things having been considered, 
it had nonetheless decided that it was in the national interest 
to proceed with the proposed policy. Under the language of the 
Model, which only requires adequate consideration of the 
  
 373 Council of Civil Serv. Unions & Others v. Ministers of Civil Serv., [1985] 
A.C. 374, 401-02 (H.L.) (Lord Fraser of Tullybelton); id. at 405-06 (Lord Scarman). 
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principles of international law rather than compliance with 
them, a court would not be able to interfere with that 
determination. In this way, the Model would actually create 
incentives for the government to be more open and forthright 
about its position.  
The final objection might be that the courts will have to 
decide the threshold issue relating to whether the impugned 
policy rose above the de minimis level of force so as to trigger 
the operation of the provision. A court would have to ask 
whether the contemplated action was of such a scale, duration, 
and intensity so as to constitute an armed attack under 
international law. This, it may be argued, is a question that is 
beyond the competence of domestic courts to decide, and 
involves a test that is too vague to be justiciable. This is the 
stuff of the political question doctrine, which has already been 
discussed.374 But the concept of “armed attack” has meaning in 
international law, and is not so vague that the ICJ has been 
unable to work with it. Nor is the concept any more vague than 
other constitutional concepts that courts have developed 
standards to interpret and enforce, as Judge Tatel eloquently 
argued in Campbell v. Clinton: 
To begin with, I do not agree that courts lack judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for “determining the existence of a 
‘war.’” . . . Whether the military activity in Yugoslavia amounted to 
“war” within the meaning of the Declare War Clause, U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 11, is no more standardless than any other question 
regarding the constitutionality of government action. Precisely what 
police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment guarantee “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures?” When does government action 
amount to “an establishment of religion” prohibited by the First 
Amendment? When is an election district so bizarrely shaped as to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of “equal protection of 
the laws?” Because such constitutional terms are not self-defining, 
standards for answering these questions have evolved, as legal 
standards always do, through years of judicial decisionmaking. 
Courts have proven no less capable of developing standards to 
resolve war powers challenges.375 
Finally, the courts of all common law countries, even those of 
the United States, as illustrated most recently in the line of 
Supreme Court decisions on detainee rights,376 have shown 
  
 374 See supra notes 314-24 and accompanying text. 
 375 Campbell, 203 F.3d at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring). 
 376 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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themselves willing and able to interpret and apply concepts 
drawn from the principles of international law.  
In closing this discussion of the operation of the entire 
article, it should be emphasized that each of the elements of 
the Model will operate in combination in ways that will provide 
cumulative benefits and mutually reinforcing effects greater 
than the sum of the individual benefits of the three sections of 
the provision. The first element of the Model is the 
incorporation of the principles of jus ad bellum for the purposes 
of enhancing compliance with the international law regime. 
But that provision is vastly strengthened by virtue of the 
operation of the separation of powers elements of the Model. 
For while the first section of the Model alone would operate to 
require the executive to consider the international law 
principles, if such consideration were conducted in a secret 
process among a small number of individuals, the prospect for 
it being paid only lip-service while being entirely glossed over 
would be much higher. The public debate likely to accompany 
any legislative consideration of the issues, and the obligation 
that two separate political branches independently consider the 
issue of international legality—resulting in publication of 
widely different perspectives and interpretations of the issues 
from varying ideological approaches—would make for a much 
more meaningful satisfaction of the requirement.377 In the short 
run, with respect to any particular situation, this combined 
operation would make it much more likely that compliance 
with the governing international law principles would be a 
serious factor in the decision-making process. In the long run, 
however, it would also contribute to the process of 
internalization and reinterpretation of those international law 
norms, in the manner that transnational process theory and 
ideational strands of liberal theories of international law 
suggest is so important in enhancing compliance with any 
given international legal regime. 
Similarly, the Model is further strengthened by making 
the decision-making process subject to limited judicial review, 
because this element maximizes the extent to which the 
domestic constitutional enforcement mechanisms are employed 
to assist in the implementation of the international law 
principles. Moreover, yet again, to the extent that the judiciary 
becomes involved in interpreting these principles in the course of 
  
 377 See supra note 272. 
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judicial review, the Model would provide for the increasing 
institutional internalization of those norms. The very prospect 
that the judiciary might be called upon to review whether the 
legislative and executive decision makers considered in good 
faith the extent to which the proposed use of force complied with 
the prevailing international law norms would serve to increase 
the likelihood that the decision-making process would be 
conducted in a conscientious and genuine manner. And turning 
full circle, such enforcement, or even potential for enforcement, 
of international law principles by the central and highly 
respected institutions of the state, only serves to increase the 
legitimacy of those principles, which in turn enhances their 
overall effectiveness at the international level. 
CONCLUSION 
The prevention of armed conflict is central to modern 
international law, and reducing the prevalence of war one of 
the enduring philosophical problems with which man has 
grappled. The causes of war are understood to operate at three 
levels—that of the individual, the state, and the international 
system. It follows that we need mechanisms that are capable of 
addressing causes within all three levels. In legal terms, that 
requires legal constraints at both the domestic and the 
international level. Yet in the twentieth century, we have left 
the legal constraint of armed conflict entirely to a positivist 
international legal system, one with thin theoretical and 
philosophical foundations, and without any of the domestic 
implementation that is necessary to improve compliance with 
international law regimes.  
The proposed Model would be a significant step towards 
the development of more robust and multi-dimensional legal 
constraints on the use of armed force, thereby reducing the 
prevalence of war. The domestic implementation of the 
international law principles on the use of force would be 
consistent with the ever increasing penetration of international 
law into domestic legal systems, and the use of domestic law 
mechanisms to enforce and enhance compliance with the 
international law regimes. This incorporation of international 
law principles would not only operate to ameliorate the 
permissiveness of the international system, the primary cause 
of war at the international level, but it would also engage 
significant domestic causes of war as well. The move is 
consistent with and supported by international law compliance 
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theory and constitutional law theory, operating to realize both 
international law and constitutional law objectives. 
The requirement for legislative approval of government 
decisions to use armed force would amplify and strengthen the 
operation of the first provision. Such legislative involvement 
would also enhance democratic accountability and bring to bear 
the deliberative and oversight functions of the legislature on 
the decision-making process, making it both more transparent 
and subject to diverse perspectives and arguments. It would 
more fully realize the structure originally thought to make 
republics less likely to wage war, and would engage the 
domestic causes of war in important ways. Subjecting the 
entire process to a limited form of judicial review would place a 
further check on the system, helping to ensure that the 
decision-making process was conducted as required, and 
genuinely based on the mandated considerations. Together, the 
separation of powers elements of the Model would operate to 
resolve aspects of the Kantian dilemma, reducing the tendency 
of democracies to engage in armed conflict with illiberal states, 
while strengthening the features of democracies that help 
explain the democratic peace. This would not only be a benefit 
to the international society more generally, but it would 
fundamentally benefit the states that adopt the Model, not only 
by increasing democratic accountability and strengthening the 
rule of law, but ultimately by protecting them from 
involvement in illegitimate and unwise military adventures.  
At first glance the proposal might seem both somewhat 
radical and rather utopian in nature. But in considering more 
closely both the theoretical foundations of the Model and the 
manner in which it would be expected to operate, the moves 
contemplated are not so extreme as might first appear. Each of 
the elements is entirely consistent with current established 
theory. What is more, it may be entirely timely, and responsive 
to concerns that are growing in a number of countries. With 
debates in Japan over the possible amendment of the war 
renouncing provision in its Constitution, draft legislation and 
formal reports in Britain and Australia on revising 
parliament’s role in decision making on the use of force, new 
proposals in the United States for amending the War Powers 
Act, to name only a few examples, the time is surely ripe for 
serious consideration of these issues. There may be theoretical 
difficulties still to overcome and problems of implementation to 
resolve, and indeed it is not suggested that the Model is the 
optimal arrangement. It is a proposal intended to advance the 
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debate and contribute to the consideration of these issues. For 
in the spirit of Madison’s exhortation with which I began this 
article, war continues to be such cause of horror in the world 
that everything should be tried in the effort to reduce the 
prevalence of armed conflict. 
